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Two Models of Consensus 
Sudarsan Padmanabhan 
ABSTRACT 
 
My dissertation titled “Two Models of Consensus” is based on five arguments. 1. 
Consensus is asymmetrical. 2. Consensus is partial or limited unanimity. 3. Consensus and 
democracy do have a concomitant relation. 4. Consensus is not organic to political systems. 5. 
Consensus depends upon civil society, subsidiarity, and the dominant cultural paradigm of 
society. 
 In the first chapter titled “Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of Civil 
Society” I argue that concept of civil society evolved under certain conditions in a liberal 
democratic tradition such as shared social imaginaries. As an example of how diversity could lead 
to hypostatization of cultural differences, I exposit the concept of Indian caste system.  
In the second chapter, “Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural Identities,” I 
compare the ideas of Hans Georg Gadamer and George Herbert Mead about self- interested 
action and mutual cooperative action. Gadamer and Mead emphasize intersubjective 
communication, ‘I – Thou’ relationships. I explain the importance of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship 
for a consensual activity.  
The third chapter, “Consensus in the Realm of Science,” discusses the impact of science 
as the context of justification in advanced liberal democracies and its effect on consensus. Charles 
 iv
Sanders Peirce’s attempt to apply his scientific method to arrive at a consensus in the social 
sphere is also discussed in this chapter. 
In the fourth chapter, “Kwasi Wiredu – The Akan Conception of Communitarian 
Consensus,” I discuss Kwasi Wiredu’s emphasis on achieving a consensus on the basis of ‘what 
is’ and not ‘what ought to be,’ in the social realm. Wiredu differentiates between a government by 
consent and a government by consensus. I elaborate Wiredu’s analysis of the process of 
consensus that was in vogue in the Akan community of Ghana. 
In the final chapter, “Political Consensus – Intra-cultural and Extra-cultural,” I argue that 
consensus is asymmetrical. It is imperative to compromise in social, political, economic, and 
religious beliefs on the basis of weak deontological and weak consequential approaches. 
Consensus necessitates a synthesis of different kinds of social actions such as purposive-
instrumental, traditional, value-laden, and communicative action into what I call the Cooperative 
Action. Only such an action can speak across cultures and facilitate genuine cross-cultural 
interaction. 
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Introduction 
 
My dissertation titled “Two Models of Consensus” explores how seemingly 
unproblematic process of consensus becomes very complex and vexatious. The term 
‘Two Models” represent the general sociological and anthropological distinction between 
societies and communities, culture and nature, and open and closed societies that is used 
to conceptually differentiate modern Western societies from non-Western traditional 
communities.1 Consensus in a pejorative sense means agreement or compromise. 
Etymologically, consensus is related to consent, which means to agree.  
 
 I was troubled by why an agreement even in simple matters remains elusive. I 
realized that the entire process of consensus or agreement is informed by a fore-structure, 
fore-understanding, and fore-judgment. Doctrines and dogmas are intertwined in the 
process of a discourse aimed at achieving consensus. Hence, there is no plateau of 
knowledge from which cultural paradigms could be theorized. What we have is a rough 
terrain full of cliffs and valleys. My interest in the problem of consensus began as an 
aesthetic question. Habermas claims that a genuine consensus is not possible in the 
aesthetic realm because of its emphasis on subjective expressions. Only an evaluation in
                                                 
1 Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society, Trans. Charles P. Loomis, New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 
pp. 5-29. Tönnies characterizes communities (gemeinschaft) organic and society (gesellschaft) mechanical. 
Both Tönnies and Max Weber argued that communities inexorably became societies due to social 
rationalization. According to Tönnies, science plays an important role in the transformation of a community 
into a society.  
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the form of aesthetic criticism is possible, according to Habermas. My argument is that 
since every cultural paradigm including religion, language, and science is influenced by 
the social and political, aesthetics cannot be relegated to the realm of the subjective 
because of its perceived absence of objectivity. Aesthetic objects are not ahistorical. It is 
understandable that a consensus could be difficult to achieve in the aesthetic realm 
because of individual tastes, but even normative and descriptive issues are problematic. 
In order to understand the factors that support or vitiate consensual activity, I explore the 
structural conditions of a process of consensus. The process of consensus has to be 
normative and hermeneutical. Therefore, I surmised that consensus has to be both 
diachronous and synchronous. 
 
 Consensus on any issue involves socio-political, interpersonal, and cultural 
aspects. I choose to examine the process of consensus from three aspects. They are: 
 
1) Civil society (Social conditions) 
2) Interpersonal relationship within a society (I – Thou relationship) 
3) Contemporary cultural paradigm (Science) 
 
 All the three afore-mentioned aspects are interconnected. In my research on the process 
of consensus, I found that most social and political theorists have started from a ground 
zero and then constructed a theory. In this sense, I call the theories of consensus of Rawls 
or Habermas, symmetrical theories of consensus. Their theories search for conditions of 
uniformity of opinions and do not deal with divergence of opinions. I decided to analyze 
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consensus not as a total agreement but a tentative agreement of divergent views. 
Consensus is about an agreement on how to make things better. The process of consensus 
involves both good and bad ramifications. In a consensual process, tactics, strategy, 
honesty, threat, and conciliatory gestures are all involved. Hence, it is not only moral but 
also strategic. I argue that consensus is asymmetrical. It is not only a discourse on what is 
the right path but an agreement to act cooperatively in spite of disagreements. Hence, I 
call consensus “co-operative action.” My conclusion is that even a definition of 
consensus must be consensual and flexible. I discuss the process of cooperative action in 
the fifth chapter. 
 
 In this dissertation I also compare and contrast the predominant Western models 
of consensus such as Habermas’ ideal speech situation and John Rawls’ hypothesis of the 
original position with the political system of the Akan society in Ghana, which 
traditionally had a system of government by consensus. The Akan political system 
emphasizes consensus in resolving all disputes. Habermas’ concept of an ideal speech 
situation contains the following features.2  
 
1. Clarity in the structure of communication 
2. Description in formal terms and show of force within the process of 
understanding or from outside 
3. Only the force of better argument is allowed 
4. All motives except the cooperative search for the truth are to be banished. 
                                                 
2 Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984. p. 10. 
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John Rawls defines the original position as follows: “It is a state of affairs in which the 
parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by 
arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces. Thus, justice as fairness is 
able to use the idea of pure procedural justice from the beginning.”3 Since the afore-
mentioned approaches emphasize ideal conditions that are necessary for a process of 
consensus, I call them symmetrical approaches to consensus. I have argued in the course 
of my dissertation that a need for consensus in the political or social realm necessarily 
indicates unrest or instability of social situations. Hence, a theory of consensus based on a 
theory of ideal situations fails to recognize the dynamic nature of the dialogical process 
necessary when there is strife between two social groups or paradigms. I have constructed 
my arguments on the basis of five assumptions, which are as follows. 
 
1. Consensus is asymmetrical. It has no ideal starting or culminating state. 
2. Consensus is partial or limited unanimity. 
3. Consensus and democracy are not concomitantly related. For example, some 
African societies have a strong participatory political system, which emphasizes 
consensus as the only method of resolving disputes. I have discussed the role of 
consensus in the communitarian democracy of the Akan society in Ghana.  
4. Consensus depends upon civil society, interpersonal relationships, and the 
dominant cultural paradigm of a society. 
5. Consensus is not necessarily organic to cultures or political systems. It is 
deliberative and accommodates cultural differences. Hence, a consensus is 
                                                 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999. p. 104 
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possible only as a fusion of horizons, exchange of viewpoints. Consensus is the 
recognition of cultural interstices and it is a cultural middle-path.  
 
 In the first chapter titled, “Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of 
Civil Society and its Problems,” I analyze the development of civil society in liberal 
democracies. Civil society is characterized by freedom of association. In this chapter, I 
discuss the role of individuals, social and political institutions, and modern social 
imaginary discussed by Charles Taylor and how consensus evolves in civil society.  What 
Taylor calls direct-access society, horizontal relationships, unmediated interaction, and 
secular polity are explained in sufficient detail. Taylor mentions Habermas’ idea of the 
transformation of the public sphere as an important aspect of the modern social 
imaginary. I discuss Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which facilitates mutual 
understanding. I also analyze in detail, the development of civil society from ancient 
Greek civilization to the modern period. This chapter also contains a brief description of 
the Akan society and the caste system in India. I also introduce concepts of solidarity and 
subsidiarity in order to explain the complementary relation between the individual and 
the social. The notion of subsidiarity is a catholic notion that says, “… nothing should be 
done by a larger and more complex organization which can be done as well by a smaller 
and simpler organization.”4 The aim of the principle of subsidiarity is to encourage social 
relationships and mediating institutions.5 I argue that democracy does not necessarily 
encourage consensus while communitarianism is not necessarily authoritarian.   
                                                 
4 David Bosnich, “The Principle of Subsidiarity,” Religion and Liberty, Volume 6, Number 4, Grand 
Rapids: Lord Acton Institute, July and August 1996. 
5 P. W. Hogg, “Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers in Canada” (1993) 3 National Journal of 
Constitutional Law 341. ‘Subsidiarity’ is a jurisdictional principle regarding the distribution of 
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Kwasi Wiredu’s analysis of the Akan system of governance through a process of 
consensus is a very good example of how non-Western cultures have institutionalized 
cooperative concept of governance. The best example of equilibrium between solidarity 
and subsidiarity is the Akan political system. Solidarity is the common identity of a 
group. Subsidiarity is the mutual relationship between the individuals in a society. As a 
contrast, I have also examined how social stratification has been rationalized in India as a 
response to divergent social, linguistic, religious and ethnic population. Indian social 
structure displays a lack of subsidiarity. Consensus becomes redundant when there is 
social solidarity but not subsidiarity. But even a notion of solidarity is questionable with 
respect to India.  
 
 In the second chapter titled “Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural 
Identities,” I further expand on the importance of the notion of subsidiarity, I analyze two 
conceptions of intersubjective relationships. One is Hans Georg Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical approach and the other is George Herbert Mead’s social behaviorism. The 
former emphasizes the independence of the ‘other’ from the ‘I’ and the latter attempts to 
define the ‘other’ in its relation to the ‘I.’ I have argued that the relationship between 
individuals in a society is an important factor in political, social, and cultural debates. 
                                                                                                                                                 
competence between federal and sub-federal levels of government. The leading statement of this 
principle is Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Official Journal C 340), 
which states that "In areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community". Although the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is not found in 
the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, several commentators have been attracted to the principle 
because it appears to provide a principled and rational basis for allocating jurisdiction between the 
provincial and federal governments. It recognizes both the importance of provincial autonomy and 
the functional superiority, in certain circumstances, of federal jurisdiction. 
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The ‘I – Thou’ relationship in a society is an indicator of the balance between solidarity 
and subsidiarity. A climate of mutual cooperation is possible only if there is an equitable 
‘I – Thou’ relationship between the members of a society. There are several underlying 
factors underlying a strong ‘I – Thou’ relationship among the members of a society. 
Religion, ethnicity, language, culture, and nationality could influence the ‘I – Thou’ 
relationship. Both Gadamer and Mead distinguish between interest based interaction and 
mutual cooperative action. Gadamer characterizes communication as the fusion of 
horizons, a confluence of cultural perspectives. I argue in favor of the need to treat 
communicative interaction as the fusion of horizons rather than stimulus-response 
activity. Consensual activity becomes more flexible if a conversation of cultural horizons 
is encouraged. Gadamer’s emphasis on non-strategic communication encourages 
multicultural interaction.6 
 
 In the third chapter titled “Consensus in the Realm of Science,” I argue that 
essential characteristic of scientific disciplines is the emphasis on the theory-laden nature 
of an idea. I will supplement Peirce’s analysis of consensus in science with Stephen 
Turner’s distinction between a scientific consensus and consensus among scientists. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah asserts that science is the context of justification in 
contemporary Western society. With science as the dominant cultural paradigm, 
consensus is heavily influenced by scientific practices. What C.S. Peirce defines as the 
experimental method or the scientific method demands a shift in paradigm since a 
knowledge episode contains tenacity, authority, and a priori methods of belief. Peirce 
                                                 
6 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 355-361. 
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attempts to apply the same methodology applied by the natural sciences to arrive at 
epistemic consensus in scientific disciplines to the moral and social realm.  
 
In advanced liberal democracies, the government and the people alike appeal to 
scientific evidence in order to establish truth. People generally share a belief in science 
and in the veracity of its method. Hence, scientific methodology has become the most 
dependable tool even in non-scientific disciplines. Demonstrability of empirical evidence 
and the cultivated emphasis on reciprocity and justifiability due to the proliferation of 
freedom and equality has complicated the process of education and the fixation of belief. 
A doctrinal approach such as the ones adopted by religion or pseudo-scientific disciplines 
is inadmissible in the age of science and democracy. Vast variations in individual 
standards of understanding, the tension between various dogmatic positions in the civil 
society, and the progressive movement of science are always in a state of constant flux. 
Hence, consensus is influenced by the dominant cultural paradigm of science.  
 
In the fourth chapter, “Kwasi Wiredu – The Akan Conception of Communitarian 
Consensus,” I explain how a pragmatic and operational system of consensual governance 
based on personhood and human rights was followed by the Akan society of Ghana. A 
government by consent and a government by consensus were fused together by 
representative and deliberative mode of governance. I argue that such a system of 
governance was possible because of the communitarianism and the shared culture of the 
Akan community. Ironically, Habermas’ ideal speech situation could be more plausible in 
societies such as the Akans in Ghana, which are communitarian in nature. The Akan 
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community insists on a consensus based on a conception of common good of the 
community. A decision is arrived at in the Akan council only if all concerned agree 
unanimously to a course of action. Hence, the community of Akans mandates consensus. 
Kwasi Wiredu’s emphasis on a non-party democracy and his views on the process of 
achieving a consensus in the Akan community are also discussed.  
 
 In the fifth chapter titled “Political Consensus – Intra-cultural and Extra-
Cultural,” I argue that cross-cultural interactions are hampered by a lack of agreement 
due to intra-cultural and extra-cultural variations in the social, individual, and cultural 
realms. Hence, only a tentative understanding of alien cultures is possible. A consensus 
cognizant of differences rather than uniformity is necessary in a multi-polar and multi-
cultural world. A failure to recognize the asymmetrical nature of the global village would 
result in cultural conflicts within and without the society. It is here that subsidiarity as the 
notion that engages differences at the micro-level rather than the macro-level becomes 
invaluable. There is no seamless transition between the social, the individual, and the 
institutional. A consensus that emerges from cultural interstices is anti-essentialist and 
anti-metaphysical. It also, in some sense, disputes the emancipatory effect of the process 
of deliberation within a society. The term ‘cultural interstices’ indicates an opposition to 
rigid social and conceptual categorizations. Homi Bhabha defines his philosophy of 
culture as a philosophy of cultural interstices. Normal characterizations such as center – 
periphery, north – south, society – community, and majority – minority relations are 
ineffectual as concrete social categories. Instead of homogeneity and uniformity, a 
philosophy of cultural interstices advocates an analysis of cultures in terms of their 
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differences. A consensus in a global and multi-cultural world is plausible only as 
informed by a philosophy of cultural interstices.  
 
 A philosophy of difference is a philosophy of ever-expanding possibilities. A 
concrete example of a consensual approach based on cultural interstices could be 
borrowed from a completely different topic. Stephen Turner’s description of a ‘third 
way,’ which is the middle-path between market economy and welfare state, is a robust 
case of cultural interstices.7 Globalization is creating problems in terms of cross-cultural 
interaction in the fields of economics, science, health, political systems, religious beliefs, 
and terrorism. Hence, in order to achieve consensus conjoining deontology and 
consequentialism is inevitable. I suggest a concept of cooperative action that coordinates 
action orientations not on the basis of rationality but on a shared conception of good. 
Such a conception of a good can evolve in the process of consensus. 
 
 Ultimately, the aim of a consensus is peaceful resolution of problems. In such a 
situation, a consensus need not be a rational agreement but a non-violent disagreement 
that enables cessation of hostilities. More often than not, consensus is inherently 
asymmetric because one side always sacrifices more than other on account of social, 
economic, and political inequalities. The need for consensus indicates the existence of 
disagreements because of the asymmetric nature of the lifeworld. Irrespective of whether 
a consensus is sought to resolve violent or non-violent confrontations, the force of better 
argument does not bring about a consensus but only the will to concede ground on the 
part of interlocutors. That is the function of consensus as a cooperative action. My 
                                                 
7 Stephen Turner, “The Third Way,” Society, Volume 42, Number 2, January/February 2005.  
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conclusion is that Western cultures emphasize legal remedies of disputes and not 
consensus. The Akans emphasize consensus and hence attempt to find a solution within 
their community. In the caste-based Indian society, religion, morality, lifeworld, art, 
culture, law, and economics were fragmented by social stratification. Contemporary 
Indian society is constructing new social imaginaries by redefining the relation between 
solidarity and subsidiarity in civil society. In a rapidly changing world, a cooperative 
action emphasizing the redefinition of both individual and social imaginaries through a 
conversation of cultures is inescapable. 
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Chapter 1 
Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of Civil Society and its Inherent 
Problems 
 The concept of civil society is an important part of the modern Western socio-
political tradition. But the idea of civil society has been transformed over the course of 
history. In the modern period, the emphasis of civil society was on individual liberty in 
the Lockean tradition, while in the Rousseauean tradition the emphasis was on 
citizenship. A conception of civil society was antithetical to feudalism and represented 
freedom of expression, free economy, and participatory democracy, to name a few. Civil 
society belongs to the realm of non-governmental association of people. The history of 
civil society begins with Plato and Aristotle in Greece. Later, Romans and Christian 
thinkers such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Francisco Suarez emphasized different 
aspects of civil society. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were the progenitors 
of the contemporary notion of civil society. Alexis de Tocqueville, who traveled in 
America in the nineteenth century, identified the concept of voluntary associations as the 
most distinguishing aspect of the American civil society.1 According to Howard Wiarda, 
civil society signifies civic consciousness which functions as an effective institution of 
checks and balances on the government. Wiarda says, “Civil society thus meant the 
possibility of participatory citizens living together in a condition of protected property 
rights providing for economic prosperity and political freedom guaranteed by regular, 
constitutional procedures and the rule of law.”2  
 
                                                 
1 Howard J. Wiarda, Civil Society – The American Model and the Third World Development, Cambridge: 
Westview Press, 2003. pp. 13-19. 
2 Ibid., p. 18. 
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 In this chapter, I have analyzed the following: 1) Solidarity and subsidiarity – 
defining features of a civil society; 2) Development of civil society in ancient Greece and 
India; 3) Archaic and modern aspects of civil society; and 4) The impact of the modern 
social imaginary. I have also given a short introduction to the Akan communitarian 
democracy and the Indian caste system. I argue that civil society has ameliorated social, 
religious, and political schisms in the West. But, genuine consensus is elusive in the West 
on account of the emphasis on law for adjudication of disputes and the irreconcilability of 
individual interests with common interests. In contrast, African communitarian traditions 
emphasized the role of consensus in order to arrive at decisions in a non-adversarial 
manner. I have discussed the Akan communitarian system elaborately in the fourth 
chapter. 
 
  A civil society has two facets, namely, the individual and the collective. For a 
society to function effectively there is a need for both arms of the society, the individual 
and the collective, to have a balanced relationship. But a distinction between the 
individual and the collective is not one of binary opposition to each other. Rather, a 
society achieves equilibrium on account of flexible and mutually enriching nature of the 
relationship between its members and the social apparatus that governs their everyday 
practices. Everyday practices are encapsulated in the habits, manners, customs, religion, 
and other shared practices in a society. But the most important aspect of a society is the 
role of the collective in the unfettered and unencumbered development of the individual. 
While the individual is not pitted in an antagonistic relationship with the social whole, 
factors such as freedom, security, and opportunities for the optimal development of an 
all-round personality in an individual depend upon the structure of a society to a large 
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extent.  
 
While equality of opportunities is dependent upon the equality of individuals as 
members of a society, all ancient societies did not practice equality of social status with 
guaranteed rights and autonomy. Autonomy and rights for all people are recent 
developments after the advent of liberal democracy in the West. In any society, factors 
such as economy, justice, social rules and regulations, standard of living, facilities such 
as housing, sanitation and water, health, occupations, and creative expressions in the form 
of art, sculpture, painting, and music were viewed as demonstrative of the advancement 
and progress of the society under consideration.  
 
 In both ancient as well as modern societies, artistic expressions and even religion 
and philosophy were considered to be the bastion of the literati and the cognoscenti. By 
dispossessing the masses of their access to intellectual achievements the higher echelons 
of the society could reign over the masses with untrammeled freedom. When a society is 
sapped of its creative energy and aspirations, it ceases to prosper and becomes vegetative. 
In most of the troubled areas in the world, the main reason for social unrest is not the lack 
of existence of a civil society, but the destruction of the social structure by religious 
extremism, political turmoil, ethnic violence or foreign intervention. This is demonstrable 
with an analysis of the nature of violence perpetrated on the populace in developed and 
developing countries. In the developed countries, the nature of violence and crimes are 
more often than not individual. In a developing country, the nature of violence is mostly 
of the character of group versus group, caste, religious, and ethnic. In some ways, the 
notion of community or collective is stronger than the individual.  
 15
 
The tension between the individual (I) and the collective (Thou) is present in all 
societies. In democracies, avenues for ventilating the tension between the individual and 
the collective are available in the form of political and social institutions. In advanced 
liberal societies, existence of a common justice system serves as an effective avenue for 
ventilating the tension between the individual and the collective. In a closely-knit 
community, there are institutions that adjudicate disputes. But, legal institutions in 
ancient Islamic civilizations, China, or India were different from the modern day 
institutions in the liberal Western countries and hence comparisons between the Western 
and traditional cultures are not tenable. Even if comparisons are inevitable, thinkers such 
as Habermas claim that a dialogical process of argumentation is peculiar to the Western 
hemisphere because of the emphasis on rationality from the modern epoch. Habermas 
argues that traditional cultures are monological and a dialogical rational argumentation is 
possible only in socially rationalized Western countries. Hence, according to Habermas, a 
rationally motivated consensus in a debate is possible only in the modern societies that 
have democratic institutions, freedom of speech, communicative rationality, and secular 
ideals.3 In contrast to the Habermasian position of symmetrical nature of consensus, it 
can be shown how traditional cultures had a methodology of achieving consensus even in 
asymmetric situations. An example of symmetrical nature of consensus is Habermas’ 
“ideal speech situation”. According to Habermas,4  
This concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based 
ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus – 
bringing force of the argumentative speech, in which different participants 
overcome their merely subjective views and owing to the mutuality of rationally 
                                                 
3 Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon 
Press, pp. 46, 284. 
4 Ibid., p. 10. 
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motivated conviction, assure themselves of both unity of the objective world and 
the intersubjectivity in their lifeworld. 
 
 
 In Ghana, the Akan society debated all decisions and arrived at a consensus not by 
the force of majority but by hearing arguments from all sides. Only when all participants 
were convinced of the veracity of the consensus, the debate ended. Hence, even 
traditional societies had a very amicable system of conflict resolution.5 The aim of the 
Ghanaian political system is not only a consensual decision making but also encourage 
the participation of people in the deliberative process, which is the strength of the modern 
day democracies. But, Ghana was forcibly turned into a Western style democracy, after 
its independence from Britain, and its traditional social structure was neglected, which 
resulted in a crippling economic, social, and political situation. On the other hand, the 
process of consensus arrived in the Akan society is based on a strong cultural bond 
existing within a group sharing a common framework of understanding.  
 
 Charles Taylor argues that the modern social imaginaries that characterize 
Western democracies and the social imaginaries that characterize other cultures are 
different, which brings forth the issue of cultural particulars and universals. Cornelius 
Castoriadis formulated the concept of social imaginaries. According to Castoriadis, “Each 
society is a construction, a constitution, a creation of a world, of its own world.”6 George 
Elliott writes that the concept of social imaginary has a Freudian ring in Castoriadis. A 
                                                 
5 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. 
6 Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Imaginary: Creation in the Social-Historical Domain,” in World In 
Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and theImagination, Trans. David Ames Curtis. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997, pp. 3–18. Cited from Anthony Elliott, “The Social Imaginary: A 
Critical Assessment of Castoriadis’ Psychonanalytic Social Theory,” American Imago 59.2, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002. pp. 141-170. 
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social imaginary is the world of creation effected by a subject for itself.7 Hence, it is 
imperative to distinguish cultural universals and cultural particulars. In short, Kwasi 
Wiredu emphasizes the difference between custom and morality. Customs are particular 
to a culture whereas morality has universal connotations. 
 
 
Solidarity and Subsidiarity – Defining Features of a Civil Society 
George McLean defines two most important aspects of social interaction between the 
society as a whole and its individual members. They are: solidarity and subsidiarity. 
Solidarity is defined as the communication or interaction between social groupings and 
communities in a society. Subsidiarity is defined as the participation of the groups and 
communities in the social activities. The notion of subsidiarity is a catholic notion that 
says, “… nothing should be done by a larger and more complex organization which can 
be done as well by a smaller and simpler organization.”8 The aim of the principle of 
subsidiarity is to encourage social relationships and mediating institutions.9 The solidarity 
could be construed as a feeling of togetherness or a sense of belonging together found in 
a society. Subsidiarity is the operational element that tests the solidarity of a society as it 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 143. 
8 David Bosnich, “The Principle of Subsidiarity,” Religion and Liberty, Volume 6, Number 4, Grand 
Rapids: Lord Acton Institute, July and August 1996. 
9 P. W. Hogg, “Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers in Canada” (1993) 3 National Journal of 
Constitutional Law 341. ‘Subsidiarity’ is a jurisdictional principle regarding the distribution of 
competence between federal and sub-federal levels of government. The leading statement of this 
principle is Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Official Journal C 340), 
which states that "In areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community". Although the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is 
not found in the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, several commentators have been attracted to 
the principle because it appears to provide a principled and rational basis for allocating 
jurisdiction between the provincial and federal governments. It recognizes both the importance 
of provincial autonomy and the functional superiority, in certain circumstances, of federal 
jurisdiction. 
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involves the participation of the people living in that society.10 For example, in ancient 
Indian social organization, social groupings were mobile and hence formation of 
identities, namely, ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic was not static. Also, migration 
in large numbers from one place to another happened when the situation became hostile 
for a group of population. For a society to have a concrete framework of administration 
and government, it must become sedentary and urban.11  
 
When a society settles down, efforts are made to streamline its infrastructure such 
as roads, buildings, lakes, health, agriculture, education, government and trade that would 
benefit the whole population. In this regard, a society is a voluntary association of its 
members to improve their standard and culture of living. Even nomadic communities had 
rules and regulations concerning the conduct of the group in marriages, sharing wealth, 
family, occupation, social habits and other customs. For example, early Vedic 
communities of India had a standardized system of procedures and rules required for a 
common law.12 Even anterior to the Vedic Aryans, urbanization was at its zenith during 
the Indus Valley civilization.13 Indus Valley civilization appears to have been effectively 
administered.  
 
Unlike modern social imaginaries that emphasized absolutely secularized ethics of 
argumentation which itself had a very strong influence of religious tradition, 
                                                 
10 George F. McLean, p. 15. 
11 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. II, Ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1978. pp. 1213-1226.  
12 Romila Thapar, p. 119. 
13 Mortimer Wheeler explains the characteristics of a civilization vis-a-vis a settlement or a community. 
According to this criterion, only the Egyptian, Sumerian and the Indus Valley cultures could be 
classified as civilizations in spite of several settlements in the forms of towns, cities and villages found 
in several places all around the world. 
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contemporary societies need a discursive framework that incorporates hermeneutical 
understanding of different cultures and traditions.  In Western democracies, political 
relation between subsidiarity and solidarity defines the social imaginary. In most liberal 
societies, subsidiarity and solidarity are interconnected.14 Even in traditional societies, the 
city-dwellers had a better understanding of the notion of subsidiarity when compared to 
their rural brethren. Problems arising out of rapid urbanization even in less populated and 
abundantly rich countries such as the United States could be catastrophic to the social, 
political, and economic aspects that are integral to the maintenance of social equilibrium. 
As Taylor observes, in rural societies, groups coordinated their activities with each other 
in the spirit of mutual cooperation while social status was not always based on mutually 
equal relationships.15 One of the most salient features in the social imaginaries envisioned 
by the modernity is the secularized transcendental principle of the equality of human 
beings. 
 
 
Development of Civil Society in Ancient Greece and India 
 
The origins of civil society in the West can be traced to ancient Greek polis. Plato 
envisioned a corporate system of governance that culminated in the Utopian ideal of a 
Republic, in which the philosopher-king was at the helm of Athens. Plato’s pyramidal 
structure of social stratification was based on a classification of physical, mental, and 
spiritual capabilities of the people of Athens. The philosopher-king was the most 
meritorious candidate who has been trained in several disciplines and who had outshone 
all others. Such a system actively encourages social stratification in which the lower 
                                                 
14 George F. McLean, p. 57. 
15 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, p. 15. 
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classes such as artisans only had a theoretical chance to graduate to the next rung of the 
social ladder.16 The chances of an artisan or a handicraftsman ascending the throne of 
Athens as a philosopher-king are remote in Plato’s Republic. Thus, Plato’s Republic is 
elitist. While Aristotle’s polis did not defy the prevalent social stratification in Greece, it 
suggested a more ecumenical form of governance that included a broad spectrum of 
population called community. Even in Aristotle’s conception of polis, women, and slaves 
were not liberated. Ironically, Plato had an elaborate training regimen for women since he 
envisioned a functional role for women in the society. Plato’s characterization of women 
appears to be strong, independent and dynamic because their role is oriented towards the 
welfare of the Republic.  
 
Plato claims that men are physically stronger than women. Romantic relationship 
between men and women is discouraged in Plato’s Republic. Even procreation is for the 
purpose of strengthening the Republic. The relationship between men and women is 
devoid of traditional male-domination because even conjugal relationship is for a higher 
cause. Hence, women have more equitable status under the auspices of the Republic. But 
a philosopher-king could rarely be a woman because Plato did not consider men and 
women equal in terms of natural abilities thereby adhering to the social hierarchy. While 
Plato’s Republic is designed to eliminate factors that contribute to disorder in the state by 
a system of governance that respects knowledge, Aristotle’s politics is regulated by the 
ethics of the polis. A polis is administered as per the wishes of its citizens. Aristotle did 
not consider women and slaves part of the citizenry. But the role of an individual citizen 
                                                 
16 Interestingly, Plato’s Republic does provide opportunities to the qualified candidates. In contemporary 
rentier societies, privileges are converted into rights, even though considerations of social justice 
necessitate affirmative action, compensation, pensions, and other employee benefits. Refer to Stephen 
Turner’s article “The Third Way” in SOCIETY, January/February 2005. 
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is very clearly delineated by Aristotle in his ethics. According to Aristotle, positive 
qualities such as responsibility, friendship, non-acquisitiveness and duty if nurtured in its 
citizens would strengthen the polis. A strong and cordial intersubjective relationship 
amongst the citizens of a polis cements its stability. But, it is very clear that the welfare 
of the citizens is always subservient to the stability of the polis. Thus, eudaimonia, as the 
concept of good life, is always in the context of the polis towards which its citizens have 
a duty.17  
 
While the city-states of Greece were strong cultural entities, India was the land of 
immigrants. Pastoral and agrarian cultures were in constant tension, which necessitated 
continuous redefinition of cultural identities. After the demise of the Indus Valley culture, 
the Aryans who were pastoral inhabited the Indian subcontinent. Re-urbanization of 
Northwestern India was at its pinnacle after the period of the Upanishads.18 Urbanization 
is the result of the development of subsidiarity, the spirit of participation of the members 
of a society. A city administration requires the participation of its people in an orderly 
fashion in its political and development. There was a paradigm shift in the social 
organization of the post-Upanishadic India, which was already beginning to move away 
from a society of hunter-gatherers and pastoralists towards a full-fledged agrarian 
population. After several stages of social development, urbanization was achieved.  
 
 While ideas of individual enterprise, moral values, a good life, a happy family, 
                                                 
17 Richard McKeon, Ed. Introduction to Aristotle, New York: Modern Library Edition, 1947. Refer to 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. George F. McLean, Ed. Civil Society and Social Reconstruction, 
Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series I, Volume 16, Washingto D.C: Council for 
Research in Values & Philosophy, 2001. p. 15. 
18 Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 
Publishers, 1987 p. 17. 
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work ethic, and religious activities were all part of the Indian social fabric, the role of the 
collective was dominant and the individual had freedom within limits as prescribed by 
the collective. Indian society was stratified into four classes from the time of the Rig 
Veda. The famous Purus ̣asukta (the hymn to the Purus ̣a) clearly delineates the class 
distinctions that existed during the Vedic times.19 Social distinctions were common to 
almost all contemporary ancient civilizations such as the Egyptian civilization and 
Mesopotamian civilization. In the Western hemisphere, the Greeks and the Romans also 
had social stratification in the form of class structure. But the factor that distinguishes 
other civilizations from the Indian civilization is the entrance of the caste system into the 
class structure. With the advent of the caste system, the application of concepts such as 
solidarity and subsidiarity assumes an entirely different connotation. In India, solidarity 
and subsidiarity were based on the imperceptible law of karma, which explains social 
status on the basis of past deeds. A concrete social imaginary is a more recent 
phenomenon in India. Religion had a minimal bonding effect while the caste-system 
effectively divided the Indian society into windowless pockets of social space. 
 
While society can be theoretically mapped as a whole and its parts, in practice, a 
society cannot exist as a collective without its parts, the individual members or vice 
versa. The subtle distinction between the society as a whole and its members lies in the 
perspective of the members as individuals and their function as a part of the collective. 
When a society fails to produce conditions conducive to a good life, then such a society 
will witness dissensions and schism between its individual members and the collective 
                                                 
19 Wendy Doniger, The Rig Veda, New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1994. Wendy Doniger discusses 
important portions of the Rig Veda such as various kinds of sacrifices, Gods such as Indra, Agni, Soma, 
Vishnu, Śiva, Surya and Varuna, issues such as death, marriage, women, spells and incantations. 
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community that oversees the everyday functions of the society. When mutual cooperation 
between members of the society and the general social order breaks down, the society is 
thrown into turmoil. The absence of a cultural social imaginary in the form of a nation-
state, religion, language, or culture in India and the daunting task of governing a diverse 
culture resulted in the hypostatization of cultural differences.  
 
In India, in order to preserve the social order, solidarity was emphasized to the 
detriment of subsidiarity. Even though novel attempts, as those found in The Bhagawad 
Gita, to instill a sense of purpose and belonging to those who were disempowered in the 
form of non-attached action (niśkāma karma), order (dharma), action (karma), devotion 
(bhakti) and knowledge (jñāna) were philosophically appealing, these concepts could not 
be put into practice due to asymmetric social relationships.20 Even religions such as 
Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, and Islam tried in their own ways to redress caste 
stratification in India. But, all Indian religions could only suggest a spiritual escape to the 
social problems. The Gita proposed an indirect way of reconciling social stratification 
and individual freedom by the concept of non-attached action that could lead any person 
belonging to any caste to achieve liberation. 
 
 In almost all societies that were either contemporaneous or anterior to the Greek 
society, social stratification was based on perceived natural qualities. African societies 
did not practice social stratification. Plato stipulates four virtues required of the citizens 
of the republic. They are: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. The afore-
mentioned qualities are imperative for being the citizens of a successful state. Plato also 
                                                 
20 The Bhagawad Gita, Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 2000. 
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describes three qualities that In India, social stratification was justified on the basis of 
gunas (qualities). Three qualities equivalent to appetite, courage (spirit) and reason 
(wisdom), respectively, tamas, rajas, and sattva combine in different ratios to constitute 
the human species.21 Interestingly, the concept of gunas, which sought to adduce natural 
justification for the class distinctions in India, was developed over a course of several 
centuries. From a classless society, gradually the Indian society was divided into four 
classes, namely, the brahman (priest), kshatriya (warrior), vaisya (business), and śudra 
(labor).22 From a society of hunter-gatherers and clans, the institution of kingship evolved 
with increasing urbanization.23 Weber’s account of cities as centers of political 
administration could be applied to the development of the cities in the Indian context as 
well. The development of a class-system aided administration and the specialization of 
occupations led to the institutionalization of kingship. Thus, from a diffuse and 
consensual decision-making social structure in the form of clans, Indian civil society 
came under the control of kingship and its supporting institutions.  
 
Simultaneously, a hitherto non-class society also began to stratify itself on the 
basis of endogamous and exogamous rules of kinship, social status based on vocation, 
access to religious rituals, and political clout. But in the context of India, what Socrates 
euphemistically called a noble lie, the gunas or qualities, was ennobled in the scriptures 
                                                 
21 M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994. pp. 271-272. Also 
refer to The Republic of Plato, Trans. F.M. Cornford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. pp. 
119-120. 
22 Wendy Doniger, p. 29. 
23 Romila Thapar, Early India, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2002. Romila Thapar gives a very detailed 
account of the process of urbanization in ancient India that finally culminated in the development of the 
institution of kingship.  
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and became rigidified.24 The gunas became constitutive in determining behavioral and 
hereditary qualities of the individuals but only in the context of a society classified on the 
basis of vocational status. Because of relentless migrations and intra-social stratification, 
class distinctions were gradually replaced by more minute caste distinctions. The caste 
distinctions were based on birth and hence any chance of upward mobility in the social 
hierarchy was impossible. Interestingly, religious ideologues realized the problems 
inherent in reconciling the concepts of svadharma (individual duty), kuladharma (family 
duty) on the one hand, and apadharma (duty under extraordinary circumstances) 
sādhāran  dharma (everyday duty). 
  
The tension between the individual and the social duty is one of the main aspects 
discussed in The Bhagawad Gīta. The term dharma contains the social aspect, which is 
in turn linked to the cosmic order (rta). Thus, the concept of dharma is akin to a 
conception of duty of the citizens of a polis. According to the concept of dharma, 
individual duty is always attuned to family and social obligations. Interestingly, in a 
class-based society, different modes of dharma were based on various occupations 
whereas in the caste-based society one’s birth determines one’s individual, family, and 
social dharma. The ineluctable causal relationship divined by the votaries of the caste 
system absolutely arrested upward mobility in the caste hierarchy by connecting birth, 
social status, and past deeds. It was only by fulfilling duties pertaining to one’s caste that 
                                                 
24 In chapter 13 of Plato’s Republic, he claims that a soul has three parts. According to the predominance of 
the three qualities or parts, namely, spirit, appetite, or wisdom a person acts. In chapter 10, Plato invents 
a myth that is known as the allegory of the metals. According to this myth, God created people mixing 
three metals, namely, gold, silver, iron,and brass representing the rulers, auxillaries, farmers, and 
craftsmen respectively. The rulers were supposed to propagate this myth in order to earn the allegiance 
of the people for the proposed state. F.M. Cornford calls this “a single bold flight of invention’ whereas 
other translators call this myth a “noble lie”.  
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a person could graduate to the next caste in the hierarchy which could ensure rebirth in 
higher classes for attaining liberation from the birth-death cycle.  
 
One could argue that while the higher classes were living and enjoying the 
present, the lower classes were wallowing in the fruits of their past while yearning for a 
better future all the while ruing the present. Throughout human history the higher classes 
have subjugated the lower classes by denying and depriving their hope for a better future. 
Very seldom has there been an uprising in the history of mankind that has been unaided 
by disgruntled elite classes even in revolutions inspired by popular movements. As 
Charles Taylor observes, people seem to be paralyzed with fear without a leader.25  
 
One of the reasons why the Indian society did not witness revolutions in the scale 
of the French or the American Revolution is the lack of one identifiable singular cultural 
objective and mind-boggling diversity of cultures. The political, economic, and religious 
power in the Indian society was distributed among the three forward classes, namely, the 
priestly, warrior and mercantile classes. Apart from the fourth class, the śudras, there was 
a fifth class (panchama) or pariah (drummer). Furthermore, because of the in-group/out-
group, ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural differences, the interstices of the society 
were filled with intra-caste distinctions. No attempts were made to unify the society 
based on a common goal. Instead, individual, family, and social goals were meshed with 
the caste and class obligations, which prevented any mobilization of the masses. Even the 
                                                 
25 Charles Taylor, p. 188. Taylor’s observation also underscores the tension between liberal and republican 
ideas of liberty in the contemporary discourse. While liberal conception of liberty emphasizes non-
interference from centers of authority including the government, the republican conception of liberty 
emphasizes non-domination. 
 27
elites who authored the codes of conduct, interpreted scriptures, and taught statecraft to 
the rulers could only provide the masses with a vague and abstract concept of liberation 
(moksha) that is actually expressed vividly by the Buddhist conception of nirvāṇa, which 
is the total destruction of the birth and death cycle.  
 
In the absence of a unitary social imaginary, Indian society was not able to either 
produce huge empires such as the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East or the Greek, the 
Roman, the British or the French Empires in the West. The same reason could be 
attributed to the lack of concerted and unified effort to fight the British when they ruled 
India for almost two hundred years. The vertically stratified Indian civil society helped 
the British unseat the top layer of the society and conquer India without much bloodshed. 
The lower classes, which were alienated from the higher classes, did not feel any 
structural difference in political governance or moral compunction when power changed 
hands from the Indian kings to the British Viceroys because the social structure was left 
unmolested. In somewhat similar manner, present day democracies fail to inspire the 
populace even during elections unless some revolutionary events such as war, 
assassination, terrorism or economic depression happen.  
 
In the Indian society, myriad distinctions among the castes made it difficult for 
the people to fight for their rights as well as social change. The rumblings due to 
discontent were usually passed on to the vertical and horizontal social structures that are 
immediately above or below one’s caste. For example, a group of people belonging to a 
lower caste if they feel disempowered and disgruntled usually fights with the immediate 
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sub-caste above or below themselves. Ironically, each caste has its own chosen nemesis 
and seldom do members of different castes join together in a clash between two castes.  
 
 
The Modern Aspects of Civil Society 
The concept of civil society is considered to be one of the finest achievements of Western 
social and political theory in terms of social organization. Civil society is considered to 
be the consummation of a politics of discussion that empowers democratic system of 
governance. The history of civil society has traversed a long and torturous path 
culminating in advanced liberal democracy in which the State and the society are 
separated. The Western conception of civil society is situated on certain cultural, 
religious, economic, and political contexts. Civil society has acquired the connotation of 
a religious dogma as the panacea for all the ills of the world. Principles such as 
democracy, freedom, rights, law, and free market are considered to be irrevocable for a 
harmonious existence. Civil society, which is a cardinal feature of democracy, 
emphasizes freedom from authoritarian institutions such as religion.  
 
 One of the cornerstones of religious dogmatism was the community of believers 
and the Enlightenment attacked the very conception of a religious community by 
encouraging individuation. Civil society is ineluctably intertwined with democracy and 
market economy in which freedoms of action, speech and expression are guaranteed. 
While democracy facilitates individual freedom and social cooperation, civil society is 
the non-political manifestation of democracy. But, many vexatious issues such as 
religious tensions, ethnic strife, abject poverty, majority-minority differences and ethical 
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questions that characterize the public sphere are not considered to be a part of the 
political-legal spectrum, by thinkers such as John Rawls.  
 
John Rawls' in his “Justice as Fairness – Political not Metaphysical” defines 
issues such as justice, equality, and liberty as conceptions that could be approached 
procedurally. But Rawls expressly affirms that his notion of justice as fairness must be 
considered only in the context of liberal democracy.26 This salient claim of Rawls has 
been neglected by most advocates of civil society who have treated the conditions 
required for a liberal democratic society as the end-result of a democracy.27 Democracy 
requires stable economy, representative government, peaceful society, and a justice 
system that adjudicates disputes. Scholars such as Rawls and Habermas have attempted 
to rationalize democracy by adducing ideal conditions such as the original position and a 
veil of ignorance in the case of Rawls and ideal speech situation in the case of Habermas. 
In many ways, social and political theories of Habermas and Rawls are democratizations 
of the Kantian categorical imperative. The categorical imperative has two aspects. The 
first aspect emphasizes the duty of a moral agent to act not out of self-interest but 
common interest. In many ways, it is a restatement of the Golden Rule, which exhorts 
people to act towards others in a way they themselves would like others to act towards 
them.28 The second aspect of Kant’s categorical imperative emphasizes the autonomy and 
                                                 
26John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical”, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1971, p. 398. From John Rawls: Collected Papers, Ed. Samuel Freeman, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999. 
27 Stephen Turner, “The Third Way,” Society, Volume 42, Number 2, January/February 2005. p. 11. 
28 The Golden Rule states: "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye 
even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets" (Matthew 7:12). In reality, all religions and 
cultures of the world have the conception of the Golden Rule.  
Kant's first formulation of the CI states that you are to “act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” “We should never act in such a 
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human value of individuals. Kant asserts that every human being must be treated as an 
end and not as a means. In a democracy, the Kantian concept of duty has to be rational, 
redeemable, justifiable, and discursive. The Kantian conception of categorical imperative 
facilitates a conception of procedural democracy. But a procedural democracy could be 
deliberative. The categorical imperative is the summum bonum of practical reason, for 
Kant.  
 
When questions are raised about the justification of the categorical imperative, 
questions of happiness and good life arise. But, for Kant, categorical imperative is far 
removed from the expectations of happiness. The categorical imperative is universal and 
hence beyond the confines of individual happiness. Only a rational and moral person can 
act according to the principles of Kant’s categorical imperative. Kant’s moral philosophy 
has tremendously influenced the modern social imaginary.  
 
Civil society and democracy are procedural categories that cannot be uprooted 
from their contexts and transported to other cultures. All cultures have the potential to 
cultivate democracy but the fertile conditions have to emanate organically in order to 
sustain it. Even if governments in countries such as the United States and Britain sow the 
seeds of democracy accompanied by a civil society in an attempt to rationalize non-
democratic regimes all over the world, the connection between democracy, freedom, 
prosperity, and justice cannot be replicated without a precipitous process of forcible 
democratization of the lifeworld of those cultures. Hegel's brilliant expression “the owl of 
                                                                                                                                                 
way that we treat Humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in 
itself. Johnson, Robert, "Kant's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 
2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/kant-
moral/>. 
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Minerva flies at the dusk” explains the progression of reason towards the Absolute Idea 
and the process of sublation.29 The problem facing Western cultures is that of simulating 
the flight of the Owl of Minerva on those cultures in which the dusk has not been reached 
yet or long forgotten.  
 
 
Habermas’ Communicative Reason and its Problems 
Habermas' emphasis on communicative reason necessarily assumes linguistic and 
communicative competencies on the part of the interlocutors who debate in a speaker-
hearer situation. For Habermas, social rationalization cannot be reduced to purposive-
instrumental activity. Hence, communicative reason presides over a normatively 
regulated discourse, which invokes the illocutionary force of an argument in an 
atmosphere of free and un-coerced interaction. This is in essence the ideal speech 
situation.30 The underlying assumptions of a theory of communicative action suggest a 
specialized discourse that, even though conducted in an everyday language, is not 
accessible to common people. Moreover, by overzealously guarding communicative 
discourse against all forms of defects, Habermas limits its scope. Habermas considers the 
open society (modern Western rational society) as dialogical in nature and the closed 
(archaic societies) as monological. Habermas argues that an archaic understanding of the 
lifeworld was seamless and undifferentiated while the modern understanding is objective 
                                                 
29 Garbis Kortian, Metacritique: The Philosophical Argument of Jürgen Habermas, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980. p. 13. "When philosophy paints its gray on gray, then has a form of life 
grown old, and with gray on gray it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known; the Owl of Minerva first takes 
flight with twilight closing in." G. W. F. Hegel, "Preface," Philosophy of Right 
 
30 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, p. 25. 
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and critical.31 In Heidegger's terminology, a distantiation between the subject and the 
environment is not found in the archaic understanding.  
 
Robin Horton argues that archaic or traditional societies do not have a distinction 
similar to the public – private sphere distinction, between a person, a group, and an 
environment. Horton calls a lack of critical-rational framework as the absence of inner-
theoretic critique. According to Habermas, archaic societies do not possess critical-
rational understanding. But the modern worldview is constructed upon critical rational  
distinction and universalizing validity claims which are in turn discursively justifiable. 
While Habermasian communicative theoretic bolsters the Enlightenment rationality it 
humanizes the purposive-rational component by positing a communicative rationality. 
The emancipatory intent that Habermas assumes is, however, as irrational as the archaic 
understanding that he examines. A deliberative democracy is an abstraction from the 
existing democratic societies. Democracy did not evolve out of a disinterested search for 
a true form of government. Hobbes emphasizes the presence of self-interest in the 
formation of a state and Locke's political philosophy emphasizes the value of individual 
rights and property. Furthermore, Locke even justifies the exploitation of foreign lands if 
they lay unutilized. Thus, the emancipatory intent envisioned by Habermas does not stand 
scrutiny in a democracy.32  
 
Ancient Greek society with its polis had a conception of a utopia or eudaimonia 
but such a conception is not possible in a liberal democracy. Democracy is a result of 
                                                 
31 David Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. pp. 
22-26. 
32 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1964. 
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social rationalization, not in terms of emancipation, but economic and political freedom. 
Economic and political freedom for the individuals is antithetical to a conception of 
emancipation akin to religious concepts of liberation. There is no salvation but only 
progress and betterment. Habermasian attempts at social rationalization leads us to some 
unpalatable conclusions. Habermas' process of argumentation is applicable only in a 
highly specialized discursive environment and his communicative discourse is 
symmetric. But Habermas does not adequately address issues pertaining to an asymmetric 
discourse in which participants belong to all sections of the society.  
 
The process of disengagement with other cultures because of the difference in the 
conceptual apparatus has real life consequences. The most catastrophic examples in 
recent history are the World Trade Center and Pentagon terror acts and the Iraq War. The 
failure to understand, hermeneutically, cultural conflicts and their potential social and 
political manifestations have resulted in the clash of cultures.33 Ironically, Western 
societies are considered to be civilized and non-Western world less socially rationalized. 
Such a conclusion is inescapable not only because of the historicity of understanding but 
also due to an attitude of possessive individualism cultivated in advanced capitalistic 
societies.34 By making the enemy the other or vice versa, once again the West is mired in 
the religious binary-oppositional framework of good and evil.  
 
For a good life, which Habermas aims to facilitate in his Communication and 
Evolution of Society (1979), linguistic and communicative competencies serve only at 
                                                 
33 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1996. 
34 C.B. MacPherson,  
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the level of meta-theoretical and meta-practical discourse. Communicative action is 
required to formalize and universalize opinions. But, an interpretation of social, political, 
and scientific discourse does not stop at the level of communicatively competent actors 
but filters down to actors at different levels of linguistic and communicative 
competencies. Hence, there is a need for addressing social and political issues at different 
levels simultaneously. A communicative action, at once, needs to appeal to actors with 
strategic (oriented to success), norm-forming, and dramaturgical (expressive) intentions. 
In this sense, I argue that there is a need for a broader conception of social action than 
communicative action that coordinates strategic, norm-forming, and dramaturgical 
actions. Hence, I would call such an action, a co-operative action. A co-operative action 
does not aim at outright conversion of viewpoints but accommodation, rational 
persuasion, and non-violent problem solving.35  
 
Charles Taylor’s analysis of the modern social imaginaries of the Western 
hemisphere deals with societies that have less religious strife and less rigid social 
stratification than countries such as India or Nigeria which are culturally diverse. Taylor 
also forewarns that any attempt to replicate the Western experience in a non-organic 
manner elsewhere could produce catastrophic results. While Taylor accepts the existence 
of several social imaginaries even within the Western hemisphere, differences between 
them could be termed as variations in cultural particulars rather than universals. 
 
                                                 
35 Wiiliam M. Evan, Ed. War & Peace in an Age of Terrorism – A Reader, Boston: Pearson, 2006. pp. 
259-265. Refer to Gene Sharp’s article “The Politics of Nonviolent Action.” 
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Impact of the Modern Social Imaginary 
There is a need for de-centered understanding of civil society in terms of procedures that 
supply the contours of what Taylor calls modern social imaginaries. Modern social 
imaginaries are those imagined structures of social beliefs that determine the social 
practices particular to a society. The concept of social imaginaries is also reflexive in the 
sense that people belonging to a particular social grouping understand themselves and 
their goals from what they perceive as their social milieu.36 People belonging to a cultural 
and social milieu have an idea what their society stands for. It is this centered 
understanding of one's position in a society, what is valued in the society and what the 
society stands for, which determines the civil society. Contemporary Western discourse 
on civil society seems to conveniently neglect the ontological remnants that underlie an 
ontic understanding in the emphasis on human rights, individual liberties, and equality.  
 
Liberal democracy that facilitated the emergence of free market and individual 
freedom is hailed as the panacea for all ills of the world. Due to the dissociation of the 
individual and the society, in the modern social imaginary the state became more 
responsive to individual interests. This is a reversal of the traditional Platonic and 
Aristotelian conception of the individual as the citizen of the polis. Plato and Aristotle 
emphasize the unity of the polis as most important function of justice. The social 
imaginary of that particular epoch is fractured along the lines of social classes. In 
contemporary liberal democracy, the social imaginary has less solidarity and more 
                                                 
36 The term ‘social imaginary’ was coined by Cornelius Castoriadis. Refer to “Castoriadis and the 
Democratic Tradition,” written by Takis Fotopoulos in ELEFTHEROTYPIA, a Greek daily on January 
3rd 1998. Fotopoulos cites Castoriadis’ The World in Fragments, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
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subsidiarity.37 The social imaginary also varies according to the contexts and hence it is 
not stagnant. In a discourse, the social imaginaries of interlocutors are constantly shifting. 
Another important aspect of the liberal democratic discourse is regarding the question 
whether it only applies to the population belonging to the society with which the 
government has a compact or are the rules applicable to the interaction between the 
countries with different forms of governments.38  Taylor’s notion of a ‘social imaginary’ 
is contextual and limited to a society or a lifeworld to which one belongs.39 The choice of 
the term ‘imaginary’ underscores the point that it is the perception of the people of a 
society about the objectives and practices of their own society. The social imaginary of a 
society is a mosaic of perceptions. The social imaginary has several parts but reconciled 
in a whole. The social imaginary also affects the ‘I – Thou’ relationships, mutual respect 
and equality that Charles Taylor mentions as the main aspect of the modern Western 
social imaginary.  
 
  
                                                 
37 George F. McLean George F. McLean, Ed. Civil Society and Social Reconstruction, Cultural Heritage 
and Contemporary Change Series I, Volume 16, Washingto D.C: Council for Research in Values & 
Philosophy, 2001. p.15. 
38 In a real life situation, the dilemma of the United States government how to treat the Prisoners of War, 
especially with respect to the terror suspects detained in Guantanomo Bay and Afghanistan and other 
United States Military bases all over the world as enemy combatants with no legal status under the 
constitution of the United States or under Geneva Convention proves the inadequacy of the laws of a 
liberal democracy which has not foreseen the asymmetric nature of the conflict. The notions of equality, 
mutual respect, individual rights or innocent until proven guilty which are considered to be the 
paradigmatic virtues of a liberal democracy fail to impress Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas and other 
terror organizations. Furthermore, the hypocrisy of liberal democracy came to the fore when the abuse 
of the prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq filtered out, the whole of the United States recoiled in 
moral indignation. All the while, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was held incommunicado in some 
undisclosed location by the United States military which was extracting information about the Al Qaeda 
and other terror plots. Taylor’s social imaginary must include positive, negative and wrong perceptions 
of the social characteristics by the people of the society which in turn leads to events such as the 
September 11, 2001. But Taylor agrees that the social imaginary is not stationary and illusory but 
always tested against ground reality. 
39 Charles Taylor warns about the danger of reducing the social imaginaries to unitary perceptions. He cites 
the example of France and the United States which became democracies by taking different paths.  
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Charles Taylor identifies economy, public sphere, and democracy as the three 
most distinguishing features of modernity that govern the self-understanding of the 
people. The pre-modern conception of politics contains a strong religious dimension 
imbedded in the perception of the world as totally ordered by a God who was a 
benevolent supernal artisan, micro-managing the events happening in the world. The 
institution of monarchy was a replication of such a God controlled the conception of 
nature, which is an ancient idea. But in modernity, the upward despondent gaze towards 
the whims of a celestial being was abandoned and terrestrial prospects were eagerly 
explored.  
 
In an interesting transformation, what Weber characterized as the ethics of the 
puritans, encouraged people to toil and succeed in this world rather than worrying about 
what was in store for them in the nether world.40 Such an insouciant attitude towards the 
designs of God was largely due to the development of science. The laws of nature that 
governed the world prompted people to doubt the unseen cause. Adam Smith recognized 
such a need when he claimed that economic prosperity was indispensable and social 
order would be better served if they were causally related to observable phenomena 
rather than intangible qualities such as virtues and wisdom.41 Another important 
attitudinal change palpable in modernity is the recognition of mutual cooperation. Kant’s 
categorical imperative identifies the inescapability of the need for mutual cooperation 
among human beings. But most of the political thinkers of the eighteenth and subsequent 
                                                 
40 Max Weber, Protestant Ethic, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Trans. Talcott Parsons, 
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1958. p. 181. 
41 Taylor, pp. 69-73. Taylor cites Louis XIV who claims that the show of respect for the monarch is in 
return for the offer of protection and justice to the people. According to Montchretien, a good ruler has 
to be a guiding force to the economy of a state by enacting good policies.  
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centuries have been content with the prudential imperative of Kant.42 
  
Weber’s and Tönnies’ diagnosis of the inexorable triumph of purposive rationality 
also anticipates mutual cooperation based on mutual benefit. Weber attributes the 
development of political associations and cities in Western Europe in the Middle Ages to 
the realization of the potential of mutual cooperation to economics. Economics and 
politics are inextricably related. Taylor argues that in modernity, political institutions 
adapted to the changing scenario of crumbling social hierarchy and growing democracy 
by facilitating mutual cooperation. Interestingly, the reflexivity of the civil society in 
Europe and America was not reflected in their economic and political exchanges with the 
third world countries. The third world countries were not deemed sufficiently civilized to 
warrant an attitude of mutual cooperation.  
 
A sense of solidarity, which ensures the social imaginary of any social 
organization, and subsidiarity, which indicates mutual cooperation, cannot be dissociated 
from each other. Thus, the subsidiarity of a society is in a hermeneutic relation with the 
solidarity of its constituents. Such solidarity could be organic or politically forged as 
witnessed in the development of democracy in the United States. There are two 
possibilities if the equilibrium between solidarity and subsidiarity is disturbed. They are: 
1) the notion of subsidiarity would become predominant in a society with excessive 
emphasis of individual rights and property. As a result, economics becomes increasingly 
a citadel of powerful corporate interests. Hence, intervention of government through law 
                                                 
42 Immanuel Kant, The Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals,  2nd edition, Trans. Lewis White Beck, 
New York: Macmillan/Library of the Liberal Arts, 1990. 
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enforcement to curb malpractices and other predatory market tendencies increases. This 
is an extreme result of Locke’s social contract. Neither Hobbes nor Locke envisaged such 
a scenario. 2) If a tendency to emphasize solidarity predominates, then nationalistic 
fervor, secessionism, religious fanaticism, and ethnic cleansing are distinctly possible 
results. It is my intention to explore a middle path between the afore-mentioned options. 
Consensus makes such a middle path possible.  
 
The notion of equality that spawned the concept of mutual cooperation is the 
cornerstone of a discourse aimed at achieving consensus in the Western societies. In the 
Akan society in Ghana, personhood and human rights are intuitively recognized. In status 
societies such as India, solidarity needs to be redefined in terms of contemporary social 
imaginary. Subsidiarity needs to be oriented with respect to newfound solidarity and 
social imaginary as a nation. Hitherto, subsidiarity was based on a code of conduct in a 
caste system, religion, language and ethnicity.  
 
There are structural differences in an asymmetric lifeworld that preclude any 
rationally motivated agreement. A theory of civil society must create conducive environs 
of intersubjective interaction among the members of a society. The power structure and 
relations between various strata of a civil society defines its strength as a society. If a 
civil society is robust, then the rights of individuals in a society are guaranteed and vice 
versa. For corporate civil societies that exist in countries like Japan and some South East 
Asian countries, individual rights are subservient to the welfare of the society. In such a 
situation, a notion of order is paramount and the individual rights are less important in 
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comparison to the common welfare.  
 
In countries such as India, which have had a cultural continuum of over five 
thousand years and a rigidly stratified society, structural transformation of a communal 
society into a democracy, that respects individual rights, has not been without difficulties. 
Especially, reciprocal relationships and mutual cooperation have had different 
connotations because of the unequal caste-class relationships. Reciprocity and mutuality 
were always considered in the background of individual duties within the ambit of caste 
duties. Hence, before the terms reciprocity and mutuality are considered within the 
framework of equality of social status, there is a need for votaries of democracy and 
liberalism to evaluate the social conditions of those countries that are forced to become 
democratic. The question that arises here is: Does democracy restore equality of social 
status? Or is equality of social status a must for democracy? In a culturally diverse 
democracy, it is imperative that the political discourse is not reduced to majority-minority 
framework. The cultural interstices or the intermediary viewpoints, which straddle the 
center-periphery, majority-minority, and first world-third world, and social-communal 
categorizations, would go a long way in initiating a process of rapprochement. I will 
discuss the philosophy of cultural interstices in the fifth chapter.   
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Chap 2 
 
Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural Identities 
 
 
In this chapter, I will be arguing in support of a reflexive approach to intersubjective 
communication in a consensual activity. Intersubjective communication creates optimal 
conditions for achieving consensus while debating controversial issues. Institutional 
safeguards such as strictures against any form of verbal or physical coercion or stifling 
discussion that guarantee formal conditions of a debate only prevent abuse of the 
individual rights of the participants. Formal conditions of consensus such as ideal speech 
situation or the original position ensure that a debate is democratic. But the will to create 
a moral bond between interlocutors demands much more than the formal conditions of a 
discourse. In order to achieve a consensus or a tentative agreement, the interlocutors 
ought to engage each other at an inter-personal level. A relaxed and cordial atmosphere is 
more conducive for a discussion of difficult issues. Absence of personal rapport or the 
presence of mutual distrust more often than not derails negotiations. Hence, civility is one 
of the basic requirements of a discourse. Civility also encourages an ethic of mutual 
recognition.  
 
In this chapter, I have discussed two approaches to intersubjective interaction 
aimed at achieving consensus. One approach is that of Hans Georg Gadamer who 
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advocates hermeneutical understanding of intersubjective communication. The other 
approach is that of George Herbert Mead, who is a proponent of social behaviorism. 
Mead emphasizes mutual adjustment of behavior as the basic condition of a successful 
communicative activity. I will illustrate how Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach is more 
accommodative of differences. An asymmetrical concept of consensus necessarily 
requires recognition of differences in the conceptual and cultural understanding of those 
individuals who are participating in a consensual activity. Gadamer’s idea of 
communication is a fusion of horizons of autonomous human beings. Communication is a 
participatory activity for Gadamer. Hence, the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ have an equal, 
reciprocal, and independent relationship.  
 
Gadamer and Mead approached the concept of intersubjectivity as a process of 
dynamic inter-relation between human beings. Hence, their theories of intersubjectivity 
are essentially theories of understanding the ‘other.’ I characterize the ‘other’ as the 
‘Thou.’ It is necessary to have an understanding of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship for an 
asymmetric idea of consensus in contrast to Habermas’ idea of consensus as a rationally 
motivated agreement. A dynamic notion of ‘I – Thou’ relationship prevents 
hypostatization of human interaction. Mead and Gadamer emphasize intersubjective 
interaction that unveils problems associated with a teleological approach to human 
relationship. 
 
George Herbert Mead and Hans Georg Gadamer considered the problem of 
intersubjectivity to be pivotal in explaining concepts such as language, culture, history, 
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science, and religion. George Herbert Mead’s method is avowedly scientific because it 
germinated from the methodology of science espoused by celebrated pragmatists such as 
William James and John Dewey. Mead wanted to understand the nature of human 
interaction and thereby control the factors that hamper the establishment of a smooth 
process of communication. Mead’s method is teleological because it is tailored to achieve 
success in communicative activity. [For example, if there is a vexatious economic issue, 
internalizing the perspectives of one side by the other will foster a better understanding of 
the problem.]  
 
Mead, as a social behaviorist, believed in connection between impulse, stimulus, 
and response in any communicative activity. Therefore, if a general schema of how 
individuals react in a particular situation could be framed then Mead felt that mapping 
human behavior and achieving success in communication and avoiding conflicts would 
become easier. Mead’s analysis of a successful communicative activity emphasizes direct 
and free interaction between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ or between various interlocutors 
participating in a debate or a dialogue.1 But the ‘I – Thou’ relationship involves 
internalization of various roles performed by the social actors in various roles of ‘I’ and 
the ‘Thou.’ As a behaviorist, Mead analyzed the behavior of social actors by observing 
and mapping their interactions among themselves. Mead writes as follows: 2 
 
                                                 
1 Mead does not use ‘Thou’ in his works.  Mead uses ‘I’ and ‘me.’ By ‘I’ Mead refers to the individual 
subject and by ‘me’ the social self. Mead also uses ‘we’ and ‘other.’ ‘Thou’ is my usage to represent ‘the 
other.’ In both second person and third person application, I think that ‘Thou’ is more evocative than the 
‘other’ or ‘You.’ 
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Social psychology has, as a rule, dealt with various phases of social experience 
from the psychological standpoint of individual experience. The point of approach 
which I wish to suggest is that of dealing with experience from the standpoint of 
society, at least from the standpoint of communication as essential to the social 
order. Social psychology, on this view, presupposes an approach to experience 
from the standpoint of the individual, but undertakes to determine in particular 
that which belongs to this experience because the individual himself belongs to a 
social structure, a social order. 
 
In contrast to Mead, Gadamer treats the ‘other’ as irreducible to the ‘I’ or vice 
versa. Gadamer’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship is in terms of a hermeneutical 
understanding emphasizes the inexhaustible or unique nature of the ‘other.’ Gadamer 
conceptualizes the ‘I – Thou’ relationship as unproblematic within the framework of 
historical consciousness and as a fusion of horizons as the paradigm of hermeneutical 
consciousness. In this chapter, I will explain the structural difficulties associated with 
Mead’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship. Gadamer’s analysis addresses problems 
that arise out of a behavioral approach by a contextual interpretation of all intersubjective 
activities. For Gadamer, the ‘I’ cannot transcend its own conditionedness and know the 
‘other’ in its entirety. Any attempt at reducing the ‘I’ to the ‘other’ or the vice versa 
violates the moral bonding that exists between the individuals whose relationship is based 
on mutual respect and recognition of freedom. In this sense any observation and response 
to the ‘other’ is only an interpretation of the gestures, actions and communicative activity 
of the ‘other.’ Hence, an objective spectator of Aristotle is non-existent for Gadamer 
because any understanding of the ‘other’ as an interpretive activity is laden with 
assumptions or prejudices (vorurteil). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 George Herbert Mead, Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, Ed. Charles W. 
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Mead’s Social Behaviorism 
Mead’s behavioral method is based on an observation of human behavior in different 
situations, gestures, and roles. In order to come up with a schema that denominates 
common factors shared by people, Mead formulated concepts such as ‘significant 
gestures,’ ‘generalized other,’ and role formation, which is the ambit within which 
understanding of the ‘other’ could be grounded.3 The ‘significant gestures’ are normally 
verbal gestures that elicit responses because of their deliberate nature and directedness.4 
Mead emphasized the fact that only if the proponent of an idea assumed responsibility for 
his/her verbal proposition, communicative activity would move forward. With the help of 
‘significant gestures,’ Mead sought to thematize the concept of role-formation. According 
to Mead, one’s knowledge of other human beings is possible only by understanding 
others through the roles assumed by oneself. For example, one’s idea of a teacher is 
plausible only by an introjection of the role of a teacher. Furthermore, one assumes the 
role of a teacher while internalizing ideas about teaching. Only in this way, could 
knowledge of other human beings be possible, that is, as teachers, doctors, engineers, 
singers, and dancers. This is what Mead means by role-formation. 
 
 The logical corollary of role-formation, in Mead, is the ‘generalized other.’ Mead 
defines the ‘generalized other’ as “taking the attitude of others toward himself and of his 
                                                                                                                                                 
Morris, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. pp. 1 - 8. 
3 I have used the ‘other’ to indicate the independently existing human beings without being subordinated to 
the ‘I.’ In the case of Gadamer, I have used the ‘other’ more frequently because Gadamer does not collapse 
the ‘other’ into the ‘I.’ While explaining Mead, I have used ‘others’ more frequently in the common sense 
of the term which indicates that which is not ‘I.’ 
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finally crystallizing all these particular attitudes into a single attitude of standpoint.”5 
Mead avers that in order to understand the attitude of others toward oneself, one must 
understand the attitude of oneself towards others. Only if a person takes the attitude of 
others towards oneself, would he/she be in a position to see a problem from different 
angles. Once the conceptual horizon of a person is widened, then conflicts could be easily 
resolved because of better communication and shared understanding. In furthering 
knowledge and scientific understanding by observation and control of social behavior of 
human beings lies the teleology of Mead’s social behaviorism. Mead believed that a lack 
of proper understanding of the behavior of other social actors complicated 
communication. In Mead’s social behaviorism, human interaction consists of three 
factors:  
 
1) The views of the individual about oneself  
2) The views of the individual about others (role-taking), and  
3) The views of the individual about the views of others about the individual (the 
generalized other) 
 
Relationship between two individuals is always hyphenated with the ‘I,’ for Mead. 
Hence, the ‘other’ or for that matter the ‘I’ is never separated from one another. Thus, the 
‘Thou’ exists only as how the ‘I’ views the ‘other,’ which is in turn dependent on how the 
‘I’ views itself as viewed by others. The above-mentioned thesis of human interaction of 
Mead reduces the ‘other’ ultimately to the views of the ‘I.’ Thus the ‘Thou’ never exists 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 J.L. Austin’s illocutionary speech acts would serve as good examples of significant gestures. 
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on its own. Mead also assumed that through concepts of role-taking, significant gestures 
and generalized other, the ‘Thou’ could be understood and human interactions controlled. 
Mead staunchly believed that an individual could objectify oneself and take the attitude 
of the society towards oneself, which would educate the individual to effectively remove 
irritants in the process of resolving conflicts.  
 
Mead believed that the future could be determined by the present from the lessons 
learnt from the past. Social progress, for Mead, is possible by tailoring one’s actions in 
response to the interests of others. In order to gain knowledge about people, Mead wanted 
to observe and gather knowledge of the social actions of people. Once knowledge about 
social acts and social actors is categorized then the facilitation of a cooperative approach 
to solve problems would be simpler, according to Mead. Concepts of mind, 
consciousness, language, meaning, and self are possible only as social acts. Thus, social 
action is imperative to any individual activity. Since all individuals are also social actors 
it becomes easier to observe and categorize social behavior. For Mead, science of “social 
psychology” is “the study of the experience and behavior of the individual organism or 
self in its dependence upon the social group.”6 The individual has the power to change 
the future of the society, according to Mead. Mead’s social behaviorism is situated on his 
firm belief in the theory of evolution, the principle of continuity, and human 
development.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Paul P.Fuetze, The Social Self, New York: Bookman Publishers, 1954. p. 76. 
6 Pfuetze, p. 36. 
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As an advocate of evolutionary biology, Mead assumes that human beings are at 
the zenith of evolutionary cycle, which is typified by the capacity to communicate with 
each other and share information. Language is the defining feature of the human beings. 
Language is the tool of socialization and socialization is a behavior peculiar to human 
beings. Language consists of gestures and symbols. Gestures are the bedrocks of the ‘I-
Thou’ relationship. By analyzing the linguistic behavior of human beings, Mead also 
adduces reasons for the religious, social, political and economic behavior of human 
beings in his theory of understanding.  
 
 Mead views the formation of mind and self as products of social activity. Both 
mind and self arise out of social activity. Mind is natural while the social activity of the 
mind gives rise to the self. Mind is a biological form and when mind assumes a social 
attitude it becomes a self. The formation of a social attitude includes linguistic 
communication, role-taking, and mutual adjustment.7 For Mead, mind is the capacity to 
interact verbally, through gestures and symbols. Communicative activity between 
individuals is deliberate and intended to evoke a response. Thus, a self is a socialized 
mind. The need for a social mind arises out of the need to communicate with others. 
Communication is possible only through gestures. Mead distinguishes between ‘ordinary 
gestures’ and ‘significant gestures.’ Ordinary gestures are those gestures that do not bind 
the individual to own responsibility for his/her gestures. Mead gives an example of the 
gestures of children. In the case of significant gestures, they are deliberate and aimed at 
                                                 
7 Pfuetze, p. 61. 
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eliciting responses from the hearer. Business activity is a good example of significant 
gestures. 
 
Significant Gestures 
Society comes into existence only when individuals share a common perspective, 
according to Mead. A common perspective consists of not only the perspectives of 
individuals but also the perspectives of members as a group. A common perspective 
objectifies social goals; it also helps in creating a social organization. Social organization 
is possible only if social actors take the attitude of others or only if they are able to 
internalize the viewpoints of other members of the social group.  
 
 Mead introduces the notion of comprehensibility, which is pivotal to his 
conception of communication and common perspective. Mead’s emphasis is on the 
relation between individual perspective and common perspective. Mead’s theory of 
interpersonal relationships is based on two assumptions:  
 
1) Interest based interaction 
2) Cooperative interaction  
 
In the first category, Mead analyzes the common environment of ants and bees. The 
dwelling place of ants is the anthill while bees live in hives. Mead argues that there is no 
communication among the ants or bees. In communication, deliberate intent to discuss an 
issue is displayed by both the speaker as well as the hearer. Under the second category, 
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the speaker or the gesturer commits himself or herself to sincerely involve the hearer in a 
discourse. Thus, cooperative activity is facilitated by the ‘significant gestures’ in the form 
of communication. Mead gives an interesting definition for the concept of ‘significant 
gestures.’ ‘Significant gestures’ are defined in terms of communication. Mead writes as 
follows:8 
It does not become communication in the full sense, i.e., the stimulus does not 
become a significant symbol, until the gesture tends to arouse the same response 
in the individual who makes it that it arouses in the others. The history of the 
growth of language shows that in its earlier stages the vocal gesture addressed to 
another awakens in the individual who makes the gesture not simply the tendency 
to the response which it calls forth in the other, such as the seizing of a weapon or 
the avoiding of a danger, but primarily the social role which the other plays in the 
cooperative act. This is indicated in the early play period in the development of 
the child, and in the richness in social implication of language structures in the 
speech of primitive peoples.  
 
 
 
Mead avers that an individual becomes socialized only when he or she assumes the  
 
attitude of the others towards himself or herself, respectively, whereby the individual 
assumes an objectifying attitude towards one’s own actions. This attitude of others 
towards oneself is known as the ‘generalized other.’ Mead also claims that only if the 
mind is able to take the role of the ‘generalized other’ that a self is formed. There are two 
factors that make the role-taking attitude possible in the individual. One is 
comprehensibility and second is intelligibility. The aforementioned factors are 
responsible for the two most important developments that made possible the sociality of 
human beings.  
 
                                                 
8 George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, Phoenix: Open Court Publishing Company, 1980. 
pp. 167-168. fp. 1932.  
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1) In the early stages of communication, human beings assume the attitude of others 
and thus become an object to themselves, becoming a self in the process. The 
same attitude also constitutes the other too.  
 
2) The next stage is that of the generalized other in which the individual is known by 
the roles played in the society. The individual is always known only as a 
‘generalized other.’  
 
 Mead explains the concept of the “generalized other”, with an example based on 
property holding. Mead points out that unlike squirrels, which store the nuts gathered 
from the ground, property is not only acquired but also protected and maintained. In 
buying a property, an impulse is transformed into a stimulus-response framework. The 
impulse present in a person to buy a property elicits an expected response from the seller. 
“An offer is what it is because the presentation is a stimulus to give. One cannot 
exchange otherwise than by putting one’s self in the attitude of the other party to the 
bargain.”9 The core concepts of Mead’s social behaviorism can be explained with the 
help of the example cited above. They are as follows: 
 
1. The conversion of a mind into a self happens as a result of the buyer assuming the 
attitude of the seller and vice versa because of the participation of the buyer and the 
seller in the social act of property exchange. Only when the subjective mind assumes 
the objective attitude about itself does a mind become a self.  
                                                 
9 G.H. Mead., The Philosophy of the Present, p. 183. Hereafter, TPP. 
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2. By assuming the role of a buyer, the seller puts himself \ herself in the shoes of the 
other. The buyer also assumes the role of a seller while bargaining for a property.  
 
3. The role-taking attitude is possible only as a generalized other. Human beings know 
others only in the variegated roles played by people in the social setting. In order to 
understand the roles played by others, it is imperative to know the roles assumed by 
the individual in the social setting. If the self is objectified and its roles analyzed, 
then the roles played by others are understood better. The different roles played by 
the individuals as teachers, doctors, mothers, fathers, engineers, etc., are first known 
in terms of one’s own actions and then generalized into a framework about the other. 
This is the concept of the ‘generalized other.” 
 
4. Before proceeding to the concept of the “generalized other” one needs to stimulate a 
response in the people who are part of a social act. This is possible only in terms of a 
shared linguistic understanding. Such a linguistic understanding is a part of the social 
act. 
 
In the four aforementioned steps, I have traced the development of a self in the 
descending order. The emergence of a self from the mind is preceded by the notion of 
the ‘generalized other,’ which is preceded by the concept of role-formation. The role-
formation is possible only when the complex linguistic communication comes into play. 
A meaningful linguistic interaction is known as ‘significant gestures.’ A social act, 
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which is a part of the social organization, is not possible without any of the above-
mentioned four steps. 
 
 
Social Act and Social Organization 
Social act is possible only if the individual introjects social roles. Introjections of the 
roles of others into one’s own understanding is a process of becoming a self, that is, an 
individual organizes his\her response with respect to the tendencies of the others to 
respond to his\her act.10 A social act is possible only if the individual and the common 
traits move into each other, in a manner akin to the “fusion of horizons” of Gadamer. 
When an individual takes the attitude of others, that individual becomes the object of 
study for oneself. Mead takes great care to emphasize the ineluctable relationship 
between the parts and the whole, the individual and the social. The individual becomes 
an individual only in lieu of the social. The social is the common reservoir of all 
individual tendencies. Thus the self-consciousness or the ‘I’ consciousness is never 
divorced from the other consciousness or the ‘Thou’ consciousness. Construction of a 
self is a dynamic process that is made possible by language, which operates as the bridge 
for communication. According to Mead, language is the social stimulus that makes 
possible the same response in the hearer that a speaker would expect of herself for the 
same stimulus.  
 
                                                 
10 G.H. Mead., TPP, p. 184. 
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Mead elucidates the beginning of the ‘I – Thou’ consciousness in terms of an 
example of a play and a game. Interestingly, Mead and Gadamer have similar views 
about the analogy of a play and a game. Given below is Mead’s analysis of a play and a 
game. In a child’s play, the child takes the attitude of different social actors, viz., 
teachers, mother, father, sister, brother, friends, etc. The child acts all these attitudes 
towards itself while at the same time internalizing the actions of himself/herself towards 
others. The ‘I – Thou’ attitude in a play arises simultaneously and does not really involve 
social actors in a real life situation. Hence, a child’s play remains as a prototype for 
social roles played by the individuals.  
 
In a game, there are rules and regulations to be followed meticulously. An 
individual has to match wits with social actors. Only if there are commonly agreeable 
ideas, can the individual communicate successfully with other actors. In a game, 
reactions to the stimulus are more organized and hence the advent of the ‘generalized 
other.’ Every action takes into account the social reaction. Thus, the individual has an 
overarching idea of the ‘generalized other.’ Concepts such as rights, law, religion, 
education, culture, and other institutions take into account the concept of the 
‘generalized other.’ Mead even goes to the extent of saying that a breakdown in the 
schema of ‘generalized other’ leads to war. According to Mead, if only people would put 
themselves into other’s shoes, conflicts could be reduced significantly. Mead cites the 
examples of the League of Nations, the International Court and other kindred 
organizations that try to settle disputes as the result of the notion of the ‘generalized 
other.’ Thus, Mead sees the application of the concepts such as ‘generalized other,’ 
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significant gestures [language], and role-taking in augmenting social controls that serve 
the society better in managing conflicts.  
 
For Mead, communication and interaction are tools for social control. Social 
actions of human beings are reflected in the social behavior of the individuals. Thus, 
Mead applies his conceptions about the ‘I - Thou’ relationship to control the social 
behavior of human beings. On the other hand, Gadamer accords more freedom to the 
‘other’ and holds that objectification of the ‘other’ leads to problems of power and 
ethical dilemma about the treatment of the ‘other’ as a tool to achieve a goal. The lack of 
contextual situatedness in the analysis of Mead becomes a major impediment in 
analyzing cultures and processes about which we do not have prior experience. Hence, 
Gadamer suggests a more encompassing and empathetic hermeneutical consciousness 
that treats the ‘other’ as a free entity without being reduced to a ‘me’ which is the 
‘objectified self’ for Mead. The ‘objectified self’ is the social self that is known in its 
various roles as the ‘generalized other.’  
 
 
Gadamer - The Nature of Intersubjective Experience 
In contrast to social behaviorism of Mead, which lays emphasis on observation and 
control of social behavior of human beings, Gadamer’s approach is humanistic. An 
understanding of social phenomena is a part of the human experience, for Gadamer. 
According to Gadamer, the ‘I – Thou’ relationship is a hermeneutical relationship and not 
a historical relationship. In the hermeneutical view of the world, the ‘other’ is not 
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reducible to the ‘I’. While advocating hermeneutical understanding, Gadamer follows the 
Kantian principle of not treating others as means to an end. Thus by stipulating the 
inviolability of the freedom of the ‘other’ Gadamer also delineates the guidelines for an 
ethics that recognizes the value of the ‘otherness.’  
 
According to Gadamer, understanding encompasses both what is agreeable to us 
and what is contrary to our beliefs. Gadamer thus recognizes the sovereignty of the 
‘other.’ Since Gadamer does not believe in absolute truths, the views of the ‘other’ stand 
on its own strength instead of gaining its validity in the altar of an absolute truth. Thus 
understanding, for Gadamer, is not a power over the ‘other’ gained through the 
knowledge of the ‘other.’ The ‘other,’ thus, cannot be understood in its entirety. Thus, the 
experiencing of the ‘Thou’ is a moral experience whereby the ‘other’ is not objectified. In 
understanding a person, what must be kept in mind is that the person, with whom we are 
interacting, ‘is in relationship with us.’11 Gadamer is very particular about respecting the 
subjectivity of the person whom we seek to understand. Gadamer delineates three forms 
of ‘I – Thou’ relationship. They are as follows: 
 
1. The ‘other’ is experienced by the observation of his or her behavior. 
2. The ‘other’ is assimilated by the ‘I’ reflectively and co-opted and preempted. 
The ‘other’ is understood in terms of one’s own behavior. 
3. The ‘other’ is given a voice. The ‘other’ is experienced as an independent 
individual ‘Thou.’ 
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The first two ways of understanding are based on what Gadamer calls the historical 
consciousness. In a historical consciousness, the ‘I’ purveys the ‘other’ as if the ‘other’ is 
historically objectified. The historical situatedness of both the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ is 
neglected in the first two ways of understanding the ‘other.’ Only in the third form of 
understanding the ‘other’ is the historical situatedness of the ‘I’ is also taken into account 
so as to consider the views of the ‘other.’ Only as an equal interlocutor does the ‘Thou’ 
stand a chance of being represented as it is. Mead’s analysis of the ‘I-Thou’ relationship 
falls under the second category of ‘I-Thou’ relationship. 
 
 
Gadamer distinguishes between theories of experience that are based on scientific 
methodology and those that are historico-critical in nature. Scientific theories of 
experience neglect the inner-historicity of individual experience and objectify 
experience. In this sense, the scientific method is a-historical. The historico-critical 
method takes into consideration the historicity of experience and interprets experience 
critically and contextually. But the historico-critical method also objectifies experience. 
Gadamer criticizes both scientific and historico-critical methods for their unswerving 
emphasis on repeatability.12  
 
According to Gadamer, the verificationism inherent in the scientific method is not 
applicable to the lifeworld. Repeatability is concomitant with verification and 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Trans. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall, New York: 
Continuum Publishers, 2000. p. 358. 
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objectification of experience. Gadamer cites Francis Bacon as the ideologue non-pareil 
of the method of science. Bacon went as far to suggest that language muddles thinking 
by distracting the mind to pour over empty conventional forms.13 Gadamer criticizes the 
unidimensional and unidirectional experience advocated by science. He also defends 
language through which we experience the world. Even though Gadamer concedes that 
problems exist in language due to conventions and other systematic distortions, he 
reiterates that the lifeworld is governed by linguistic behavior.  
 
 Gadamer expresses his reservations about the application of the methodology of 
natural sciences in human sciences. The specific goal-oriented activity of science 
straitjackets human experience. Scientific experience does not encompass the whole 
gamut of experience and it is situated on everyday experience.14 For science, only the 
positive experience, which successfully fulfils the objective of a scientific method, is 
acceptable. For human sciences, all kinds of experiences are acceptable. Experiencing is 
itself a learning activity, for Gadamer. Hence, the characterization of an experience as 
positive or negative is constrictive. For the natural sciences, any theory is valid only as 
long as it continues to remain unfalsified. [Gadamer indicates the similarity to Karl 
Popper’s theory of falsification in this context.]15 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Trans. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall, New York: 
Continuum Publishers, 2000. Pp. 346-347. 
13 Ibid. p. 349. 
14 Ibid. pp. 350-351. 
15 Gadamer, pp. 352-353. 
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 Language, for Gadamer, illustrates the multi-dimensional nature of experience. 
Experience is not reducible to those that conform to our expectations alone. There are 
new experiences, always. In a manner akin to Mead, Gadamer writes: 
 
In his Phenomenology of Mind he (Hegel) shows how the consciousness that 
would be certain of itself has new experiences. For consciousness its object is the 
in-itself, but what is in-itself can be known only as it presents itself to the 
experiencing consciousness. Thus the experiencing consciousness has precisely 
this experience: that the in-itselfness of the object is in-itself “for us.”16 
 
Gadamer takes a very catholic view of experience by designating openness to variegated 
forms of experience as the primary condition of gaining knowledge. The validation of 
experience must not be biased and dogmatic. Experience must always welcome new 
insights. Gadamer writes: “The dialectic experience has its proper fulfillment not in 
definitive knowledge but in openness to experience that is made possible by the 
experience itself.”17  
 
One of the most important aspects of lifeworld experience is the role of tradition. 
Tradition is the treasure-trove of experience. Tradition makes experience possible as the 
continuum of events. Tradition adduces meanings to identities, cultures, and languages. 
The lifeworld is inextricably entwined with tradition. Tradition is the landscape in which 
hermeneutical consciousness, which is not only historical but also open and undogmatic, 
validates its experience. There is an unceasing fusion of horizons between tradition and 
hermeneutical consciousness through language. Tradition is a ‘Thou’ that always forms 
the backdrop of a dialogue, interaction, andcommunication. But traditionary meaning has 
                                                 
16 Gadamer, p. 354. 
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an existence of its own. Tradition is not reducible to the opinion of others or opinions 
about others. Gadamer thus criticizes those approaches that objectify social roles. In such 
approaches, tradition is seen as an aggregate of individual opinions. This critique of 
Gadamer applies to Mead’s role-taking attitude. Gadamer avers that tradition becomes 
universal because it is always a partner in all activities and it is accessible to all in 
different ways. Tradition is not a person and hence personal relationship is not 
emphasized. In ‘I-Thou’ relationship the ‘Thou’ is always a person and hence moral 
questions arise when interacting with others.  
 
 
Experiencing the ‘I-Thou’ relationship 
Gadamer distinguishes three types of ‘I-Thou’ relationships. In the first type, a person 
tries to categorize the behavior of his/her fellow beings. The behavior of other people is 
then categorized in several ways. These categories are used to predict any future 
behavior. Gadamer writes: “We call this a knowledge of human nature. We understand 
the other person in the same way that we understand any other typical event in our 
experiential field – i.e., he is predictable.”18 Gadamer disavows such an analysis on the 
basis of the Kantian categorical imperative, which forbids any one from treating fellow 
human beings as means to an end. When a person is treated as an object of knowledge, 
the humanity of that person is not acknowledged. Thus, the other, ‘Thou,’ is used as a 
means to gain knowledge, which is the end.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Gadamer, p. 355. 
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According to Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness, the relationship between 
the individual and the other (I – Thou) must not be subordinated to each other. The 
problems in such approaches, as we see in Mead, could be traced to the dogmatic 
emphasis on the method and the objectivity of knowledge.19 Because of the emphasis on 
the method, the historicity of the experience in question is not acknowledged by the 
scientific and the historico-critical methods. It is impossible for a person to experience 
tradition in a detached manner shearing himself \ herself from the tradition which is the 
underlying framework. Gadamer attributes this method of isolation of facts to the 
methodology of social sciences borrowed from the eighteenth century scientific methods, 
whose progenitor was Hume. The scientific method only accepts as knowledge what is 
‘typical and regular in behavior.’20 Gadamer criticizes this method as a-historical 
because it purely depends on induction; from a known behavioral analysis accruing from 
observation of human behavior, the future actions of human beings are predicted.  
 
 In the second type of ‘I-Thou’ relationship, the ‘Thou’ is recognized as a person. 
But the ‘Thou’ is always understood in terms of the ‘I’. The dialectical relation between 
the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ is deduced from the way the ‘Thou’ is understood through the ‘I’. 
Under this process of understanding, the proponent of an idea is countered by another 
idea, emanating from the opponent, and this is the way all forms of communication are 
carried out. The dialectical relation is only reflective and hence this opens up the 
floodgates for the understanding of the ‘other’ through one’s own categories. Mead’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Gadamer., p. 358. 
19 Gadamer., p. 358. 
20 Gadamer, p. 359. 
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concepts such as role formation and ‘generalized other’ fall under this category. Mead 
assumes without any compunction the uniformity of mental structures. As a result, Mead 
concentrates on explaining the knowledge of self with the help of the knowledge others. 
The mind gathers information about the behavior of others by assuming various roles 
donned by others. The self is formed when these experiences about the behavior of 
others are introjected. Mead does not have any qualms about coopting and preempting 
any reflection on the part of the other.21 Mead uncritically assumes that the ‘I’ can know 
about the other without any questions being raised about the mediacy or immediacy of 
such knowledge.  
 
 Gadamer traces the dialectical analysis of the ‘I-Thou’ relationship to the struggle 
for mutual recognition that characterizes human interaction. Gadamer cites the example 
of a Master-Slave relationship that Hegel uses so effectively to illustrate the dialectical 
relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou.’ But, the dialectical relationship between the 
‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ is very complex and multi-dimensional. The dialectical relationship is 
not just a calculated evaluation of human behavior but a commensurate reaction, which 
also has what Gadamer refers to as the ‘negative element.’  
 
Gadamer avers, “The experience of the ‘Thou’ attained here is more adequate 
than what we have called the knowledge of human nature, which merely seeks to 
calculate how the other person will behave.”22 Mead’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’ 
relationship is more concerned with the knowledge of human nature and only less 
                                                 
21 Ibid. p. 359. 
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remotely with the dialectical mode of interpersonal interaction. Gadamer’s critique of the 
dialectical model of ‘I-Thou’ relationship is that reciprocity that governs the relationship 
is not always apparent to the interlocutors. Individuals are not self-conscious in the 
dialectical model. Gadamer gives the example of a servant who tyrannizes the master by 
serving him as a slave. The servant does not know that he is tyrannizing the master by 
his unswerving allegiance. In another interesting example, Gadamer also maintains that 
welfare and charity work strip away the individuality of the person to whom they are 
directed.  
 
 The dialectical model of reciprocal relationship is the bulwark of historical 
consciousness. The otherness of the ‘other,’ the past, and the understanding the ‘other’ as 
a person is assumed to be unproblematic for the historical consciousness. The historical 
consciousness aspires to transcend its own conditionedness in search of certainty in 
knowledge. Gadamer addresses the above-mentioned lacunae in the historical 
consciousness in his concept of hermeneutical consciousness.  
 
 
The Hermeneutical Consciousness 
Gadamer emphasizes the role of hermeneutical consciousness in understanding third 
form of ‘I – Thou’ relationship. In the hermeneutical consciousness, incompleteness of 
the knowledge of human nature and the dialectical mode of understanding human 
relationships are recognized. The prejudices (Vorurteil) in viewpoints are inescapable 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 Ibid. p. 359. 
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according to Gadamer and hence neutral knowledge free of all prejudices is impossible. 
This makes the hermeneutical consciousness historical too. The mutuality of the ‘I – 
Thou’ relationship is emphasized in the hermeneutical consciousness. The hermeneutical 
consciousness is the consciousness of the presence of tradition as the refractory crucible 
in which all interactions are validated or invalidated. By accepting the commitment to 
treat each other mutually, the moral bond is cemented. Gadamer says, “A person who 
reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this 
tradition in exactly the same way … To be situated within a tradition does not limit the 
freedom of knowledge but makes it possible.”23 The most important of the hermeneutical 
experience is its emphasis on a reflective relation to tradition. In this context, Gadamer 
argues that the ‘Thou’ has to be seen as a partner and it must be allowed to voice its 
opinion without being constrained by the ‘I.’ Gadamer explains openness to tradition as 
follows: “Openness to the other, then, involves recognizing that I myself must accept 
some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so.”24 As 
against historical consciousness, which is not critical of the historicity of the knowledge 
of historian, Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness recognizes its historicity, its 
prejudices, need for openness and the empowerment of the ‘Thou.’ 
 
 
Mead and Gadamer : Behavioral Versus Hermeneutical Perspective 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness enshrines the role of tradition, intersubjectivity, 
historicity, openness to opinions of others, fallibility of knowledge, power of the 
                                                 
23 Gadamer, pp. 360-361. 
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negative, and the entitlement of the ‘Thou.’ Gadamer lays emphasis on the irreducibility 
of the ‘Thou’ to the ‘I.’ The ‘I – Thou’ relationship in Mead is restricted to what 
Gadamer calls the first two levels of his categorization of ‘I-Thou’ relationship. Gadamer 
subsumes all types of ‘I – Thou’ relationship examined by Mead and goes a step further 
by a critique of historical consciousness. Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness 
advocates the treatment of the other in its own immediacy without reducing the ‘other’ to 
the ‘our.’  
 
In Mead, self-consciousness is possible only through the consciousness of the 
‘other.’ But the ‘other’ is accessible to the ‘I’ without any problems of mediacy or 
immediacy, for Mead. If the social roles of others are internalized, then the 
understanding of the ‘other’ is possible in Mead’s social behaviorism. Activities 
involving intersubjective enterprises like language, society, tradition, economics, and 
religion are all reducible to stimulus-response framework in Mead. Even though Mead 
himself criticized the scientific method for being mechanical in its application without 
any window for interpretation, he is entrapped within the scientific method. Mead 
introduces the future-oriented approach to his method of observation of human behavior 
but the scientific method is causal in character and hence not open to negative results. 
Only a successful response is gratifying to a stimulus. Hence the historicity and the 
multifaceted nature of knowledge are neglected.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Ibid. p. 361. 
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Mead introduced concepts such as novelty and cooperation in the ‘I – Thou’ 
relationship. But there is an uncritical assumption inherent in Mead’s schema that the ‘I’ 
and the ‘Thou’ are equally empowered in terms of status (mental, social, political and 
economic). Since Mead fails to show how the ‘Thou’ could be understood immediately, 
problems persist in the individual – social relationship. Furthermore, Mead also readily 
assumes that any knowledge-driven activity is good and the society is willing to 
participate in communicative activity to solve problems. The aforementioned 
assumptions are only ideals whereas Mead installs them as the pillars of his theory of 
sociality. Mead, though he concedes that experience has to be historical in taking into 
consideration the past, the present and the future, does not successfully explain how a 
universal framework is possible for the interpretation of the social and the individual. 
The only interaction possible is through the ‘generalized other.’ Mead, perhaps, assumes 
that ‘generalized other’ is a universal concept. But the ‘generalized other’ is a 
signification and not a symbol as Mead claims because communication is not perfect.  
 
Gadamer argues that there are no custodians of knowledge in hermeneutics. 
Knowledge is an event, which is never complete. Only universality is the hermeneutical 
situatedness. Tradition is the only horizon into which all other horizons merge. All 
knowledge arises only inside tradition. Historicity is an integral part of the tradition.  
Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness opens new vistas in ethics, law, philosophy, and 
art. By empowering the ‘other’, Gadamer gives a voice to the unheard. The 
empowerment of the ‘other’ dismantles the structures of domination. Gadamer’s 
emphasis on the openness to the ‘Thou’ has enormous significance for cross-cultural 
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interaction, religious tolerance diverse interpretations of history, political dialogue and 
economic liberty. Gadamer’s non-teleological approach unfetters him from any 
transcendental goals. But, even for Gadamer, resolution of conflicts while 
accommodating divergence in viewpoints is a problem because a disourse has to end in a 
consensus.  
 
A consensus necessarily means that one opinion is considered superior to another 
and hence more correct. Gadamer’s and Mead’s conception of the “I – Thou” 
relationship has great significance in multicultural dialogue with respect to liberal 
democracies. But liberal democracies have a strong economic focus, which emphasizes 
competition in the promotion of individual interests. A majority promotes social interest 
only as an aggregate of individual interests in the form of legitimation. 
 
 
Dialogue and Cultural Tradition 
Dialogue is a pivotal part of interpretation. Interpretation is possible only in the context 
of language. Unlike Habermas, who initiates a shift in paradigm from ‘consciousness’ to 
‘language,’ Gadamer does not accord foundational authority to language.25 While 
Gadamer entirely agrees with Heidegger that language is the dwelling place of being, 
language is a product of tradition. Every epoch is defined by a cultural paradigm and vice 
versa, which is representative of dominant ideas informing that epoch. A cultural 
paradigm of a period is its social imaginary. Social institutions of an epoch embody its 
                                                 
25 Habermas: Critical Debates, Eds. Thompson & Held, pp. 46-48. 
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cultural paradigm. By stipulating a cultural paradigm, other important aspects of a culture 
are marginalized. Based on the determination of a paradigm of a culture, cross-cultural 
comparisons are performed. In order to illustrate the democratic character of a dialogue, 
Habermas differentiates the monological character of traditional communities and the 
dialogical character of the Western societies on the basis of social rationalization. The 
underlying assumption in Habermas’ comparison is that social conditions influence the 
dialogical framework. While linguistic development is also a part of the process of social 
transformation, it does not entirely exhaust the cultural paradigm. Habermas assumes that 
Western civil society has been transformed structurally and hence un-coerced dialogue is 
indeed possible. A direct-access society, which according to Taylor the liberal democracy 
is, seems to indicate a social transformation that has given rise to a civil society, which is 
capable of making better social choices. According to Max Weber, such a civil society is 
the resultant of social rationalization.26  
 
Max Weber has described the path of the social, political, and cultural 
transformation of the public sphere in Western Europe in his mammoth Economy and 
Society. Max Weber’s analysis of the quantum leaps achieved by the Western society 
during a particular epoch also delves upon various social, political, religious and cultural 
aspects. Science and technology have been a part of the market and hence have a rhythm 
of their own in development and consumption. But democracy, as anticipated by Lyotard, 
has been outflanked by globalization. Hence, there is a need for more openness to other 
traditions. Democracy as a tradition needs to be hermeneutically questioned. The 
                                                 
26 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. 
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question that needs to be answered is whether democracy has become hypostatized. As 
the individual-social relationship is being constantly redefined, Gadamer’s broader 
perspective with emphasis on conversation and dialogue rather than a political system 
that is based on majoritarian rule facilitates consensus in a democracy. Gadamer’s 
emphasis on a convergence of horizons accommodates cultural particulars and universals. 
In this respect, Mead’s strict scientific methodology excludes the issue of cultural 
particulars, differences in human capabilities, emotional persuasion, rhetoric and strategic 
action. The assumption that after the Enlightenment, some how, people have been 
transformed into rational beings intent on achieving a consensus was pervasive. But in 
other disciplines such as science, technology, politics, and business that encounter ethical 
issues only in terms of social responsibility conducive to a successful enterprise, reason 
never assumes an emancipatory function. Hence, in those disciplines consensus is 
contractual agreement. 
 
Gadamer indicates that the nature of scientific methodology and scientific enquiry 
does not successfully explain the realm of the social sciences and art. Imbedded in 
Gadamer’s emphasis on tradition is the relation of the self (I) to the notion of the ‘Thou,’ 
which is possible only as a part of the culture (Bildung)27. Gadamer says, “What remains 
important is the concept that a self can be formed without breaking with or repudiating 
one’s past and that this formation cannot be achieved by any merely technical or 
methodical means.”28 Interestingly, Gadamer discusses two kinds of experience, one is 
Erlebnis and the other is Erfahrung. With respect to the Erlebnis, Gadamer speaks of 
                                                 
27 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. xii. 
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aesthetic experience or experience of works of art. Erlebnis has a subjective tinge. With 
reference to the Erfahrung, Gadamer discusses experience that pertains to the lifeworld 
and perspectival horizon. It is within this experience that the ‘I – Thou’ relationship 
needs to be situated. According to Gadamer, Erfahrung is a constant fusion of horizons, 
integrating new experiences.  
 
In Habermas’ search for a postnational constellation there is an urgency towards 
universalization of horizons, which does not allow a role for subjectivity. Gadamer warns 
against such a hasty generalization in which the individual moments are tyrannized in 
search of the universal. By defining experience as shades of Erlebnis and Erfahrung, 
Gadamer addresses the issues of being and becoming respectively. The ‘I – Thou’ 
relationship in Gadamer is one of creative interrelation. Such a dynamic interrelation 
between two interacting subjects could be understood from Gadamer’s views on 
communication. Communication is akin to excavation of historical sites. In a 
communication, the subject matter (Sache) becomes mutually accessible.29  
 
Habermas’ emphasis on the illocutionary force of arguments in a normative 
regulated action has the telos of uncoerced consensus. But in spite of universal 
pragmatics, which emphasizes communication aimed at mutual understanding, discourse 
is not mutually accessible to the participants with strategic and dramaturgical motives. 
While a self-imposed code of conduct emphasizes coherence of intentions and 
declaration of intentions, which is epitomized by the illocutionary speech acts of Austin, 
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normatively regulated discourse has an expressly practical telos. Truthfulness, truth, and 
rightness are associated with validity claims that are contested in a discourse. But 
truthfulness or sincerity is not the defining feature of a normative discourse. Truthfulness 
or sincerity, which is the hallmark of a concept of authenticity, cannot be institutionalized 
except in a religious discourse because of its subjective nature.  
 
Everyday discourse is authentic in its sphere and there cannot be a generalized 
account of authenticity, which is epoch defying.30 In Habermas’ normatively regulated 
action, only filtering cultural differences in an “ideal speech situation” ensure personal 
autonomy, which is incumbent on the rationality of human beings. Mead explains the 
social situatedness of communication. He says,  
 
The social environment is endowed with meanings in terms of the process of 
social activity; it is an organization of objective relations which arises in relation 
to a group of organisms engaged in such activity, in processes of social 
experience and behavior. Certain characters of the external world are possessed 
by it only with reference to or in relation to an interacting social group of 
individual organisms; just as other characters of it are possessed by it only with 
reference to or in relation to individual organisms themselves. The relation of the 
social process of behavior -- or the relation of the social organism-to the social 
environment is analogous to the relation of the processes of individual biological 
activity-or the relation of the individual organism-to the physical-biological 
environment.”31  
 
Accessibility of language camouflages inequalities and differences that a culture 
injects into the language. Here, Gadamer’s critique of Habermas’ emphasis on rationally 
motivated consensus is especially valid. According to Gadamer, language conceals more 
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than what it reveals. Habermas’ emphasis on the illocutionary force of an argument is 
based on the concept of authenticity belonging to the Enlightenment epoch. But in a 
decentered world of understanding, any attempt at universalization is paradoxical. On the 
one hand, universalization is possible on the basis of objective and empirical 
observations. On the other hand, universalization is anti-thetical to a decentered 
understanding. In Lyotard’s parlance, there are only petty narratives and not grand 
narratives. Habermas seeks to conjoin petty narratives and grand narratives in a 
decentered lifeworld. In this sense, Habermas’ has effected a change in the paradigm 
from ‘consciousness’ to ‘language.’  
 
Mead clearly distinguishes an ideal discourse from a socially situated discourse. 
He also mentions that a social discourse is influenced by economic, religious, and 
political factors. Mead says,  
Universal discourse is the formal ideal of communication. If communication can 
be carried through and made perfect, then there exists the kind of democracy to 
which we have referred, in which each individual would carry just the response in 
himself that he knows he calls out in the community. That is what makes 
communication in the significant sense the organizing process in the community. 
It is not simply a process of transferring abstract symbols; it is always a gesture in 
a social act which calls out in the individual himself the tendency to the same act 
that is called out in others.  
What we call the ideal of a human society is approached in some sense by the 
economic society on the one side and by the universal religions on the other side, 
but it is not by any means fully realized.32  
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31 G.H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 130.  
32 G.H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, pp. 327-328. 
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Both Mead and Habermas envision a state of perfection even though philosophically they 
realize the vacuousness of such an idea whether it is a perfect democracy for Mead or 
“ideal speech situation” for Habermas. Thus, a theory of consensus constructed upon a 
theory of perfection in an atmosphere of imperfection is bound to be exclusionary. 
Gadamer refuses to acknowledge such a state of perfection even though language as a 
paradigm is not inimical to a hermeneutical understanding of the tradition.  
 
Consensus must necessarily take into account individual interests and values. 
Mutual cooperation must not neglect individual aspirations. In this chapter, I have 
discussed two approaches to interpersonal communication. One is an interest-based 
interaction and the other is mutual cooperation. Mead’s theory of social behavior is based 
on the success of internalization of the perspectives of other actors. Hence, it restricts the 
scope of the otherness. Gadamer’s approach recognizes the autonomy of the other and 
requires the interaction of the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ as independent but culturally informed 
actors who cannot be reduced to each other. I favor Gadamer’s treatment of en-worlded 
subjects who as historically situated and hermeneutically conscious agents have to come 
together and discuss mutually important issues. An asymmetrical process of consensus 
does not stipulate rationality or an ideal social choice. Preferences become values or vice 
versa in the course of a consensual activity. Values and preferences evolve only in the 
process of consensus. Thus, cultural particulars are dialogically contested. 
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Chapter 3 
Consensus in the Realm of Science 
 
 
Science – Cultural Paradigm of Democracy 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to explain the triangular relation between science, 
culture, and liberal democracy. The dominant cultural paradigm in the Western 
hemisphere, which is science, informs the background understanding and shared 
lifeworld in social, political, and cultural spheres of interaction. Consensus in the 
Western hemisphere is to be understood within the framework of the dominant cultural 
paradigm.1 Charles Sanders Peirce emphasized the importance of science for the 
betterment of society. Charles Sanders Peirce’s writings on community of observers and 
unlimited community indicate his interest in the social relevance of scientific method. 
Peirce argued that an experimental method devised along the principles of science would 
facilitate convergence of beliefs. Peirce applies an experimental method, which is similar 
to Karl Popper’s theory of falsification in order to verify the logical certainty of beliefs. 
Kwame Anthony Appiah asserts that science as a paradigm questions existing social and 
                                                 
1 From the Middleages, science has captured the imagination of philosophers such as Descartes, Hobbes, 
Locke, and Kant, to name a few. But, only in the twentieth century, due to the importance accorded to 
scientific disciplines and technological advancements, science has become the cultural paradigm. Even 
Pope John Paul II apologized on behalf of the Catholic Church for the persecution of Galileo and others for 
their scientific endeavors during the Middle ages. Science and technology have complete dominance in our 
daily lives. Religion unabashedly uses science to advance its agenda.  
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cultural beliefs, while stipulating what is and what ought to be believed.2 Synchronous 
questions such as what is scientific and unscientific, justification of scientific hypothesis, 
and diachronous questions such as the historical development of the discipline of science 
inform the discourse about society, politics, education, and economy in the Western 
hemisphere.  
 
In advanced liberal democracies, science is the context of justification for 
important issues. Our attempt to achieve a consensus is dependent upon science, which is 
the context of justification. I will also examine Rawls’ theory of justice, which applies the 
method of hypothesis but without the supporting premises. Rawls neglects the impact of 
science on the lifeworld. I will show how Peirce and Popper accepted the historicity of 
science while Rawls begins with the ahistorical conception of politics in his theory of 
“Original position.” Rawls is thus guilty of theorizing for an entirely different lifeworld. 
His theory of justice is theory laden but suffers from the lacuna of positing an ahistorical, 
stationary, and isolated social thought experiment. In order to explain the effect of Peirce 
and Rawls’s theories on liberal democracy, I will utilize Stephen Turner’s writings on 
liberal democracy. I will show how the method of hypothesis is conducive to achieve 
consensus in scientific and social spheres. 
 
Karl Popper claims that disciplines such as psychology and history are afflicted 
by demarcation problems. Disciplines such as psychology and Marxism were considered 
to be scientifically justifiable in the early twentieth century. Popper argues that scientific 
                                                 
2 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Thinking It Through, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 127-130. 
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predictions are not possible in the afore-mentioned instances and only a negative 
utilitarian (reducing the misery instead of increasing the happiness) thesis is possible. 
Popper’s social and political thought is characterized by his theory of falsification, which 
will be discussed more elaborately in the course of this chapter. Popper believed that in 
order to test the validity of scientific theories, they must be subjected to the attempt of 
falsification. Unlike the post-Enlightenment optimism of an emancipated society, Popper 
has a very moderate projection of social advancement, which he calls “piecemeal 
engineering.”3 Popper attributes historicism and holism to the natural yearning of human 
beings to control their lives with the knowledge of future events. Popper argues that 
society is not static, isolated, and recurrent like the solar system.4 Hence, according to 
Popper, future-oriented social programs are not scientifically justifiable. But Popper 
concedes that scientific advancement impacts education and hence social and political 
changes have occurred. Popper, himself, was a staunch advocate of liberal democracy.  
 
 Lakatos and Putnam criticized Popper’s theory of falsification for simplifying the 
process of critical evaluation of a scientific hypothesis.5 Lakatos argued that Popper’s 
disjunction of falsification/corroboration does not encapsulate how major theories in 
science are corroborated. Only repeated experimental failures could undermine the 
scientific validity of major theories of science. Unless a theory fails to satisfy both simple 
and complex experimental applications consistently, only the auxillary hypothesis to the 
established theory is altered.  
                                                 
3 Stephen Thornton, “Karl Popper,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta, (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/popper/>.  
4 Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 338. 
5 Refer to “Karl Popper,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Winter 2002 Edition) 
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Popper’s philosophy of science has direct influence on his social and political 
thought. According to Popper, applying the method of natural sciences in social sciences 
would encourage totalitarianism. Popper admits that science is the major social paradigm. 
By denying science of the task of predicting historical development, Popper seeks to 
preempt social engineering. Popper emphasized the importance of creativity and heuristic 
motivation in scientific research. Similarly, Charles Sanders Peirce also emphasized the 
methodology of science in understanding the phenomenon of the world. In order to 
cultivate the habit of scientific thinking, Peirce envisaged a community of observers. For 
Peirce, scientific research was a social activity and hence a need for consensus among the 
scientists was necessary for the development of critical inquiry. 
 
There is a stark difference between the consensual activity of a group of scientists 
working on a specific scientific problem and a group of scientists who are working on a 
problem that involves multi-lateral levels of understanding. An example of the former 
would be nuclear scientists and the latter environmental scientists. Another example is 
that of a group of medical scientists discussing an epidemic. In the field of science, there 
is a contrast between the cognitive understanding of the expert and the audience. For a 
specialized group of professionals, linguistic and communicative competencies about 
their field are immediate. For the group of experts who observe the process and 
development of a theory, product, or policy, results are explainable in terms of structural 
factors within their discipline. But, the non-experts resort to a belief in the authority of 
the experts, which is tenaciously clung on to by them. The cognitive understanding of the 
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expert is identified by her proximity to the process of structural changes within a 
particular paradigm where as in the case of non-expert it is defined in terms of an ardent 
adherence to the principles laid down by the experts.  
 
The clash of paradigms within a culture is due to the conflict between the 
expertise and non-expertise aspects of theorization of knowledge within a scientific 
discipline. Instead of characterizing the debate between science and other disciplines as 
theory – practice problem, it is imperative to recognize the chasm between the status of 
experts and the audience. Russ Hanson argues that all observations are theory-laden.6 
Hence, Hanson refutes the existence of a theory-practice problem. The cognitive 
authority of scientists emanates from their expertise. Since there is no real plausibility of 
direct access to the citadels of scientific knowledge for the non-experts, only avenues of 
fixing beliefs are that of authority, tenacity, and a priori forms. The non-expert audience 
understands science, as an alien paradigm, in terms of other accessible paradigms. In 
several ways, the process of understanding science by non-scientific audience stunningly 
resembles Plato’s “allegory of the cave” and the Indian parable of “five blind men and an 
elephant.”7  
 
Expert Versus Audience 
The expert or the non-expert tag is dynamic and interchangeable when paradigms change. 
Depending upon the esteem need of the society, expertise is valued. A doctor is a non-
expert when she learns music or dance from an artist and vice versa. But there is a tacit 
                                                 
6 K.A. Appiah, p. 154. 
7 Plato, Republic, Trans. F.M. Cornford, London: Oxford University Press, 1945. Book VII.  
 78
understanding of the hierarchy on the social scale. For all the popularity and fame, in the 
corridors of power, scientific, economic, and legal experts have more political clout than 
artists. There was an epoch when art was considered divine. During that epoch, even 
management was considered to be an art. Martial art is a classic example. Now, martial 
art is called martial science. What was considered to be a divine individual talent is now 
harvested scientifically. Social rationalization has transformed many an art into a science. 
John Dewey’s writings on aesthetics bespeak of the importance of education and training 
in art, sport, law, psychology, and science.8 This could be attributed to the 
disenchantment of the lifeworld due to a change in paradigm to science and the 
democratization of the public sphere. Religious bewitchment of the intellect has given 
way to the scientific mastery of the environment. Science is about universals and hence 
cultural particulars have played a limited role. Or science can also be explained as 
essentially a bourgeoisie steering mechanism from the viewpoint of the left.9 Science has 
been an effective justificatory context for the communists and the capitalists alike. My 
objective in emphasizing the scientific method and science as a cultural paradigm is to 
explain that symmetrical conception of consensus in based on an idea of rational citizen 
who is heuristically motivated to know the reality. Democracy and science have 
transformed the process of achieving consensus.  
 
In the Middleages, as long as science did not challenge the existing paradigm, 
which was religion, there was an uneasy peace between them. In some sense, the 
paradigm conflict between science and religion was also a clash between religious and 
                                                 
8 Paul Kurtz, American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, pp. 20-21. 
9 Stephen Turner, Liberal Democracy 3.0, pp. 23, 117. 
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scientific bourgeoisie, in which the proletariat were the infantrymen. As Turner points 
out, the masses are ensnared by the sentiment of self-denial and whichever paradigm 
portrays itself as the epitome of self-denial that paradigm would be respected. In a liberal 
democracy, there are institutions and processes to legitimate paradigms and the most 
important avenue for legitimating is by discussion. To some extent, knowledge 
associations, boundary organizations, and commissions bridge the distance between the 
experts and the audience.10 But the question that is upper-most in our midst is whether 
consensus achieved via knowledge associations is a surrogate-consensus?  
 
Expertise – Transformation of the Cultural Paradigm 
Kwasi Wiredu emphasizes the need to recognize the objective of a dialogue that seeks to 
achieve consensus. According to Wiredu, questions about cultural particulars in religion, 
ideology, and ideals can be intractable. The objective of a consensual activity is to arrive 
at an agreement on ‘what needs to be done.’ A debate about ‘what ought to be done’ 
would never end. The everlasting struggle between the proponents of various ‘ought’ 
positions is based on dogmas and hence positions that are at variance cannot be 
reconciled without a complete transformation of the belief systems of the participants in a 
dialogue. Hence, Wiredu insists on the separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ issues in the 
epistemological realm from social and political issues while attempting to reach a 
consensus. The testability of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ positions is logical in the realm of 
epistemology and more specifically science. In social and political realm, what Peirce 
calls the methods of fixing beliefs such as tenacity, authority, and the a priori operate 
                                                 
10 Turner, Liberal Democracy 3.0, pp. 72-96. 
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along with the experimental method. In the social realm, logic is a heuristic tool. 
Wiredu’s position is very similar to Rawlsian theory of avoidance and his separation of 
political idea of justice as fairness, on the one hand, and metaphysical, religious, moral, 
and subjective conceptions of justice, on the other. But Wiredu does not advocate an ideal 
situation in which social and historical conditions must be suspended in a political 
discourse. 
 
Pragmatic Consensus 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s writings on fixing beliefs, clear ideas, and necessity elucidate 
the need to have guiding principles or provisional hypothesis, not only in science but also 
in everyday transactions, rather than absolutely indubitable principles as the starting 
point.11 Science is a discipline that emphasizes common skills, training, and common 
discourse.12 Turner points out the monopolistic nature of scientific expertise and its 
inalienable connection with politics. The general tenor of Turner’s argument that 
scientific expertise is political could be extended to other forms of expertise such as 
religious, economic, literary, artistic, and therapeutic. Expertise in its nature is 
monopolistic. As Turner points out, what Ulrich Beck terms as demonopolization is never 
plausible in any form of expertise.13 A political consensus on subjective, emotive, and 
vexatious issues is even more intractable. Hence, what Turner calls self-denial is 
indispensable for achieving a political consensus on issues pertaining to individual 
interest such as income tax, distribution of resources, agricultural subsidies, affirmative 
                                                 
11 Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” pp. 372-382. Cited from Baird & Kaufmann, 2000. 
12 Turner, pp. viii-x. 
13 Ibid., p. 3. 
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action, and healthcare.14 Consensus becomes even more difficult when the paradigm is as 
asymmetric as social justice, ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, and terrorism. Let us 
discuss the prospects of applying scientific models in social communication.  
 
Most of the early pragmatists such as Peirce, James, and Dewey believed that a 
functional model of science could effectively solve the problems of authority, 
dogmatism, and a priori modes of ascertaining beliefs. Peirce suggested an interesting 
idea of what could be termed as working hypothesis, which resembles the theory of 
falsification suggested by Karl Popper. According to Popper,15  
The result of tests is the selection of hypotheses which have stood up to tests, or 
the elimination of those hypotheses which have not stood up to them, and which 
are therefore rejected. It is important to realize the consequences of this view. 
They are these: all tests can be interpreted as attempts to weed out false theories - 
to find the weak points of a theory in order to reject it if it is falsified by the test. 
This view is sometimes considered paradoxical; our aim, it is said, it to establish 
theories, not to eliminate false ones. But just because it is our aim to establish 
theories as well as we can, we must test them as severely as we can; that is, we 
must try to find fault with them, we must try to falsify them. Only if we cannot 
falsify them in spite of our best efforts can we say that they have stood up to 
severe tests. This is the reason why the discovery of instances which confirm a 
theory mean very little if we have not tried, and failed, to discover refutations. For 
if we are uncritical we shall always find what we want: we shall look for, and 
find, confirmations, and we shall look away from, and not see, whatever might be 
dangerous to our pet theories. In this way it is only too easy to obtain what 
appears to be overwhelming evidence in favor of a theory which, if approached 
critically, would have been refuted. In order to make the method of selection by 
elimination work, and to ensure that only the fittest theories survive, their struggle 
for life must be made severe by them.  
                                                 
14 Ibid., p.p. 81- 83. The most striking example of the emphasis on self-denial in expertise is the commotion 
created in the Congress while implementing the September 11 Commission Report. It is imperative for the 
intelligence agencies such as the CIA and Military Intelligence to indulge in self-denial or else be 
characterized as politicizing national security. Already, there is a suspicion that the veneer of self-denial 
has become unstuck and the whole process is viewed as the turf war between the Pentagon and the State 
Department to control the budgetary authority.  
15 Karl Raimund Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. pp. 131-
136. 
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According to Peirce, both deductive and inductive inferences do not need absolute 
certainty.16 As MacIntyre describes in After Virtue, problems concerning generalization 
of predictions in social sciences could be traced to their tendency to model their methods 
on the basis of the mathematical models of natural sciences.17 In the natural sciences, 
there is an ‘Original position,’ which is, according to Peirce, provisional and 
hypothetical.  Peirce’s aim was to discover a method of forging an agreement in the realm 
of community and not just individuals. The most important tenets of Peirce’s pragmatism 
are as follows: 
 
1. Beliefs are identical if and only if they give rise to the same habit of action. 
2. Beliefs give rise to the same habit of action if and only if they appease the 
same doubt by producing the same rule of action. 
 
The underlying assumption in Peirce’s pragmatic definition of belief as a habit is the 
emphasis on the motivation for action. Only that which motivates a person to act is a 
belief. By tracing the pattern of beliefs, one can also anticipate the path of action. The 
scientific methodology imbedded in this approach appears to be hampered by 
stereotyping action-habit-belief patterns. But as John Murphy points out, there can be 
different beliefs, which produce same actions. This is the iconic method of signification 
of Peirce. The meaning of an action is dependent upon the result it produces. According 
to Peirce, “ … we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of 
                                                 
16 Baird & Kaufmann, Eds., Peirce, p. 387. 
17 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 88. 
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every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no 
distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference in 
practice.”18 An allied aspect of Peirce’s pragmatism is his experimentalism. Peirce 
wanted to cultivate a habit of thinking as a question of experimentation as it is thought in 
the laboratories. In his “The Fixation of Belief” he delineates four methods of fixing 
beliefs. They are as follows:19 
  
1. Method of tenacity  
2. Method of authority  
3. A priori method  
4. Experimental method.  
 
A true belief, for Peirce, is the one, which elicits general agreement. Peirce’s 
experimental method emphasizes a concomitant relation between habit, action, true belief 
and consequences. Peirce’s experimentalism is incumbent on scientific realism. While the 
experimental method poses several important questions about religion, culture, customs, 
and manners, it is not directly applicable to issues that have a long and torturous history.  
 
Scientific consensus that was sought by Peirce is easier to achieve in a laboratory 
setting in which heuristic motivation is an important factor. But in politics, the emphasis 
is not on knowledge but power. For politics, science is an instrument of power, which has 
                                                 
18 John P. Murphy, Pragmatism – From Peirce to Davidson, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.  p. 26. 
19 Baird & Kaufmann, Eds. Nineteenth Century Philosophy, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000. Peirce, “The 
Fixation of Belief,” pp. 378-382.  
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replaced religion. A scientific consensus, which is a broad consensus about a scientific 
finding, is different from a consensus among scientists. The former is an informed 
judgment, which is more debatable. Stephen Turner gives the example of global 
warming. There is a broad consensus among scientists about global warming while on the 
other hand there are wide variances in conclusions drawn in different studies on global 
warming.20 A good example of consensus among scientists would be a group of medical 
professionals who discuss the most effective treatment to epidemics and arrive at a 
consensus.  
 
Peirce, while trying to clear the cobwebs of metaphysical muddles, suggests the 
application of the model of consensus among scientists to non-scientific realms. The 
community of observers who are more scientific in their approach would have to contend 
with conflict of interests in social, political and economic spheres. While an emphasis on 
functionality could redress metaphysical muddles, which paralyze society, especially in 
the religious realm, into inactivity, it could also create new modes of reality that is 
scientifically constructed.  
 
In the laboratory, scientific procedures that are adopted need an objectivating 
attitude. It is impossible to adopt such an objectivating attitude to social and political 
issues because people have different beliefs on which they are prepared to act. (It is to be 
noted here that Peirce was an anti-foundationalist and believed that knowledge was 
historical.) Habits of action have become ingrained in people’s minds. In the public 
                                                 
20 Turner, p. 61. 
 85
sphere, there is no ground zero (theoretically) in contrast to what a scientist has in the 
laboratory, especially with respect to vexatious religious, social, economic, and political 
issues. However, for the purpose of consensual activity, the tenor of Peirce’s 
experimental method could be utilized. The concept of non-teleological activity with 
emphasis on procedures rather than final ends could be a viable alternative. In the post-
modern epoch, is it possible to have a purposive activity as practiced in Aristotelian 
polis? It appears impossible to have a concrete purposive goal for a society or a 
community without subordinating the individual goals to the common goal. In a liberal 
democracy, the assumption of inviolable individual liberty is both a boon and a bane. For 
the protection of individual rights and facilitating individual cultural development, an 
emphasis on individual rights is inevitable. But, how are the social goals to be reconciled 
with the individual goals? There is an inherent contradiction in liberal democracy. By 
emphasizing absolute inviolability of individual rights, a position of compromise is 
preempted.  
 
Ian Hacking argues that there are problems related to the scientization of moral or 
ethical issues. Hacking explains how the concept of child cruelty was medicalized into 
the phenomenon of child abuse.21 In the 1960s, a group of physicians in Colorado 
decided to define child cruelty in medical terms. Thus, the scientization of child cruelty 
began deliberately in an effort to take it away from the realm of ordinary discourse to the 
realm of scientific discourse. In course of time, most of the developed Western countries 
promulgated laws and elaborate procedures to address the issue of child abuse. Hospitals 
                                                 
21 Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999. p. 
125. 
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and law enforcement agencies were inundated with reports of child abuse. Since, the 
occurrence of child abuse is not akin to traditional criminal activities, the help of the 
society was enlisted to inform the police and child-care agencies about plausible cases of 
child abuse. While the process of determining whether a child has been abused was 
scientifically analyzed, the process of affixing the blame was carried out in a haphazard 
manner. Thus, scientific method does not ensure fairness. 
 
One of the problems that Peirce did not envisage with the scientific method was 
the evolution of technology as the business engine of science. As long as science 
remained as the pursuit of knowledge, the fruits of its endeavors trickle down to the 
public sphere only as a movement from above. On the other hand, with the inextricable 
matrimony of science and technology, science has also lost its perceived emancipatory 
telos that it gained during the Enlightenment epoch. The aim of reason to emancipate the 
humankind from the throes of despair into which it was thrown by religion was frittered 
away once again with the intervention of politics. Religion, as long as it did not attempt 
to legislate what reality was, had an important role in constituting a goal for human life. 
But with the ascent of reason, it gradually abdicated its authority to science. Science, as 
long as it was concerned with the discovery of the wonders of nature, had an 
emancipatory telos. But, once science started constituting reality by mastering nature and 
altering the balance of nature, it became a dominating force. Science has effectively 
replaced religion as the new religion.  
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As monarchy, oligarchy, timocracy, and tyranny were the political expressions of 
a religious-communitarian society, democracy is the expression of a scientific society.22 
Democracy and science, together, constructed the world of freedom and suffrage. As 
religious institutions of the West fervently proselytized in foreign lands and on many an 
occasion engaged in forcible conversions, which were justified in terms of superior 
knowledge and culture, the present day democracies of the West justify the 
proselytization of democratic practices based on a scientific methodology. But Peirce’s 
experimental method is not aimed at the construction of an infallible foundational 
ideology. But still it suffers from a failure to recognize the infelicities and abuses that 
would have ensued from a total emphasis on experimental methodology.23 Peirce 
explains that synonymous sentences could be used to explain different beliefs and 
antonymous sentences could be used to express similar beliefs.24 Ultimately, the behavior 
determines the efficacy of the belief. Peirce seems to anticipate perlocutionary speech 
acts of Austin.25 While Peirce’s theory explains the problem of beliefs in a refreshingly 
explicit manner, the variance between beliefs could cause gargantuan problems. The 
society is, at once, dogmatic, authoritarian, and speculative. The experimental method 
assumes a community of observers who share the same goals and aspirations. Peirce’s 
provisional hypothesis is applicable to a situation in which interlocutors share values. But 
                                                 
22 Plato, Republic, Trans. F.M. Cornford, Book VIII 
23Probably, the society needs to participate in an orgy in the disenchanted and individuated epoch. The 
absence of Salem witch trials or religious persecutions in the modern day democracies necessitates such a 
display of community ritual in which the community participated whole-heartedly. Such a process is akin 
to the enactment of Greek tragedy and also has a cathartic effect on the collective soul of the society. Wars 
and genocides have been replaced by celebrating capital punishment and following democratic practices 
with religious zeal. 
24 Cited from Baird & Kaufmann, 2000. Refer to C.S. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” p. 388. 
25 John Austin, How to do things with words, Eds., J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975. 
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in a civil society, consensus is difficult to achieve because interlocutors are culturally 
diverse. One can only find adherence to laws of the society, which are guaranteed to elicit 
penal actions from law enforcement. Laws are the religious rituals of liberal democracy. 
 
Peirce’s Community of Observers 
Charles Sanders Peirce viewed the experimental model of science as the pragmatic 
technique for clarifying the meaning of ideas.26 Peirce was opposed to metaphysical 
system building and hence questioned whether determinism should be the postulate of 
science rather than indeterminacy. In his philosophy of evolutionary categories, Peirce 
emphasizes the role of tychism (chance), synechism (continuity), and agapism 
(evolutionary love). In several ways, Peirce’s philosophy has phenomenological leanings. 
Peirce likens people who are unsettled by doubting a concept of truth in science or 
religion to Ostriches that bury their heads in the sand. Doubt is identified with weakness 
and truth with certitude. For Peirce, ultimately, the problem of doubt pertains to the 
community and not restricted to the individual alone. So, Peirce identifies method of 
tenacity with individual belief. The second method of fixing beliefs is that of authority. 
Peirce says that the method of authority is the chosen method of upholding theological 
and political doctrines. In a manner similar to the tirade of Socrates against Athenian 
citizens, Peirce derisively remarks:27  
 
Let the people turn out and tar-and-feather such men, or let inquisitions made into 
the manner of thinking of suspected persons, and when they are found guilty of 
                                                 
26 Paul Kurtz, Ed. American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, New York: Macmillan Company, 
1967. p. 47. 
27 Cited from Baird & Kaufmann. Peirce, p. 378. 
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forbidden beliefs, let them be subjected to some signal punishment. When complete 
agreement could not otherwise be reached, a general massacre of all who have not 
thought in a certain way has proved a very effective means of settling opinion in a 
country. If the power to do this be wanting, let a list of opinions be drawn up, to 
which no man of the least independence of thought can assent, and let the faithful 
be required to accept all these propositions, in order to segregate them as radically 
as possible from the rest of the world.   
 
Peirce claims that the method of authority thrives on religious and political power. The 
individual right is always subordinated to the community need. A feeling of sympathy 
and fellowship creates a very strong bonding which creates an intoxicating social feeling, 
which demands absolute servitude. Such servitude as demanded by institutions such as 
religion, guild, and aristocracy spawns an emphasis on authority. Peirce tellingly points 
out the scheme of intellectual slavery initiated by organized faiths. Peirce’s examples are 
also multi-cultural. The monumental stone structures erected in the name of religion in 
Siam and Egypt illustrates the power of the social feeling of fellowship that characterizes 
religious fervor. Peirce cites the institution of priesthood in religions as the best example 
of authority. The method of authority is challenged by cross-cultural interaction, which 
poses questions about the superiority of the belief perpetrated by the religious or political 
authorities. A reflection on the veracity of knowledge-claims of religious or political 
institutions also causes authority as a method of fixing beliefs to flounder.  
 
A more complex method replaces the method of authority and it is called the a 
priori method. The emphasis on the agreeableness to reason is the basis of the a priori 
method. A description of the a priori method resembles that of the search for an essence 
during romanticism. The uncanniness inherent in human beings would naturally decide 
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what is reasonable in “harmony with natural causes.”28 Peirce refers to Plato’s reasoning 
that “the distances of the celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the 
different length of the strings which produce harmonious chords.”29 The afore-mentioned 
relation appears reasonable but it is not factual. Another universalization that Peirce 
indicates is “the doctrine that man only acts selfishly-that is, from the consideration that 
acting in one way will afford him more pleasure that acting in another.”30 The latter 
observation could be construed as an attack on utilitarian emphasis on pleasure. Peirce is 
skeptical about the a priori method because it depends on social sentiments, accidents, 
and instinct. Only distantly, the a priori method is connected to observation and 
verification of facts. Inductive generalizations are rampant in the a priori method.  
 
Methods of fixing belief such as tenacity, authority, and a priori are capricious 
and unsystematic. Demonstrating external certainty is not possible in the afore-mentioned 
methods of fixing beliefs. Science obeys laws that are not individual but common to all. 
The modes of reasoning in science are not inspirational but factual. Hence, Peirce claims 
that the method of science is the only valid form of inquiry. According to Peirce, science 
resolves the problem of doubt by illustrating practically and objectively the cause of such 
a doubt. On the other hand, Peirce also pointed out that isolated experimentation would 
not contribute to the corpus of scientific knowledge and hence science needs a 
community of observers. Interestingly, Peirce also encouraged the process of formulation 
of scientific hypothesis that would be a precursor to actual experimentation. In this 
                                                 
28 Cited from Baird & Kaufmann, 2000. Peirce, p. 379.  
29 Ibid., 
30 Peirce, p. 380. 
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context, he called the process of trial and error method of formulating successful 
hypothesis abduction. For Peirce, beliefs were not infallible but probable or provisional. 
What Peirce called “critical common sensism” is a perfect example of conjoinment of 
teleological and deontological understanding of the process of science.31 The term 
“common sensism” in terms of reflecting the “sense of the commons” is not critical. But, 
“common sensism” as recognition of the commonly understood but in the backdrop of a 
critical method, which is the scientific method, defines pragmatism as a philosophy, for 
Peirce. The process of consensus among the community of observers operating upon a 
provisional hypothesis enables the confluence of reason and experience. Reason allows 
experience to manifest itself, which results in the phenomenology of the given. Thus, in 
Peirce’s scientific method, procedures, application of procedures and consistent 
readjustment of hypothesis have great importance. Peirce’s emphasis is on the inferential 
relation between the premise and the conclusion of a scientific hypothesis. Peirce 
contends towards the end of “How To Make Our Ideas Clear” that even though there are 
variations in the results in the experimental method as more perfection is achieved, the 
results will tend to converge rather than diverge.  
 
 Peirce’s method of logical inquiry could be applied to the process of achieving 
political consensus. Peirce rejects the need for ultimate foundations in fixing beliefs and 
clarifying doubts.32 Even though Rawls insists on the need for tolerance of variegated 
beliefs and a phenomenological suspension of judgment in the form of ‘veil of 
                                                 
31 James K. Feibleman, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1946. pp. 310-316. 
32 Burch, Robert, "Charles Sanders Peirce", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2001 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/peirce/>  
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ignorance” unlike Peirce’s theory of inquiry, Rawlsian theory of justice is handicapped 
by an ascetic approach which does not engage but withdraws from the world. In some 
ways, Rawlsian approach mirrors that of Romanticism that searches for a deeper self or 
true meaning by valorizing one perspective of a theory of justice.33 On the other hand, the 
scientific objectivating attitude necessary for social rationalization makes Rawlsian 
theory of justice very much a product of the Enlightenment thinking. Rawls utilizes 
economics and sociology to explain inequalities in the distribution of goods. In this 
context, Ronald Dworkin contests Rawls argument that the original position would lead 
to equality of resources. Dworkin argues that only equality of resources would lead to the 
original position.34 
 
 In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas discusses the 
development of moral consciousness in relation to the process of learning and behavior. 
Habermas analyzes moral rationalization on the basis of developmental psychology of 
Piaget, Selman, and Kohlberg.35 The first stage of moral development is based on the 
success or failure of an action and hence at the physical realm. In the second stage, the 
paradigm is “Do unto others that you want to be done to you,” the Golden Rule. Not 
surprisingly, the Golden Rule has been applied in all cultures and religions. Habermas 
criticizes Mead for not going beyond the second stage, even though Mead proposes 
mutual cooperation. The third stage is the Kantian categorical imperative “Never use 
                                                 
33 Charles B. Guignon, On Being Authentic, pp. 49-77. 
34 Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
Volume 10 Number 4, Fall 1981. p. 345. 
35 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Trans. Christian Lenhardt & Shierry 
Weber Nicholsen, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990.  
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others as means to an end.” The last mentioned is the deontological perspective in which 
success or failure of desires becomes immaterial. Only the means of an action becomes 
paramount. The rectitude of the means, especially in the sense of Kantian duty, attains 
foremost importance. In Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches to issues such as justice, 
the deontological perspective predominates. The other two realms as discussed above, is 
not accorded as much importance as the categorical imperative of treating everyone as 
ends and not means. Concepts such as “ideal speech situation” or “overlapping 
consensus” or “reflective equilibrium” target the realms of esteem needs and not the 
preliminary levels of moral development explained by Kohlberg and Sellman.36  
 
For the purpose of achieving a consensus, is it possible to ground the process on 
the supposition of highest moral development? Applying Peirce’s thesis of provisionality 
of hypothesis, a strong emphasis on an emancipatory or altruistic course of moral 
development appears illogical.37 But, Peirce believes very strongly that chance plays an 
important role even in science. The physical world, which is governed by laws, according 
to Peirce, also changes. In Peirce’s logic and scientific method, probability occupies a 
special place. The Hegelian identification of the manifestation of reason in the state and 
the Marxian subversion of the state as the repository of false consciousness seems to lurk 
beneath the surface of most liberal theories. It is in this sense that Peirces’ provisional 
hypothesis about fixation of beliefs is necessary. But, Peirce vehemently argues for 
unconditional love, self-sacrifice, and unlimited community in his ethics. There is a 
                                                 
36 Ibid. pp. 116-167..  
37 The best example of structural violence is the after-effects of colonial freedom struggle. Some other 
examples are genocide in Rwanda, caste and religious violence in India, and other oppressive regimes. All 
the afore-mentioned episodes are justified on altruistic grounds and demand great sacrifice and self-denial.   
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strong sense of asymmetric and communal relationship. Even while discussing the 
problem of evil, Peirce advocates unadulterated love.  
 
 Peirce’s ethics has a strong deontological component. In an almost Kantian tenor, 
Peirce says, “The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim.”38 In another context 
while pursuing his idea of ‘unlimited community,’ Peirce says,39  
…the very first command that is laid upon you, your quite highest business and 
duty, becomes, as everybody knows, to recognize a higher business than your 
business, not merely an avocation after the daily task of your vocation is 
performed, but a generalized conception of duty which completes your 
personality by melting it into the neighboring parts of the universal cosmos. 
 
 
Peirce’s passionately claims that one’s duty is to expand the ethical horizons to 
embrace the whole world. Ethics, for Peirce, is a science of ideals. As a habit, ethical 
action is desirable and logical. Since conduct is a rational action that aims at the ideal 
good of the society, even self-sacrifice must not limit its horizons. In this sense, Peirce 
advocates universal love. He calls evil a limited and imperfect stage of love. In that sense, 
Peirce also separates science and ethics. A question of justice for Peirce, thus, would be 
asymmetrical. Peirce’s conception of an “unlimited community” stems from the finitude 
of human beings and the illogicality of hatred and destruction. Hence, Peirce’s 
deontology is based on the purposelessness of fighting over issues that are ephemeral. 
Peirce’s realism is evident when he emphasizes unconditional love for all. One can sense 
almost Buddhistic non-attachment to the triviality of individual desires vis-à-vis common 
good. Peirce strongly argues that the welfare of the community defines individual goals. 
                                                 
38 James K. Feibleman, p. 386.  
39 Ibid. p. 386. 
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The Original position – Precondition of an Overlapping Consensus 
Rawls’ theory of justice emphasizes the liberal notion of the inviolability of individual 
rights. In the same breadth, Rawls also propounds a proviso, which ensures equal 
distribution of opportunities and resources in a manner advantageous to the under-
privileged groups in a society. The original position, according to Rawls, is the initial 
situation. Rawls says, “These principles are those which rational persons concerned to 
advance their interests would accept in this position of equality to settle the basic terms of 
their association.” Later, Rawls claims, “The original position is defined in such a way 
that it is a status quo in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the 
outcome is not conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social 
forces.”40 In the following quotation, Rawls refutes the utilitarian theory of the greatest 
good of greatest numbers. According to Rawls,41  
 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
a society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of 
justice for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not 
allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of 
advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the rights secured by 
justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. 
 
Rawls’ afore-mentioned emphasis on deontology is aimed at preempting purposive 
rationalization, that is, a theory of justice as a confluence of individual interests. An 
emphasis on purposive-teleological rationality encourages individual pursuit of 
happiness. Rawls, by emphasizing the deontological aspects of theory of justice, ensures 
                                                 
40 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 102-104. 
41 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 3-4. 
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an overlapping consensus based on shared consent, mutual respect, reciprocity, fairness 
in terms of equality and opportunity and other primary goods. But Rawls’ ‘difference 
principle’ is akin to the Lockean proviso that characterizes his theory of property.42 
Rawls acknowledges the existence of inherent inequalities in a society. But by 
propounding the condition of ‘Original position’ which when characterized by a ‘veil of 
ignorance’ leads to the two principles of justice, Rawls ignores the historicity of the 
social understanding of democracy.  
 
A Lockean program for the colonization of the American continent was based on 
the justification of acquiring landed property on the basis of labor.43 Equality and human 
rights were not universal ideals during Locke’s era. But it is quite clear that for Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau, slavery was not as unproblematic as it was for other philosophers 
and thinkers of their era. There is definitely a paradigm shift from ‘what ought to be’ to 
‘what is to be done,’ especially, in Hobbes and Locke. A strong emphasis on individual 
rights and property was a great leap in political philosophy for the reason that a less 
comprehensive doctrine of social and political conceptualization was being introduced in 
the West. The British society, during the period of Hobbes and Locke, was governed by 
strict religious dictates that spawned the entire spectrum of life. Hence, horizontal socio-
political associations and voluntary associations were available only to the upper classes. 
But with a common law ensuring the safety and security of the individuals without 
reference to the class or creed of the people brought about a great revolution in Britain.  
                                                 
42  John Locke, Two Treatise of Government, London: A. Millar et al., 1764. Cited from B.J. Diggs, The 
State, Justice, and the Common Good. Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Company, 1974. pp. 75-76. 
43 Ibid. pp. 75-76. 
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By ordaining the state with the responsibility of guaranteeing safety and security 
of the individuals, social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke engineered a formula 
that benefited both the state and the citizens. Hitherto, the state was corporate and hence 
encumbered by lugubrious inefficiency on account of its monumental administrative 
tasks. Since, religion, education, sports, arts, economy, and foreign policy were all 
concentrated in the hands of the state the task of administration became cumbersome and 
unwieldy. With the diminution of religious and social tasks, which were to be followed 
by the liberalization of trade, the state became more efficient in delegating authority 
whereby ensuring responsibility. Thus, social contract and later democracy rescued the 
suffering state. With social responsibility vested in the individuals, social values 
underwent a tremendous change. Institutions that were more democratic and reciprocal 
such as constitution, parliament, congress, courts, and elections gradually replaced the 
elite political systems that installed institutions and established values.  
 
One can deduce the unmistakable imprint of the Enlightenment reason, which had 
quashed the divine rights theory or even a theory of privilege masquerading as a theory of 
natural selection. In many ways, Socratic polis is a paradox and reveals the maladies of a 
comprehensive and centralized state. Socrates also assumes an original position in the 
form of selection and training regimen for the auxillaries. The laborers and 
handicraftsmen are naturally bereft of qualities that are to be found in the guardians and 
auxillaries. The Socratic Republic indicates the failure of a totally deontological system 
and the need for teleological action. A Republic exists as a just state, which is 
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purposive.44 In order to maintain the sanctity of the Republic, those factors that do not 
assist in the betterment of the Republic have to be weeded out.   
 
For Rawls, the original position entails the foundation of an equitable system of 
social equality and freedom. Rawls assumes those conditions as a given in a liberal 
democracy what Hobbes and Locke envisioned as proposed guarantees. In Rawls’ theory 
of justice, the goods that were so important for Hobbes and Locke are already enshrined 
in a constitutional democracy and hence the ascent to the next stage is that of justice for 
all. Hobbes and Locke enunciated a social contract theory, which also assumed certain 
shared qualities of human beings. Both Hobbes and Locke were influenced by Newtonian 
mechanics, particularly, and science, in general. Hence, the concept of ‘becoming’ 
assumed more importance to that of ‘being.’  
 
Rawls does not accord importance to the process of expertization of the liberal 
public sphere. But Rawls did not apply the methodology of science because of an 
inversion in the conception of politics. Aristotle’s good life in a polis is not the basis of 
Rawlsian minimal conception of the role of politics. Instead of integrating the horizontal 
(an emphasis on addressing those issues that affect the society in the present) and vertical 
concepts of development (future-oriented objectives), Rawls precludes politics from 
social reality by performing an epoche on everything except what could be simplified as 
food, clothing, and shelter. Thus, politics, which is hailed as the mother of all sciences by 
Aristotle, has been reduced to a discipline that can arbitrate issues, which do not brook 
                                                 
44 Plato, Republic, Trans. F.M. Cornford, 1945.  
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emotional or ideological responses. Thus, in Peircean parlance, Rawls’ theory of justice 
only aspires to be an a priori theory of fixing beliefs in the political arena.  
 
Rawls’ theory of justice operates on the concept of arriving at a consensus, which 
faintly resembles Peirce’s experimental method of inquiry. The foundational principle of 
Rawls’ theory of justice is the ‘Original position.’45 The ‘Original position’ is a situation 
in which individual interests are kept in abeyance and only a rational approach to 
common interest is suggested. Among a community of believers in the rectitude of 
reason, the two principles of justice, namely, the principle of equal opportunity and the 
difference principle will be the final rational evolutes. Rawls believes that there would be 
consensus in the process of distribution of resources because of the absence of individual 
interests. A veil of ignorance is the self-imposed restriction on rationalization on the basis 
of individual interests and goods. According to Rawls, in the Original position none will 
be advantaged or disadvantaged by social or natural contingencies. While Rawls’ 
approach is less comprehensive, the procedural approach itself is a long-term approach. A 
procedural approach to the concept of social justice demands a very strong commitment 
to the process, which is not debatable. While Rawls does not define a hierarchy of ends, 
rational interlocutors would decide for themselves whether the principles chosen to 
represent the process of realizing justice is fair to all. Rawls tries to conjoin rational 
foundations and pragmatic functionalism.  
 
                                                 
45 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 15-19. 
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 The theory of justice is comprehensive because it follows a causal argument 
ensuing from the concept of impartiality of reason and scientific objectivity. Rawls’ 
theory of justice is comprehensive in terms of cultural universals and not in terms of 
cultural particulars. Rawls’ thought experiment is thoroughly an Enlightenment ideal 
recast in the mold of twentieth century liberal democracy. A concept of Aristotelian 
eudaimonia with the social conditions of a Greek polis is more comprehensive while 
Rawlsian approach is less comprehensive because of the triumph of individual rights and 
right to property in a democracy. The foundational principles of Rawls’ theory of justice, 
principle of equal opportunity and the difference principle are constant. Only a process of 
institutionalization of justice in the form of laws, institutions, and government policies 
could usher in social change. Reflective equilibrium, the state of theory merging with the 
practice, which is asymptotic to the say, the least, maintains an emphasis on the 
principles of justice.46  
 
Rawlsian theory of justice needs both empirical and theoretical justification as 
indicated by Dworkin.47 By neglecting theoretical justification of a theory of justice, 
Rawls does not accord importance to the critical evaluation of empirical justification. A 
theory of justice encounters great difficulties when faced with ethical dilemma, scientific 
issues, and political decision-making. While Rawls might eschew a comprehensive 
theory of justice in order to avoid controversial and vexatious claims that are ideological 
in nature, a compartmentalized view of human lifeworld into public and private spheres 
has never been able to withstand the onslaught of media, government, religion, and 
                                                 
46 Rawls, pp. 18-19. 
47 Wolfe & Hittinger, pp. 23-42. 
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technology. Unless Rawls proves the absolute separation of physical and mental qualities 
of human beings, the attitude of avoidance amounts to an act of ascetic withdrawal from 
the hostile world. As enworlded subjects, human beings do not have the luxury of 
withdrawing from the world.  
 
 Most of the theories on justice are hampered by either an entirely comprehensive 
or minimalistic approach. In order to have an effective theory of social justice, there is a 
need for not only normatively regulated approach but also a theory of justice that speaks 
to people both at the individual and social realms. That is a theory of justice or good have 
to be of interest to the society as well as the individual. There have been several attempts 
from Plato to Rawls to situate a theory of justice as a communal virtue or as an individual 
motivational principle. In all these approaches, there is a tacit assumption that people 
want to live in a certain way. Interestingly, Chanakya and Machiavelli also arrived at the 
conclusion that people yearn to live peacefully with their families and aspire for wealth. 
There is a tendency not to consider human life as a mixture of both good and bad. Liberal 
democracy is an approach, which harnesses the good and discourages the bad with 
respect to individual rights. Any absolute frame of reference for good and bad is not 
amenable to addressing problems addressing social justice at different levels, as the 
paradigm of religion proved. Religious faith sought eternity in an ephemeral world. 
Hence, Rawls constructs his theory of justice on a soft consensus that ignores social 
situations.  
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Problems in Peircean and Rawlsian Models of Consensus 
I will first discuss the problems associated with Peirce’s experimental method and then 
Rawls’ procedural method. In Peirce’s method, the appearance-reality problematic of 
Plato remains alive. While science is not a vain search for Utopia, for Peirce, it is 
inherently better than other methods of affixing beliefs such as tenacity, authority, and 
the a priori method because of its provisional foundations and critical methodology. But 
on the other hand, science is also a social construct and it battles other disciplines for 
being the tool of social change. What Peirce also considers the convergence of logical 
thinking and scientific knowledge necessarily requires the eclipse of methods of tenacity, 
authority, and a priori. I emphasize that even scientific method contains appeals to 
tenacity, authority, and a priori justification since science is institutionalized. This was 
the reason why Karl Popper recommended falsification as the method of ascertaining the 
validity of scientific theories. 
  
In the course of time, science also spawned institutions akin to religious institutions. 
Religious institutions had the priestly class, the oligarchic patrons, powerful rulers, and 
loyal followers.48 Science has effectively replaced religion with its own hierarchy with 
the experts on top of the hierarchy. As Lyotard predicted, governments and experts have 
a mutually enriching relationship as long as the relationship is cooperative to the agenda 
of the government. But with great technological advancements, governments need 
technocrats and not just bureaucratic administrators. Such a class requirement only serves 
                                                 
48 Stephen Turner, “Religious Pluralism, Toleration, and Liberal Democracy: Past, Present, and Future,” in 
Religion and the Political Order, p. 278. 
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to cement the hegemony of the educated elites, which is meritocracy, admixed with 
aristocracy. Such an arrangement led Plato to anoint Philosopher-King as the ideal 
concoction of reason and spirit. In a society composed of “noble lies,” such a concoction 
of qualities (Gold, Silver, Iron or Bronze) is plausible.  
 
The dilemma of convincing the people about the imperative need to change a system 
of governance underscores two possibilities. On the one hand, it takes a long time for a 
system of governance to change procedurally. On the other, democracy, which is a 
“government by discussion”, is problematic because of the universalistic ideals that 
characterize a conception of democratic polity in general. One of the prime examples 
given by Turner in Liberal Democracy 3.0 is that of Rawls’ theory of justice.  
 
Rawlsian theory of justice takes into consideration a sample of people who are 
already democratic and hence already into the scheme of social rationalization particular 
to liberal democracy. Furthermore, the sample of people chosen also has an ideal though 
minimal in the Rawlsian sense. Thus, whether one person or a group of persons 
imagining oneself in the situation of the original position would come up only with the 
two Rawlsian principles of justice. Rawls tacitly applies the experimental method of 
Peirce and introduces an Aristotelian intent. Hence, Rawls wants to conjure a science of 
morality. It is a vividly Aristotelian project sans social stratification. Even though Turner 
criticizes Rawls for not taking into account the impact of science in determining the 
character of liberal democracy, following the tradition of pragmatism, Rawls and other 
political theorists have imbibed the scientific method adopted by both Peirce and Dewey. 
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The ‘guiding principle’ and ‘provisional hypothesis’ of Peirce find an echo in Rawls as 
original position and a veil of ignorance respectively. While Peirce is optimistic about his 
experimental method and the application of the consensus among scientists to the realm 
of everyday discourse, Rawls banishes science from the political realm. It is ironical that 
Rawls says that the science follows a different methodology that cannot be discussed in 
the political realm. But Rawls’ notion of a healthy liberal democracy assumes the 
following about a good society.49  
 
1. No sexual discrimination 
2. No racial discrimination 
3. No religious discrimination 
4. No social discrimination 
 
The afore-mentioned injunctions require laws supported by scientific procedures from 
fields such as economics, statistics, biology, and physics, to name a few. Laws necessary 
entail enforcement of penalties in case of infringement. Science disproves bogus theories 
about evolution of human beings, sexual differences, and rational capacity.  
 
Rawls assumes a pervasive sense of a humaneness as the foundation of a 
democratic community as a given. In Rawls’monumental work on justice, one can find a 
                                                 
49 David M. Adams, Philosophical Problems in the Law, Belmont: Wadsworth, 2005. pp. 276-381. For 
excellent articles and case studies on affirmative action, non-discrimination, equality, and race please refer 
to the book mentioned above. Though Rawls does not explicitly state specific forms of discrimination, I 
have taken the liberty of assuming that he would not object to my assumptions about equality and non-
discrimination so important to his concept of the original position and a veil of ignorance.  
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divergence of good and justice. This divergence also impacts Rawls conception of natural 
duties and institutional obligations. Rawls himself discusses how his theory of justice 
takes an Archimedean standpoint because of its emphasis on long-term wellness of the 
society. Rawls also emphasizes how individual desires that conflict with the principles of 
justice are to be discouraged.50 But contrary to Rawls’ claim that justice supersedes good, 
justice is also a good. Perhaps, as Socrates claims in the Republic, justice is the highest 
good. As Joseph Raz, William Galston and Alasdair MacIntyre emphasize relentlessly, at 
least a minimal perfectionism is necessary.51 In his chapter on “Justice in Political 
Economy,” Rawls speaks of “embedding ideals in our working principles” which 
encapsulates the necessary connection between short-term and long-term goals. But what 
Rawls maintains as the independence of the theory of justice from the existing wants and 
needs is not possible by a less comprehensive theory of fairness.52 I strongly argue that 
the process of establishing a just society is a positive conception, which requires a 
metamorphosis of the existing social conditions that ferment injustices in the society.  
 
An ideal thought-experiment while functioning as a driving force needs an 
overlapping consensus with the progressive elements of the various arms of the society 
such as science, religion, law, and education. While disciplines such as economics, law, 
and science have changed the conception of social reality, an emphasis on a political and 
non-comprehensive theory of justice is based on a conception of a static self. Charles 
Guignon describes the drastic transformation of even the conception of a social self from 
                                                 
50 Rawls, ATJ, pp. 231-232. 
51 Wolfe & Hittinger, Eds.  Liberalism at the Crossroads, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1994. 
52 Rawls, ATJ, p. 231. 
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the pre-modern to post-modern epoch.53 Globalization has mandated the need for a 
comprehensive re-evaluation of the concept of justice. Both Rawls and Peirce emphasize 
deontology. But Rawls espouses a policy of avoidance while Peirce advocates active 
engagement. Rawls posits an ideal beginning, which would lead to an ideal outcome. 
Peirce’s scientific method is “a search for the laws demanded by the facts and inclusive 
of them.”54  
 
Feibleman claims that Peirce learnt from Kant’s observation that self-love propel 
people to act. The logical connection begins with the individual and ends ultimately with 
the universe. According to Peirce, human beings are driven towards the possession of 
ecumenical things. But, paradoxically, everything in this world is ephemeral and the 
community of such things, he calls an ‘unlimited community.’55  
 
I conclude from the afore-mentioned argument of Peirce that a consensus in a 
multiculturally diverse society must logically begin with the analysis of the metaphysics 
of relations between conflicting practices and extend it to the ‘unlimited community.’ 
This is the ideal. But Peirce also claims that consensus could be elusive due to 
interpersonal and social factors. This is the reality. Peirce’s paradox presages Kenneth 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that individual interests and social choices 
are logically divergent.56 I have tried to argue in the course of the chapter that individual 
and social components are integral to any social, political, or scientific enterprise. A 
                                                 
53 Guignon, pp. 107-109. 
54 Feibleman, p. 47. 
55 Ibid. p. 46. 
56 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. 
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consensus in the political arena necessarily needs a provisional hypothesis that engages 
on the one hand, beliefs that emanate from tenacity, authority, and a priori reasoning, and 
on the other, illustrates and justifies the superiority of the scientific method. Democracy 
is entwined with the concept of provisional hypothesis because even ideal original 
positions are subject to a provisional consensus. Based on the provisionality and 
justificatory nature of the method of hypothesis when applied to a social and political 
system, preparatory conditions of a partial or limited consensus are established. This is 
the strength of any participatory democracy, whether it is communitarian or liberal. 
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Chapter 4 
Kwasi Wiredu – The Akan Conception of Communitarian Consensus 
 
In the first chapter, I applied Charles Taylor’s framework of modern social imaginaries to 
analyze the character of civil societies. Society, morality, and polity derive their 
legitimacy from the social imaginary of a culture. In the context of the United States, the 
bitter antagonism between the Democratic and the Republican parties reminds one of the 
Ghanaian imagery of two crocodiles with one stomach and fighting over food. Partisan 
politics in democratic societies emphasizes political success and not consensus. Because 
of antagonistic relationship between different political parties intent on furthering the 
interests of their supporters, social imaginary is fractured. Such a fractured social 
imaginary leads to a thoroughly confused civil society. The Democratic and the 
Republican absorption with each other, prevents a more ecumenical understanding of the 
world. Consensual politics, which is considered to be one of the defining features of 
advanced democracies, is rare in the United States or any multi-party democratic politics. 
In this chapter, I advance the thesis that plausibility of consensus is more in traditional 
African communitarian societies than in multi-party democracies. I also explain the 
equilibrium between solidarity and subsidiarity that exists in the Akan political system. 
Solidarity is the unified social imaginary, which is broadly shared in a culture. The Akan 
have a strong cultural identity. Subsidiarity is the element that cements mutual social 
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relationships between individuals. It is a necessary condition for social cooperation, in 
other words consensus. 
 
The absurdity that prevents consensus in our lifeworld is epitomized by the 
Ghanaian imagery of two crocodiles having the same stomach but fighting over food. The 
Akan community in Ghana followed a system of consensual decision-making process, 
traditionally. But the emphasis on consensus has suffered due to the shift in the social 
imaginary of Ghana from traditional Akan community to colonial Ghana and then to 
post-colonial Ghana. The sense of solidarity and subsidiarity that is organically fostered 
in a communitarian society is entangled in the quagmire of competitive and avaricious 
individualism that is alien to the Ghanaian social imaginary due to colonization. Thus, 
African thinkers such as Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, and Kwame Anthony Appiah 
emphasize the need for cultural decolonization of African thought.  
 
Kwasi Wiredu especially emphasizes a system of consensual democracy with no 
parties.1 Wiredu argues that traditional Ghanaian decision-making was non-majoritarian. 
Wiredu further goes on to say that in parliamentary or other forms of majoritarian 
democracy, only the winning political grouping has greater power on decision-making. 
Wiredu says, “It is, then, from a consensus-oriented standpoint, a system that is 
frequently deleterious of genuine representation, that is, representation beyond 
parliamentary window-dressing.”  
 
                                                 
1 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. pp. 
143-144. Hence forth abbreviated as CUP. 
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The Need for Conceptual Decolonization of African philosophy  
 
The conceptual colonization of African tradition has debilitated the conceptual schema of 
African thought process. While manifestation of external influence is cause enough for 
concern, dearth of scholars trained in traditional African thought in modern Ghana is far 
more appalling. The superimposition of an alien thought-schema on traditional African 
culture, language, religion, and political institutions has created conceptual complications 
for African philosophers in distinguishing what is traditional African thought. An 
impartial and critical analysis of the conceptual schema of native African thought 
requires decolonization of modern African thought.  
 
While educated Africans were twice removed from their own culture due to 
colonization, scholars from erstwhile colonial powers have written extensively about the 
African culture. The already de-Africanized post-colonial Africans have recourse mainly 
to those texts written by non-Africans scholars about Africa. Some writings that were 
inaccurate created artificial philosophical, linguistic, and religious muddles. Kwasi 
Wiredu lists several concepts such as God, Reality, Being, Existence, Belief, Knowledge, 
Faith, World, and Universe prevalent in African cultures, which have been distorted due 
to conceptual inaccuracies in their rendition into Western languages.2 Kwame Gyekye 
cites the works of Horton, which characterize entire African thought as collective, rigidly 
                                                 
2 Kwasi Wiredu, CUP, pp., 136-137.  
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monolithic, lacking inter-theoretic competition and alternative possibilities.3 Wiredu 
delineates three factors that cause conceptual colonization the most. They are as follows:4 
 
1. Language 
2. Religion 
3. Politics 
 
Wiredu cites the example of Cartesian skepticism, which is explicated by the famous 
method of doubt. The Cartesian claim for explaining certainty is Cogito ergo sum [I 
think, therefore I am]. Wiredu explains the complex process involved in unraveling the 
philosophical import of the Cartesian doubt in Akan. Descartes’ attempt to illustrate 
infallible certainty would be very difficult to formulate in Akan for the simple reason that 
in the Akan conceptual schema, there is no place for infallible proposition. The Akan 
discourse assumes that knowledge is possible without being infallible and at the same 
time recognizing that certainty is not possible at all times. Hence, “I think, therefore I 
am,” translates into a variety of expressions such as:5 
 
1. I know very clearly or I know very clearly therefore I am there. [Minim pefee or 
Minim koronyee enti mewoho ] 
2. I very much know. [Minim papaapa] 
 
                                                 
3 Kwame Gyekye, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1987. pp. 44-45. 
4 Ibid. p. 136.  
5 Wiredu, CUP, p. 139.  
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The level of conceptual colonization is evident from responses from John Mbiti who 
argues that the Cartesian dictum ‘I’ must be replaced with ‘We.’ Leopold Senghor 
averred that traditional Africans had a participatory view of knowledge and hence would 
rather say, “I feel, I dance the Other; I am.”6 Alexis Kagame points out the absurdity of ‘I 
am’ in Bantu since it always has to be followed by an attribute or an adjunct of a place. 
Mind, in Akan, is conceived as an ability to think and does not the status of an entity.  
 
Wiredu indicates the conceptual incongruity between traditional conception of the 
universe as the place in which human beings exist and divining a mythology about the 
creation of universe along the lines of Christianity which requires the postulation of a 
creator God. While a religious affiliation or conversion to the religion introduced by the 
colonizers does not indicate an abdication to colonial mentality, a steadfast refusal to 
evaluate critically the beliefs of one’s religion does smack of irrationality. Wiredu argues 
that an uncritical mixture of indigenous and foreign religions have led to severe 
distortions in the African conceptual schema.7  
 
 The third avenue, which has been completely distorted by colonial domination, is 
the political system of Africa. All African countries had their own system of governance. 
Governing bodies were of two kinds; centralized and decentralized. In both forms of 
governance, political representation of various groups was accorded importance. Wiredu 
and Gyekye, specifically mention the political system of the Akans in Ghana that arrived 
at decisions through consensus. The Akan system of decision-making emphasizes a 
                                                 
6 Ibid. p. 140. 
7 Ibid. pp. 142-143.  
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political rule by consent through consensus, which is more rigorous than any modern 
system of democracy.  
 
Western democracies, especially, the Anglo-American system of democracy, are 
attuned more towards transaction of daily business. The decision-making has to be short 
and swift so that time is not lost in haranguing over disputes. Time is translatable into 
money in Western democracies that are maintained by advanced liberal economies. 
Hence, the market considerations are more important than humanistic considerations. 
But, in Akan, for example, the political process could not avoid consensus. The 
empowerment of each person as an indispensable part of a community supersedes any 
other consideration. Since each person is considered invaluable as a member of the 
community, considerations ranging from individual human rights, personhood, and 
ethical obligations are imbedded in the process of consensual mediation.  
 
In Akan, the person and the community are intertwined. Hence, there are no 
separate armies; no bureaucrats; and no landowners. Land is jointly owned by the 
lineage. Each person as a part of the community performs all the aforementioned 
functions. Western democracies adhere to a majoritarian decision-making process. This 
alienates a huge chunk of people who do not form a part of the winning majority. In 
Africa, the traditional African form of government by consensus was not encouraged 
during the colonial rule. The British government insisted on a multi-party democracy 
with elections as a precondition for independence. Most of the African countries accepted 
the system of multi-party democracy foisted on them only to get independence from 
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ruling foreign powers. Once independence was attained, the elected rulers became 
dictatorial and dissolved all opposition parties. One-party system was introduced in most 
African states.  
 
Even though Africa boasted of leaders such as Leopold Senghor, Kwame 
Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere who were highly educated freedom 
fighters, all of them banned other political parties and garnered power. The lack of 
critical counsel and accountability, which was the defining feature of traditional African 
political systems, severely damaged the cultural, social, economic, and political fabric of 
nascent post-colonial African states. The quagmire created by despotic leaders of the 
newly independent African states created incalculable amount of suffering.  
 
Liberal Democracies and Adversarial Politics 
Colonial powers such as Britain and France forcibly introduced majoritarian democracy 
as a pre-condition for the independence of their colonies. Questions could be raised about 
the rationale for laying down the precondition of democratization of traditional societies 
that had a communitarian form of government. The political, geographical, and cultural 
landscapes of the colonized countries have been ravaged beyond redemption. Hence, by 
installing a system of democracy with which people did not identify what were the 
chances of such a country surviving as a unified political entity? Democracy and colonial 
rule being oxymoronic, what was the rationale behind the insistence of the colonial 
powers on a democratic form of government as the precondition for freedom? Only the 
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educated elite of the colonized countries had exposure to the process of that foreign style 
of democracy while the vast multitude was never educated in that system of democracy.  
 
In countries such as India, during the colonial rule, monarchy was operative and 
the governance was based on village, town, and city administrations that still followed 
the native system of governance. The British had taken over the top administration and 
the Viceregal powers regulated the already existing forms of governance. The kings, 
petty kings, and other regional rulers were made subservient to the British crown. The 
British, who left religious, cultural and ethnic demography of India mostly unmolested, 
undertook very limited structural transformation of the social sphere. Only for strategic 
reasons, did the British encourage the Hindu-Muslim divide and later sow the seeds of 
dissension between the Hindus, the Sikhs, and the Muslims. After decades of struggle, 
the British granted Indians limited political participation at the state level while the final 
decision-making authority was with the British. The British had also trained Indians in 
the democratic system of governance and hence a transition to democracy was less 
problematic compared to several other newly independent colonies.  
 
But, in Africa as well as in Asia, what caused gargantuan miseries to the 
population was the arbitrary division or formation of nation-states based on religion, 
tribal affiliation and ethnicity. In some cases such as Nigeria, arbitrary grouping of tribes 
into one nation has led to calamitous consequences. While colonial powers attempted to 
religiously homogenize the colonies with the objective of civilizing the barbarous native 
population in many countries, as the religious climate changed in the mother country 
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giving way to democratic forms of political legitimation, those new ideas were 
introduced into the colonies without any time for gradual assimilation or organic 
development. Thus, within a space of a few decades, the conceptual schema of the 
colonized countries underwent frequent changes, which totally unsettled the social and 
political systems that evolved organically. Colonialism was also a cultural invasion. In 
that sense, both good and bad aspects of the colonizing cultures intermingled with the 
native culture of the colonies. After independence from the colonial powers, those 
cultures that could not disentangle the complex web of inter-cultural miasma hurtle down 
the path of self-destruction. The process of cultural de-colonization involves both 
learning and unlearning that requires cultural self-reflection.  
 
After democracy became the ruling form of government in all colonizing 
countries, the logical corollary was to introduce the same system of governance in the 
colonies. The colonies were devastated in the spheres of economy, politics, religion and 
education after being ruled by foreign powers for several decades. Christianity was used 
to “civilize” the native population of the colonies; democracy was also introduced as a 
system of governance not with any consideration to the social and political framework of 
the colonized countries but because it was the only system of political legitimation 
known to the colonizing powers. The process of aggressive democratization undertaken 
by Britain and the United States in the twenty first century also has a dogmatic element 
but in a manner much different from the French and the British as colonizers.  
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When Britain withdrew from India, Iraq, Pakistan, Ghana and other countries 
after ending its colonial rule, all those countries were required to design a democratic 
constitution. But, in the present climate, constitutional democracy has assumed the 
proportions of a religious dogma. With the separation of the Church and the State, the 
only good-in-itself whose specter lurks even beyond cultural, religious, and geographical 
identities is democracy, the religion. Democracy has assumed a transcendental identity 
and, in a manner reminiscent of all religious ideologies, shuns immanent critique. 
Democracy is the state religion of the twenty-first century. 
 
Wiredu rejects both multi-party democracy and one-party rule for Africa. While 
the multi-party democracy is majoritarian and power-oriented, the one-party rule is more 
despotic. Hence, Wiredu advocates a system of non-party democracy devised along the 
lines of traditional African systems. Such a non-party system of democracy could be a 
very important structural adjustment in diverse civil societies such as those found in 
India, Nigeria and even the United States which is increasingly becoming a home to 
multi-lingual and multi-ethnic population with more concrete-identities. Wiredu’s 
analysis indicates the flaws in a bi-partisan political system found in countries such as the 
United States.  
 
In a two-party system, diverse interests are broadly classified and identified with 
either of the parties contesting statewide and nationwide elections. Only those interests 
that have powerful financial and political support achieve their ends whereas the voices 
of people who belong to the downtrodden sections of the society are seldom heard. While 
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the separation of the Church, the state, and the market has benefited the people in general, 
the strong nexus between the market and the state prejudices the political authority. Even 
civil society which in democracies plays a very pivotal role in galvanizing public opinion 
on issues of common welfare does not have as much access to the corridors of political 
power as the multi-national corporations. In most cases, issues such as health-care, 
education, security, and social justice are debated endlessly and totally politicized in a 
partisan manner. Proceduralism, unwittingly, contributes to the dilatory tactics of partisan 
interests.  
 
Procedurally, in a democratically elected body such as the United States Senate or 
Congress, the Republican and the Democratic parties have to pass laws by a majority 
vote. In an atmosphere vitiated by diametrically opposite interests, both parties wrangle 
over the items that need to be added or deleted for a bill to pass in the Senate or the 
Congress. Finally, when a compromise is reached, a skeletal law that is a pale 
resemblance of the original draft of the law is passed. More often than not, the most 
powerful interests would have influenced the outcome of the law or bill and the interests 
of the common people would have been neglected.  
 
The supporters of a competitive and adversarial politics of the democratic system 
found in the United States would indicate the efficacy of the decision-making powers of 
the Senate and the Congress. The deliberative politics in the United States is unequivocal 
in ensuring legal safeguards, which guarantee the individual rights of the people. But, 
even in the court of law, the legal process benefits those with access to good lawyers, 
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financial support, media exposure, and the willingness to tenaciously pursue a lawsuit. 
Even law is politicized in the United States because people elect judges, district 
attorneys, and sheriffs according to their party affiliation. Thus, ultimately, procedures 
that have been agreed to by the Democrats and the Republicans determine what is true or 
false and good or bad.  
 
The domination of corporate interests and emphasis on majority decision-making 
is justified by an appeal to possessive individualism and ethical egoism, which 
culminates in the reluctance to coordinate social actions on the basis of common welfare 
interests.8 By encouraging ethical egoism, the welfare of less privileged population is 
neglected. Such an emphasis on individual self-interest that evolves into selfishness could 
be traced to the total inviolability of individual rights and property as instituted by 
Locke.9 Hobbes and Locke also influenced Jefferson and Madison who encouraged 
science, public schools, economic independence of individuals and a separation of 
religion and state.10 Benjamin Franklin was a proponent of Republican ideals and 
represented the mercantile interests of America quite admirably.11  
 
                                                 
8 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962. While Macpherson’s emphasis on possessive individualism as the defining feature 
of modern liberal tradition of Hobbes and Rousseau is persuasive, several thinkers disagree strongly with 
such an emphasis.  Joseph Carens, James Tully, Jane Mansbridge, and several others have disagreed with 
Macpherson’s characterization of modernity. Refer to Joseph H. Carens, Ed. Democracy and Possessive 
Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy of C.B. Macpherson, New York: SUNY Press, 1993.  
9 T.O. Lloyd, The British Empire 1558-1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. pp. 41-46. Also refer 
to C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962. 
10 Henry Adams, The History of the United States of America, Ed. Ernest Samuels, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1967. 
11 T.O. Lloyd, pp. 78, 89. 
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While Protestant religious ideals were a binding factor, economic interests 
predominantly influenced American society because of an emphasis on property and 
individual rights as envisaged by Locke. Even today, welfare measures of the government 
of the United States always face opposition from the Libertarians because distribution of 
property under any guise is an attempt to distribute property. Even the changing face of 
the United States which has increasingly integrated people from scores of nations into its 
society and the need for investments in social security, education, science and 
technology, and infrastructural development has little impact on the Libertarians and the 
Republicans who zealously protect their inviolable right to property. Thus, American 
civil society is riven by a conflict between the republican and the liberal ideologies. Both  
ideologies have allied with interest groups for support. In spite of the United States 
having drastically transformed into a multi-cultural society, both conservative and liberal 
ideologies do not encourage a system of coalition government democracy with more 
representation from under-represented ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups.  
 
Effects of Cultural Colonization of Africa 
Wiredu’s non-party democracy could theoretically redress the problems of non-
representation or under-representation of several cultural, ethnic and racial groups that 
feel disenfranchised due to a lack of recognition of their problems. Gyekye and Wiredu 
concur on the conceptual reconstruction required to rediscover the cultural past of Africa 
and chart a path to the future, through a turbulent present. Africa of the future needs 
address issues that arise from colonization in the linguistic, cultural, and political spheres. 
In this context, Gyekye analyzes problems inherent to the traditional African corpus of 
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knowledge. Some problems discussed by Gyekye are technological skill, scientific 
knowledge, rights of the spouses in the event of death of the other, one-lineage rule, and 
women’s rights.12 Wiredu also mentions the disadvantages of a commentarial tradition 
vis-à-vis written or scriptural traditions of philosophy found in the West and the East. 
Gyekye evaluates both positive and negative aspects of post-colonial African culture. 
Wiredu and Gyekye also recognize the need to challenge distortions of African 
philosophical thought caused by the discoloration of African culture, language, and 
religion during colonial rule. Okot p’Bitek lambasts Western studies of African religious 
texts for their ulterior motives. Okot p’Bitek cites several instances in which incorrect 
assumptions have completely distorted the meaning of religious beliefs.  
 
Wiredu’s example of the Akan concept of “Anyamesom” will elucidate the lack of 
linguistic clarity in English accounts of the Akan practices. The root of “Anyamesom” is 
“Onyame.” Roughly translated “Anyamesom” means “service of God.” The word 
“Onyame” translates into Akan “supreme being.” Christian scholars have translated Akan 
religion as “Abosomsom.” “Som” means “service” and “Obo” means “stone.” Akan 
religion is then translated as “the service of the stone service.” The Akans do believe that 
some spirits reside in stones and natural objects. But they do not have any service for the 
stones. They do not even worship Onyame, their supreme being. Hence, the Judeo-
Christian belief system has been unreflectively transposed on the Akan belief system.13 
                                                 
12 Gyekye, Kwame. Tradition and Modernity, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. pp. 217-271. 
13 Okot p’Bitek, p’Bitek, African Religions in Western Scholarship, Nairobi: East African Literature 
Bureau. p. 109. Okot p’Bitek argues that Akan God is made for man and not vice versa.  
p’Bitek, Religions of the Central Luo, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1971. 
Ghanaian philosopher Oguah also criticizes the cultural bias against African philosophy.  
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P’Bitek attributes the flippant translations to the motive of defending colonialism and 
demeaning African religions. As Wiredu believes, de-Christianization of African 
religions is a very important step in disentangling the thread of colonization of African 
culture. Religion and culture cannot be de-colonized without recourse to linguistic 
devices. Hence, it is necessary for the Africans to philosophize epistemic and 
metaphysical concepts in their own language.  
 
Destructive Power of Colonial Myths 
In the political arena, the most cataclysmic effect was brought about in Rwanda and 
Burundi. The gradual injection of the Hamitic hypothesis into the psyche of both Hutus 
and Tutsis was responsible for the eruption of genocidal violence.14 Mahmood 
Mamdani’s work on the factors that contributed to the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda and 
Burundi traces it to the strong belief in the Hamitic hypothesis of both Hutus and Tutsis. 
The Tutsis were considered to be different from the Hutus on account of the former being 
Hamitic. The Christian fables have a story about the curse of Noah who was the father of 
Ham. Noah cursed Ham for showing disrespect to him. Thus, Ham’s son Cannon 
purportedly was the progenitor of a clan of black people. The descendants of such a race 
were the Tutsis according to the colonial masters. While the Tutsis were Africans, the 
colonizers painted them as the descendants of Ham arguing that the curse made them 
black. Since the Tutsis were the ruling clan in Rwanda, the Tutsis were hailed as Hamites 
who were considered to be more of European stock than the native Hutus. All the while 
                                                                                                                                                 
Helen Buss Mitchell, Ed., Roots of World Wisdom, Canada: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999. pp. 
106-111. Also refer to Kwasi Wiredu’s “The Moral Foundations of an African Culture” for Akan ethics 
which places great emphasis on the interconnectedness of sociality and morality. pp. 331-341. 
14 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002.  
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the Hutus were being ruled by the Tutsis who themselves started believing in the Hamitic 
hypothesis.  
 
For the colonial masters, the Hamitic hypothesis gave ample ammunition to 
support the Tutsis who were ruling the Hutus. After the independence of Rwanda, the 
Hutus who outnumbered the Tutsis in Rwanda captured power and also the jobs. The 
Tutsis who were sulking under the Hutu regime repeatedly attacked Rwanda in the name 
of Rwandan Patriotic Front from the neighboring Uganda. This resulted in brutal reprisals 
from the Hutus. To exacerbate the situation, just before the genocide, the Tutsi army 
assassinated the Hutu President of Burundi. What followed were several raids of the RPF 
into Rwanda. The Hutus started retaliating by killing several thousand Tutsis in Rwanda. 
After repeated provocations by the proponents of the Hutu power, several hundreds of 
thousands of Tutsis were killed in a clinical fashion. Thus, the genocide began and with 
the assassination of both the President and the Prime Minister of Rwanda, there was no 
one to stop the genocide in which the army, hospitals, colleges, schools and Churches 
participated as a community ritual. Such a situation arose as a result of colonization and 
the resultant distortion of history that poisoned the relationship between the Hutus and 
the Tutsis.15  
 
Intersubjectivity in Akan Philosophy  
The eyepiece of African culture has been the colonial past, thus far, and hence an entirely 
different discourse is needed to balance the colonial past and the post-colonial future. It is 
not entirely possible to revisit the ancient African culture because of the irreversible 
                                                 
15 Mamdani, pp. 132-136, 195-196.  
 124
changes that have taken root in the African society such as Western education, 
Christianity, urbanization and political system of multi-party democracy. But there are 
ways of incorporating traditional African procedures that would foster a consensual mode 
of arriving at political decisions. The traditional Akan emphasis on consensus has 
underlying strong moral and communitarian assumptions. Morality in Akan is not 
individual but communitarian and hence always has a strong “I-Thou’ (intersubjective) 
connotation.16 Intersubjective relationship also ensures reciprocity that is a defining 
feature of the Akan conception of personhood.  
 
A process of introjection of social roles is natural to the Akan conception of 
personhood, which is connected with being a responsible member of the Akan 
community. Proverbs such as the following emphasize the reflexive nature of Akan 
interpersonal relationships, morality and polity.17 They are: 
 
1. If you do not allow your neighbor to reach nine you will never reach ten. 
2. Somebody’s troubles have arrived; those of another are on the way. 
3. It is a fool that says, “My neighbor is the butt of attack not me.” 
4. The stick that was used to beat Takyi is the same that will be used to beat 
Nyankomago. 
5. One person’s path will intersect with another’s before too long. 
6. Do not do unto others what you would not that they unto you. 
                                                 
16 I am using ‘I –Thou’ as a variation of George Herbert Mead’s ‘I – We’ relationship which, he says, 
constitutes the self. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1934.  
17 Helen Buss Mitchell, Ed., Roots of World Wisdom, pp. 334-336. 
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Wiredu argues that the golden rule of doing unto others what one wants to be done to 
oneself is enshrined in Akan injunctions against selfishness and egoism. Deontic theories 
of ethics of which Rawls was one of the most recent proponents do not address issues of 
social inequality effectively and consequentialist-utilitarian ethics of happiness neglects 
the need for a social structure and the ineffable nature of happiness. Akan communitarian 
ethics allocates roles for a conception of duty as well as happiness within the confines of 
Akan community.  
 
Wiredu calls the Akan ethics humanistic because of its emphasis on the 
importance of coordination and cooperation within a community without reference to a 
God or other supernatural foundations of ethics. In the Akan community, the notion of 
personhood required procreation as a necessary qualification. The youngsters were 
expected to reverential obey the elders. The strong communal identity itself depends on 
traditional agrarian rural culture. In liberal capitalism, civil society replaces traditional 
communitarianism. 
 
Consensus and the Political Structure of the Akan Community 
The Akan notion of consensus is communitarian in nature. Akan notion of community 
stems from concepts such as mogya (blood principle), onipa (person), and okra (life 
principle.) The okra is also the divine element that is present in all human beings 
according to the Akans. According to the Akans, human beings are naturally endowed 
with the qualities of equality and dignity. The Akan society is matrilineal. Members of 
 126
the Akan lineage are found far and wide in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The Akans 
believe that human beings are interdependent. From childhood till death, people need 
help from others and hence the individual is always beholden to the society. Some Akan 
sayings to this effect are as follows:  
 
a) A human being is not a palm tree so as to be sufficient unto himself.   
b) A human being needs help.  
c) It is because of the need to have someone blow out the speck of dust in one’s eye that 
antelopes go in twos.  
 
There are several adages in Akan that emphasize the need for mutual cooperation, 
interdependence, reciprocity, and equality of status of human beings. Akans also 
repeatedly indicate equality of human beings in their religious outlook. God bestowed 
responsibility on the Akans as masters of their own destiny and at the same time also 
vested the individuals with the duty of social responsibility. Akan communitarianism also 
stems from a dependency on land. Since agriculture was the main occupation land was 
not owned by individuals but by the community. Even the Akan lineage chiefs did not 
have the right to sell off land.18  
 
 The Akan political system was essentially composed of a council of lineages. The 
council chiefs were the most experienced and respected village elders representing 
various villages. While most of these positions were hereditary, they were subject to the 
                                                 
18 In the context of the Akans, a lineage is a family tree of a group of people who live in an Akan village or 
town that traces its origin to a woman. There are several lineages in Ghana. For example, Ashanti is one of 
the lineages of the Akans. 
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will of the people. Some positions such as the ‘leader of the young men’ went to the most 
eligible young man of the village who represented the village in the council of chiefs. He 
had the right to speak fearlessly about the issues such as those relating to the non-
performance of chiefs. The Akan community strongly enforced the rule that the chiefs 
were selected according to the will of the people. The Akan towns had a council of 
village heads with the Chief of the town accorded the role of the chairman. The office of 
the chief was both hereditary and elective. Out of the group of eligible leaders from a 
lineage, the Queen Mother selected a candidate based on factors such as experience, 
reputation, military prowess and integrity from a pool of candidates. But finally the 
decision to appoint a chief was in the hands of the council and popular consent. 
Deserving candidates from other branches of royal lineages were also given an 
opportunity to participate in the political process. 
 
The title of the ‘chief of the young men’ (Nkwankwaahene) was given to a person 
who did not belong to the ruling lineage but who had the support of the population of the 
village in general. Such a person was authorized to raise objections and convey the 
misgivings of the people about a candidate for the title of the chief of the council and on 
any other issue. The Akan political system had confederacies at both state and national 
level and the paramount chiefs serving at the level of a group of states were in charge of 
the administration of the whole nation.19  
 
 The Akans recognized the need for an administrative head of the state while at the 
same time instituting a system of checks and balances that mirrors the attempts of modern 
                                                 
19 Wiredu, CUP, pp. 157-162. 
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day democracies. By making the office of the chief accountable to the council of elders 
and also popular consent, tyranny was preempted. The decision-making in the council of 
village elders achieves its fruition only when a consensus was reached. Such a consensus 
became the view of the chief and not vice versa. Since great efforts were made to hear all 
views without dismissing or marginalizing any strand of opinion, the final decision was 
totally binding on all members of the council. Public criticism of consensus achieved by 
the council members was viewed with reprobation. Only the popular representative who 
did not belong to the council of elders could question the decision of the council even 
after a decision was reached.  
 
In the event of a chief failing to adhere to the rules of political governance, he 
faced the prospect of being ‘destooled.’ The Akan equivalent of a throne is the stool. The 
office of the chief had sanctity. But the chief was considered to be a spiritually endowed 
person only as long he followed the rules of the political governance. Thus, one can 
discern an apparently seamless relation between village, town, state and national 
governance. Because of a strong local organization and a federal structure at the central 
level that emphasized participatory decision-making at all levels, the Akan system of 
governance ensured that local issues were resolved at the local level. Instead of 
proceduralizing issues and taking them to a separate judicial authority, issues were 
resolved within the community with the aim of establishing peace rather than demanding 
retribution.20 Another important individual right enshrined in the Akan community is the 
right to trial. No punishment is meted out without a trial. Wiredu mentions an instance in 
                                                 
20 Wiredu, CUP, pp. 161-164. 
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which even the dead-body of a person who committed suicide and suspected of some 
wrongdoing was tried posthumously.21  
 
 The Akan concept of right to land is not based on individual ownership but 
lineage ownership. The land belonged to the lineages and not to the individuals. No land 
could be sold or bartered away. Only the chief has the right to reallocation of possession 
in times of distress for a lineage while other lineages have more than what they require. 
But the right to the redistribution of the land also requires the cognizance of the lineages 
concerned and cannot be done arbitrarily by the chief.22 In spite of Akan practices such as 
right to trial accorded to everyone, community land ownership, non-discrimination, 
religious freedom and political consensus, there were social practices which appear 
anachronistic such as ritual killing of people to accompany the dead chiefs and the total 
supplication demanded of the non-adults as they were not considered mature enough to 
voice their opinions. Some of the positive traits of the Akan culture have been ravaged by 
colonization, modernization and greed of the chiefs. Wiredu laments the lack of moral 
rectitude that has led to the cultural and political chaos in Ghana in particular and Africa 
in general due to the collapse of traditional communitarianism.  
 
Some of the modern African leaders such as Senghor, Nyerere, Nkrumah, and 
Kaunda took advantage of the traditional emphasis on non-party democracy to install 
themselves as unquestioned leaders and established one-party rule. By obfuscating the 
distinction between a non-party democracy and one-party rule, despotic African leaders 
                                                 
21 Wiredu, CUP, p. 165. 
22 Ibid., pp. 165-166 
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justified their rule on the basis of traditional communitarian political system of Africa. As 
Wiredu points out, one of the most cherished rights of the African culture, the right to 
representation in political decision-making, has been denied by despotic regimes in 
outright defiance of the UN Human Rights declaration. But more recently, because of the 
tremendous pressure exercised by the UN and other member countries on military 
dictators and other tyrannical rulers, Africa has multi-party democracy in several 
countries. Wiredu argues that even though a multi-party democracy is better than 
tyranny; it only breeds adversarial attitude and not consensual decision-making because 
of the emphasis on majority vote. While the ethno-centric approach of the colonizers to 
political, social, economic and religious affairs of Africa has contributed to a large extent 
in the ensuing political instability of those African states that gained independence in the 
second half of the twentieth-century, a dearth of African leaders with a vision for better 
Africa and also the collapse of traditional political institutions and the post-colonial pangs 
of anxiety have contributed to the desuetude.   
 
Difference between the Akan and the Western notion of Consensus 
The notion of consensus has different connotations in the Western and African contexts. 
In the Western conception of a notion of consensus idealized by Habermas, which is 
designed on the Enlightenment idea of reason, people debate an issue aiming to arrive at 
an understanding with the only deciding factor being the force of arguments (rationally 
motivated agreement). Every person will be allowed to speak without being coerced. The 
process of argumentation and discourse will require people to be linguistically competent, 
rational, and democratic. All these prerequisites demand Western education, linguistic 
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skills, and a particular type of rationality. Such a notion of consensus in which the best 
argument wins the day does not take into account variations in linguistic competence, 
social practices, political system, education, and cultural traditions. Moreover, by 
stipulating the necessity of a winning argument, the other parties feel excluded and un-
represented. Thus, by reducing the rationality to the outcome of an argumentation 
process, the resultant agreement does not qualify as a consensual agreement.  
 
The Western notion of consensus is arriving at an agreement without recourse to 
extra-verbal remonstrations. Disagreements are to be resolved within the framework of a 
discourse and the discursive framework has been agreed upon before the commencement 
of the debate. Hence, only those arguments that stand out as rational will be acceptable to 
the people who are chosen as interlocutors based on their communicative competence.23 
Thus, a concept of consensus in Western democracies, according to Habermas, is only 
aimed at arriving at a mutual understanding among free and equal individuals. The 
Western concept of consensus depends upon the conception of individuals as capable 
actors who can engage in rational argumentation. But a consensus among variegated 
ethnic, linguistic, racial and religious groups requires genuine compromise and 
understanding. The asymmetrical nature of multicultural dialogue would be best served 
by adopting a path of consensus similar to the Akan notion of consensus.  
 
Thinkers such as Wiredu and Gyekye refer to an entirely different conception of 
consensus in their writings. The African notion of consensus that Kaunda, Nyerere, 
                                                 
23 Jurgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1., Trans. Thomas McCarthy, Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984. pp. 273-344. 
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Wiredu and Gyekye talk about is related more to a compromise that is achieved as a 
result of detailed consultation on thorny issues in which people from all sections are 
represented by delegations at various levels of the government. Among Western 
countries, the United States of America practices a form of democracy in which two big 
parties (the Republican and the Democratic Parties) contest elections and the power 
changes hands between them. While legal and constitutional safeguards are in place, all 
sections of people are not represented, especially minorities, handicapped, and women. 
The decision-making power rests with the party that has more members in the Congress 
or the Senate. Every political decision boils down to a power game between the 
Democrats and the Republicans. Finally, in order to transact business in the House or the 
Senate, there is a need for compromise, which is more often than not based on 
expediency. The acrimony and antagonism that is created between the two political 
parties is matched only by the apathy shown by the suffrage due to the cynicism arising 
out of the irremediability of the situation.  
 
A large portion of American voters believes that the Republican and the 
Democratic parties are only after power and not common good. Since there are no 
alternatives because of the domination of two major political parties in the United States, 
the Democratic and the Republican parties, it is not possible for small political parties 
such as the Green Party or the Libertarian Party to advertise their message adequately to 
the general public. Bipartisan consensus is more akin to the concept of interest-based 
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democracy and not the Habermasian ideal of deliberative democracy.24 Even fundamental 
issues such as education and health-care are contentious because of the procedural 
incompatibility between the liberal and the conservative strands of American political 
system. Max Weber’s characterization of the Western bureaucracy as driven by 
purposive-rationalization has been consummated in the American political system.25  
 
Reductionistic analysis in terms of good-evil, friend-enemy, and rational-
irrational categories have gained such a stranglehold on the American populace that a 
third option is never considered a viability.26 More often than not, Habermas’s ideal 
consensus operates even rarely in the rarefied atmosphere of the board meetings of 
multinational companies. On the contrary, paradoxically, Habermasian consensus unlike 
in the highly rationalized societies is possible only in communities such as Akans in 
Ghana.27 The underlying assumptions in Habermas’ “ideal speech situation” based on the 
                                                 
24 Benhabib, Seyla. Ed. Democracy and Difference, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996. Refer 
to Habermas’ article “Three Normative Models of Democracy” and Seyla Benhabib’s “Toward a 
Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy.” 
25 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Trans. Talcott Parsons, New York: 
Charles Scribner Sons, 1958. 
26 The influence of theology on politics could be gleaned from Stephen Turner’s Liberal Democracy 3.0 
and Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker’s The Puritan Oligarchy, New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1947. which 
describes the strong religious element in education, politics and civic life of America from its inception. 
Even though Jefferson declared the need for public education, his Lockean ideals influenced economic and 
political individualism that became the hallmark of American culture.  
27 David Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic Reason, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987. pp. 174-
176. Habermas’ distinguishes between rational Western social organizations and traditional monological 
communities. Dialogue, for Habermas, is possible only in those social formations that emphasize reason.  
 Habermas’ suggestion of replacing the United Nations Security Council with a global executive with 
representation from all countries in the world is plagued by several crippling problems. It first requires an 
indiscriminate universalization glossing over economic, political, ethnic, linguistic and religious factors. 
The argument that vast advances in science and technology and in political liberalism would some how 
bring the eternally feuding cultures together is a pipe-dream. While Habermas’ utopian dream is a 
theoretical possibility, the structural problems are exposed even at a much smaller magnitude in terms of 
what Stepher Turner describes as the tension between liberalism and the need to safeguard liberalism. 
Majoritarian democracies are better than the one-party government, theocracy, and tyranny. As Habermas 
himself describes in The Postnational Constellation, the twentieth century has been the most violent of 
epochs while at the same time the most drastically transformed. That there is a need for a complete 
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categorical imperative of Kant have become supererogatory in the post-modern scenario. 
Hence, consensus along the lines of Habermas’ theory of communicative action is 
ironically out of place in advanced liberal societies such as the United States. Unlike 
interest-based democracy, Africans especially in Ghana practiced a form of delegacy, a 
form of consensual communitarianism that was non-party.  
 
 The consensual form of governance that was prevalent in African groups such as 
the Akan, the Zulu and the Swazi have a long history of successful resolution of conflicts. 
According to Wiredu, a need for consensus indicates conflict and a successful consensus 
is in the resolution of the conflicts taking into account the views of all concerned. Unlike 
the Western notion of consensus that has been constructed around the Hobbesian social 
contract that is negative in connotation, the African notion is positive. In the Western 
notion of consensus, the innate assumption is the vacuousness of involving all sections of 
the populace in the consensual decision-making process. Another negative assumption 
that characterizes Western debates is a sense of disbelief in the ability of people to come 
together to resolve conflicts, which could be due to the failure of the Enlightenment ideal 
that reason would free the world of all its ills. The classic example of such a mutual 
distrust is the doctrine of mutual destruction practiced by the erstwhile Soviet Union and 
the United States of America. Perversely, the tenuous peace that lasted for more than 
thirty years between the Soviet Union and the United States validates both Hobbes and 
                                                                                                                                                 
structural transformation is indisputable but Habermasian postnational constellation has been theorized 
only from the viewpoint of advanced liberal countries and a global economy. The prospects of the twenty-
first century appear to be more daunting and more catastrophical and with the absence of a doctrine of 
mutual deterrence, however sinister it then appeared, the world looks even more dangerous and self-
destructive. Thus, Habermas’ oxymoronic ideal espouses a universal communitarianism, which is anti-
thetical to liberal individualism, which would require a Sisyphean sadomasochistic self-denial on the part 
of the entire population of the world.  
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Socrates. The fear of awesome retribution acted as a deterrent for both the USSR and the 
US while extraordinary amount of restraint and back channel diplomacy also bespeaks of 
some last vestige of goodness that prevented the respective governments from taking 
extreme measures. While any direct strike on the US or the USSR was deterred, it did not 
preclude both the US and the USSR from waging proxy wars in different parts of the 
globe. The cost of those proxy wars has been colossal for both the USSR and the US. 
Especially, in the case of the US, it culminated in the events of September 11th 2001.  
 
A doctrine of mutual deterrence, strict surveillance of people, an adversarial 
political process, and a society that encourages competition than cooperation is not the 
best setting for consensual interaction. While the African consensual process presumes an 
intention on the part of the interlocutors to arrive at a consensus irrespective of their 
positions, the Western notion of consensus has too many mandatory requirements to even 
qualify to be a part of the consensual process, which stipulates necessary cultural 
prerequisites.  
 
The imagery that characterizes the Akan rationale for a consensus is that of a 
crocodile with two heads and one stomach fighting over the food.28 The colourful 
imagery portrays the paradox of the people belonging to a same group with same interests 
fighting over matters that could have been resolved amicably if only they had understood 
that the final destination or the ultimate objective is best achieved by working together. 
The crocodile imagery scoffs at the stupidity of human beings caused by selfish motives. 
Another striking example of the Akan openness is the statement “even a fool is entitled to 
                                                 
28 Kwasi Wiredu, CUP, p.173. 
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be heard.”29 Any consideration of social status, intelligence quotient, or any other 
discriminatory factors have been dismissed by the edict that everyone needs to be heard.  
 
While the preparatory process of an Akan consensus is laudable for its emphasis 
on equality, the procedural part of a consensual process is even more rigorous. Any 
vexatious issue would have to be discussed at various levels such as villages, towns, 
cities and finally amongst the king and the advisory council. Instead of a process that 
imposes the will of a numerical majority on everyone else, the Akan process of consensus 
necessarily involves the participation of the people at every level.30 But, does the Akan 
process of consensus lead to unanimity? While K.A. Busia nostalgically remarks about 
the emphasis on unanimity among the interlocutors, Wiredu argues that the condition of 
unanimity is meant to be only an ideal objective of a consensual process.31 Unanimity is 
the avowed goal but not if it is forced. A consensus is achieved through compromise 
between clashing viewpoints on social issues. Epistemic and ethical issues have 
underlying assumptions about truth and value respectively. These are assumptions that 
are shared by all cultures. Hence, they are known as cultural universals. An example of a 
cultural universal concept is human rights. Epistemic or ethical issues need to be justified 
critically and rationally. But on social issues, compromise leads to consensus. A general 
broad-based consensus presages unanimity while the particulars and the specifics are 
open for further discussion. “Unanimity is the perfection of consensus. But consensus 
                                                 
29 Wiredu, CUP, p. 174.  
30 Ibid. p. 175. 
31 K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti, London: Frank Cass, 
1968. 
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does not call for unanimity.”32 Wiredu clarifies that while unanimity of opinions will 
solve all conflicts, it is next to impossible to arrive at unanimous decisions while tackling 
thorny issues. Hence, consensus is a peaceful reconciliation of differences by taking into 
account various ideas voiced by the affected people. Even if the process takes more time, 
the objective of a consensus will have to be pursued to its logical end. A consensual 
decision-making process, in the African context, is very close to a decision-making 
process by consent. 
 
Democracy - A Government by Consent 
In a democracy, individual opinions are supposed to be valued. But, in Anglo-American 
forms of democracy, the majority group enjoys total political power. Democracy is 
identified more with the possession of decision-making power than a form of governance 
that takes into consideration the common good. Since winning elections is the only form 
of power, the whole process is categorized by competition, jealousy, and rivalry. The 
winner take all policy is not representative of all sections of people and this leads to 
alienation amongst people who are not part of the winning party. Wiredu also points out 
the lack of representation from various sections of the electorate in spite of various 
committees, commissions, and other constitutional safeguards guaranteeing a voice for 
the minorities.33 The minority has Hobbesian privileges of rights to self-preservation and 
Lockean rights of property while the majority has the power to enforce their social and 
economic policies on the minority. 
                                                 
32 Ibid. p. 174.  
33 Kwasi Wiredu, “Tradition, Democracy and Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Africa,” [TDPCA] 
Rewriting Africa: Toward Renaissance or Collapse? JCAS Symposium Series 14, Osaka: Japan, 2001. p. 
166. See also Wiredu, CUP,  p. 177.  
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In the case of African traditional societies such as the Akan, the Zulu and the 
Swazi, the aim of a consensual process of decision-making is not triumph or defeat but 
amicable settlement of problems. The majority opinion does have its significance but the 
minority needs to be heard and its concerns noted. If the minority is convinced by the 
sincerity of majority opinion then there is no objection to implement the majority 
decision. But the majority opinion cannot be imposed as a decision on minority based on 
the numerical strength of the majority.34 The main objective of democracy is to protect 
individual freedom from the tyranny of the majority.35 Wiredu constantly reminds us of 
the perils of a contentious and adversarial form of democracy encouraged in Britain and 
the United States. But democracies in the United States and Great Britain, while situated 
on the ideal of common good for all, are influenced by public opinion or vested interests. 
In a rights based democracy, any infringement of individual rights would have to be 
fought procedurally.  
 
The Weberian analysis that the movement for democracy has been influenced 
heavily by monetary and mercantile considerations can be applied to the interest-based 
forms of democracy practiced in the United States. It has been widely recognized that 
economic interests determine the political clout in especially countries such as the United 
States. If an individual has wealth, then he/she has access to power and vice versa. The 
macro-economic trickle-down theory is the predominant economic principle that is aided 
by a strong procedural streak embedded in the United States political system. A partisan 
                                                 
34 Wiredu, CUP, pp. 174-175.  
35 Ibid. pp. 172-182. 
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war is fought on several fronts in the United States political system such as immigrant 
rights, welfare, health insurance, education, social security, foreign policy and trade.  
 
While the conservative right and the liberal left both recognize individual liberty, 
their interpretations of the concept of liberty are different. While the liberals emphasize 
negative liberty with non-interference from the government, the conservatives emphasize 
positive liberty with non-domination as the guarantee of the individual rights.36 Thus, 
economic liberty is paramount for the conservatives while the liberals value individual 
rights in terms of sexual orientation, body, and religious beliefs. While the libertarians 
avowedly oppose any intervention in both economic and individual rights, the 
Republicans support the trickle down economy of neo-classical capitalism while the 
liberals want social security, unions, education and health-care all affordable to ordinary 
citizens.37 There is a subtle class conflict but more complex than those found in the mines 
of England in the mid-nineteenth century.  
 
The salutary effect of proceduralism, even while producing alienation and 
individuation, is that it protects the social fabric of capitalistic economies, by creating a 
complex web of bureaucracy, entertainment, courts and elections, from descending into 
the Hobbesian state of nature. The governments in such democracies have to perform a 
balancing act between various interest groups and hence are necessarily majoritarian in 
policy implementation. Such governments do not have a holistic view of common good. 
As Wiredu rightly points out, the basic premise of such democracies is based on the 
                                                 
36 Phillip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Governance, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
37 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974. 
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assumption that there are not many possibilities for arriving at a consensus in order to 
solve problems. In order to expedite the decision-making process, the majority opinion 
necessarily overrides minority sensibilities.38 Even though, in some sense, most 
democracies are interest-based democracies, majority opinion has greater procedural 
force in the United States. Hence, there is minimal scope for a government by consent or 
consensus in adversarial democracy practiced in the United States.  
 
Democracy – A Government by Consensus 
Traditional African societies such as the Akan, the Zulu, the Swazi, the Banyankole, the 
Tallensi and several others have had either centralized or non-centralized forms of 
governance.39 Wiredu analyses the system of political governance in the Ashanti group of 
Ghana to illustrate how consensus is achieved. The Ashantis, who are a subgroup of 
Akan, are matrilineal. Every Akan town or village is composed of several clans. A 
lineage from one of these clans constitutes the royal lineage and the people of the town or 
village accept the royalty of the lineage. From this lineage, the chief is elected. A lineage 
comprises of individuals who are linked by kinship relationship. Every town or village 
constitutes a political unit and together the villages and towns for a paramountcy, a state 
(oman), namely, the Asante state or Akim Abuakwa state headed by a paramount chief, 
the omanhene. While selecting the chief of a state, the council comprising of village 
chiefs and the ‘commoners’ Asafo company have to authorize the selection out of a pool 
of worthy men. Thus, a chief cannot be imposed upon the Akan community.40 The chief 
does not have an agenda apart from the one given by the people. The chief publicly takes 
                                                 
38 TDPCA, p. 169.  
39 Wiredu, CUP, p. 183.  
40 Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity, pp. 120-121. 
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an oath assuring the people that he would implement and adhere to what has been 
ordained by the people of Akan. Some of the demands imposed by the people on the 
chief are as follows:41 
 
We do not wish that he should curse us. 
We do not wish that he should be greedy. 
We do not wish that he should be disobedient [or, refuse to take advice]. 
We do not wish that he should treat us unfairly. 
We do not wish that he should act on his own initiative. 
We do not wish that it should ever be that he should say to us, “I have no time,” “I have 
no time.” 
 
The above-mentioned dictates of the people illustrate what is meant by the concept of 
‘democracy by consent.’ While the people have invested political authority in the chief, 
he/she cannot act unilaterally without consulting the people at every level of the Akan 
political organization, be it the village or the state. The council of elders, who are 
themselves chiefs or lineage heads of the villages or the towns, will have to consult their 
constituents before taking the matter to higher levels. The chief will then act on the 
advice of the council of elders. Thus, the chief does not exist apart from the people and 
the people demand a part in the decision-making process. Any violation on the part of the 
chief invokes the punishment of de-stooling.  
 
                                                 
41 Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity,  p. 122.  
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While the rule by the consent of all is a sublime ideal, the question is how to 
translate consent into practice. Or in other ways, how does the consent of people manifest 
into political action? The answer is through consensus. While the consent of the people is 
sought at every stage of decision-making, divergent views are processed at the crucible of 
consensus. Consensus brings about a compromise between various options. The Akan 
system of governance fervently believes in collective thinking. Adages such as “One 
head does not go into council,” and “Wisdom is not in the head of one person,” betray a 
strong sense of participatory decision-making that is supposed to be the hallmark of 
modern democracies.42 Since the people of the Ashanti community did not feel 
themselves alienated from the political process, a separate system of checks and balances 
was not needed.  
 
 In the final analysis, African ethnic groups such as the Akan, Zulu, Tallensi, and 
Swazi fostered a system of governance that could be viewed as democratic, broadly. 
Some of them had centralized governance, for example, Akan, and some did not such as 
Logoli and Tallensi. But, the emphasis on consensus is found in many groups such as the 
Akans. For Akans, consensus is the only way to resolve conflicts and no other way is 
better. Consensus is the only avenue for cementing the consent of the people. 
Majoritarian democracies of the Anglo-American model do not rule by the consent of the 
people by any stretch of imagination. Consensus in such democracies operates at the level 
of deal making or compromise on what is acceptable to both parties in conflict. A change 
of cultural paradigm is not possible from such positional negotiation process. Two sides 
                                                 
42 Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity, p. 131.  
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involved in a debate dogmatically hold on to their foundational ideologies and hence a 
solution outside the existing paradigmatic framework fails to emerge. 
 
Wiredu captures the essence of the sense of deprivement and alienation that 
permeates the being of the vanquished political party and its supporters.43 Wiredu also 
suggests that the democratic models of governance found in Switzerland and Belgium are 
better models than those found in the United States and Britain for the simple reason that 
the government includes people belonging to political parties representing different 
sections of the people.44 The inability of the Anglo-American models to include diverse 
interests and the stranglehold of the business interests on the government has resulted in 
adversarial politics and the neglect of the process of rapprochement between eternally 
feuding political parties. While the system of traditional governance in Africa, 
theoretically, took into consideration the will and the welfare of the people, modern 
democracies attach more importance to the system of administration. While individual 
liberties and rights are enshrined in the UN Human Rights Charter and in the constitution 
of various countries, translating rights into practice is seldom smooth. In traditional 
African societies, protection of individual rights was coeval with governance and hence 
there was little need for a separate charter of human rights. 
 
African Communitarianism and Post-Colonial Political Ideology 
Post-colonial Africa produced several leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, 
Kenneth Kaunda, and Kwame Nkrumah, who utilized their Western education to suit the 
                                                 
43 Wiredu, CUP, p. 177. 
44 TDPCA, p. 170. 
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African context. All the afore-mentioned leaders were trained in Western cultural 
environment and also received advanced Western educational training. Julius Nyerere 
espoused an indigenous approach to social organization and economic development 
similar to traditional African form of communitarianism, which he called Ujaama 
socialism.45 As the President of Tanzania, Nyerere pursued an agro-based economy and 
encouraged cooperatives that would be supported by communitarian African society. 
Leopold Senghor, who ruled Senegal as its President for more than two decades, 
advocated a strong blend of native African culture of Senegal and the acquired 
knowledge in science and technology from Europe. Senghor also accommodated religion 
in his philosophy. Senghor was a Christian leader in a predominantly Muslim country.  
 
In his writings, Senghor was refreshingly candid about the foibles of African 
culture and the benefits of European scientific development and the need to strike a right 
balance between European education and African culture.46 Senghor’s European 
education influenced his political ideas. Senghor’s words encapsulated his thoughts about 
the concept of a nation: “What makes the Nation, is a common will for a life in 
common.”47 Senghor’s approach took a critical view of European capitalism as well as 
Soviet-style socialism. Senghor’s avowed idea was to integrate the contributions of 
European socialism with African traditional values.48  
 
                                                 
45 Julius Nyerere, Nyerere on Socialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. 
46 Leopold Senghor, p. 146.  
47 Leopold Senghor, On African Socialism, p. 84. Senghor delivered this speech at the first Young Seminar 
of the PFA, May 16-19, 1960. 
48 Ibid. pp. 92-93.  
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Julius Nyerere, who was the first President of Tanzania, endorsed 
communitarianism and opposed capitalism. Nyerere felt that only a shared enterprise 
characteristic of African communitarianism would be suitable for Tanzania. Hence, 
Nyerere was more interested in state participation in the distribution and sharing of 
wealth than in state ownership of the means for the creation of wealth. “The Arusha 
Declaration” clearly outlines Nyerere’s emphasis on rural development and cooperatives. 
He disavowed the economic theories of both Adam Smith and Marx. While Adam Smith 
is considered to be the high priest of capitalism, Marx’s theory of class conflict between 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie created a crevasse between various sections of the 
society. Nyerere and Senghor, both contest the relevance of the proletariat-bourgeoisie 
dichotomy in the African context.  
 
Kwame Nkrumah, who was the first President of Ghana, was a sworn Marxist but 
tailored his ideology to the Ghanaian topology. Since Nkrumah did not have to contend 
with the Marxian binary opposition between the bourgeoisie and the exploited proletariat 
in Ghana, Nkrumah went on a reckless spree of mechanization in Ghana that brought 
disastrous consequences. Nkrumah did not find any contradiction between religion and 
Marxism. For Nkrumah, the Marxist revolution was only contingent upon the situation. 
During the Ghanaian freedom struggle, Nkrumah charted a course of non-violent protests 
and strikes rather than espousing armed revolution. It is ironical that Nkrumah advocated 
revolutionary socialism while in exile after he was deposed in a coup in 1966. It was 
convenient for Nkrumah to talk about armed revolt since he was deprived of political 
power and wanted to recapture power. Nkrumah exhorted his compatriots to rise in revolt 
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against the people who deposed him. Hence, the Marxian element of inner-contradiction 
in capitalism and also the tension between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are not a 
part of the political ideology of Nkrumah, in a true sense.  
 
All the afore-mentioned leaders were culpable of identifying communitarianism 
in non-partisan traditional African societies with one-party system of democracy, in 
which alternative processes of electing leaders were scuttled. A despotic leader forcibly 
imposed the one-party system on the populace in order to perpetrate a system of 
governance without a choice for alternatives. While Nkrumah was unscrupulous in 
changing strategies to consolidate his political power, Nyerere truly believed in the 
efficacy of African communitarianism and systematically implemented measures to 
encourage people to get involved in rural reconstruction. Senghor understood the lacunae 
in Western socialism and capitalism and hence advocated self-reliance, cultural 
rejuvenation and pooling of resources. Senghor’s Mali Federation was an idea in 
promoting federalism amongst Sudan, Senegal, Upper Volta and Dahomey. Upper Volta 
and Dahomey did not join the federation as the referendum failed to muster support and 
later they joined Niger and Ivory Coast in the Counseil de l’Entente.49 Senghor also tried 
to initiate a federation of twelve West African states with the exception of Madagascar.  
 
Senghor’s integration of West African states is based on the concept of negritude. 
The concept of negritude defines Senghor’s communitarianism as African collectivity. 
Nkrumah contributed little or nothing to strengthen the notion of African 
communitarianism in Ghana. Nkrumah dreamed of a federation of African countries. But, 
                                                 
49 Senghor, p. 14. 
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Nkrumah’s drastic measures to indiscriminately industrialize Ghana in a short span of 
time and revitalize the economy by huge imports proved to be a disaster in the long run. 
Nkrumah, who was a despotic ruler, neglected Ghana’s traditional system of governance, 
which symbolized communitarianism.  
 
Nyerere is the best example of an African leader who designed his whole political 
enterprise on the concept of communitarianism. But Nyerere also ruled Tanzania with an 
iron hand under a one-party system. The Akan concept of communitarianism, which 
encompasses personhood, human rights and consensual political decision-making, 
distinguishes communitarianism from individualism.50 The Western notion of 
communitarianism is rights-based and treats community as an aggregate of individuals. 
Gyekye rejects any such description of African communitarianism and also asserts the 
proviso of individual value imbedded in the collective decision-making process of 
communitarian African groups such as Akans.51 Gyekye refers to Senghor’s moderate 
stance on African communitarianism and his simultaneous emphasis on the importance of 
the role of individuals in a community. Hence, African communitarianism is not inimical 
to individual development.  
                                                 
50 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, p. 189. 
51 Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity, p. 40. 
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Chapter 5 
Political Consensus – Intra-cultural and Extra-cultural 
 
 
In the postmodern epoch, the originary or foundational categories have been replaced by 
the interstitial spaces of the binary oppositional categories such as subject-object, black-
white, colonizers-colonized, and capitalist-communist discourse. While globalization has 
created a common market, post-colonial and post-modern frameworks have created a 
sense of the present in terms of subjective-identities. The post-colonial and minority 
groups have started experiencing the presence while advanced liberal democracies are 
oriented towards the future. Hence, there is a phase-difference in the conceptualization of 
concepts such as democracy, religion, economy, justice, and education and what they 
signify for the developed and developing countries. The tyranny of the universal, which 
was total in the pre-modern and modern cultures, had camouflaged the interstices, which 
epitomize difference and instead constructed a canopy of illusion of universality.1 In this 
chapter, I have argued that a process of consensus cannot avoid cultural differences, 
conflict of identities, systematic distortions, and a clash of social and individual 
imaginaries. Conflict between cultural universals and particulars afflict both intra-cultural 
and extra-cultural discourse. In intra-cultural discourse, a debate on cultural 
                                                 
1 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, New York: Routledge, 1994.  p. 1. I will refer to it as LOC. 
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universals and particulars depends on a shared social imaginary within a culture. In an 
extra-cultural discourse, there is a clash of social imaginaries of different cultures. In the 
former there is confusion about what constitutes cultural particulars and universals. In the 
latter, there is a need for conceptual clarification of social imaginaries. In order to 
facilitate consensus, I propose cooperative action, which aims at partial or limited 
unanimity, a joint venture in pursuit of agreement, recognition of cultural differences, 
mutual adjustment of viewpoints, and a flexibility in initial and final conceptual 
positions. 
 
While there is always the danger of panoply of individual identities dissolving 
into egoism, at the individual level, and ethnic conflict, at the social level, celebration of 
individual identities have immensely contributed to the colorfulness of world in terms of 
variegated cultures, languages, customs, and religions. It must be noted that as Cornel 
West and Bell Hooks averred, historical descriptions of pre-modern, modern and post-
modern epochs have differing significance depending upon social contexts.2 The afore-
mentioned contextual framework is emphasized by Amartya Sen as evaluator-relative 
ethical framework.3 Homi Bhabha argues that there is a cultural consciousness of the 
interstitial and that of the presence that characterizes the postmodern firmament.  Bhabha 
writes as follows:4 
 
                                                 
2 Cornel West, Ed. The Cornel West Reader, New York: Basic Civitas Books, 1999. Refer to the chapter 
“The New Cultural Politics of Difference,” pp. 119-143.  Bell Hooks, “Postmodern Blackness” reprinted 
from Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics, Boston: South End Press, pp. 23-31  
3 Amartya Sen, “Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983. 
4 Ibid. p. 2. 
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It is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains 
of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness, 
community interest, or cultural values are negotiated. How are subjects formed 
‘in-between’, or in excess of, the sum of ‘parts’ of difference (usually intoned as 
race/class/gender, etc.)? How do strategies of representation or empowerment 
come to be formulated in the competing claims communities where, despite 
shared histories of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of values, 
meanings and priorities may not always be collaborative and dialogical, but may 
be profoundly antagonistic, conflictual and even incommensurable? 
 
While Bhabha’s description would encapsulate the Indian post-independence cultural 
experience to a nicety, it is also true of most advanced countries that are addressing the 
issue of multiculturalism. Michael Dummett’s writings on the plight of economic 
refugees in European and North American countries have revealed glaring deficiencies in 
addressing the issues of economic and political asylums.5 Bhabha refers to an underlying 
process of cultural hybridization that has cultural difference at the center. Cultural 
differences are recognized and respectfully engaged. According to Bhabha, “The 
borderline engagements of cultural difference may often be consensual as well as 
conflictual; they may confound our definitions of tradition and modernity; realign the 
customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and challenge 
normative expectations of development and progress.”6  
 
Bhabha reiterates constantly that internationalism must be a ‘middle passage’ that 
does not totalize individual experience. A lack of recognition of cultural hybridity and the 
presence of the interstices have had incalculably damaging consequences as witnessed in 
Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Rwanda-Burundi, and Palestine, to name a few. Totalization of 
                                                 
5 Michael Dummett, OnImmigration and Refugees, London: Routledge, 2001. 
6 Bhabha, LOC, p. 2.  
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particular cultural experiences lead to exclusionary lifeworlds. Bhabha argues that the 
postcolonial epoch is a celebration of cultural hybridity and interstitial spaces. The 
concept of fusion of horizons brilliantly explicated by Gadamer has a hoary history. Kant, 
Hegel, Marx, Husserl, Levinas, Benjamin, Adorno, and Heidegger have been the 
torchbearers of the ethics of mutual recognition.7 Of all the above-mentioned pantheon of 
philosophers, Gadamer and Levinas have given the most positive and constructive 
reconciliation of the theoria and praxis of the ethics of mutual recognition.  
 
Intersubjectivity and Cultural Hybridization 
The approach that characterizes Gadamer’s and Levinas’ theories of alterity is the 
warmth and comfort exuded vis-à-vis the ‘other.’ Heidegger grounded the Dasein as the 
dynamic being-in-the-world that straddles the ontic and the ontological level. The 
ontological level is not an abstraction from the ontic level.8 But Gadamer and Levinas 
take the concept of intersubjective relationship to a new level by creating the optimal 
non-instrumental conditions for a mutual interaction between the ‘I’ and the ‘other.’9 
While Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics desists from a categorical incarceration of 
the ‘other,’ Levinas makes the ‘I’ completely subservient to the ‘other.’  
 
I would characterize Levinas’ inversion of the Enlightenment prejudice towards 
the ‘I’ as the tyranny of the slave. This would probably engender a dread that Sartre 
                                                 
7 Robert Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley Press, 
2000. 
8 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York: SUNY Press, 1996. pp. 77-83. 
9 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, New York:   
Continuum Publishing Company, 2000. 
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perceives in the other being the enemy.10 Levinasian conception of the ‘other’ could also 
in a remote sense lead to concepts such as reverse colonization, which does not 
necessarily follow from Levinas’ enthronement of the ‘other’ vis-à-vis the ‘I.’11 On the 
other hand, Levinas’ enthronement of the ‘other’ to the detriment of the ‘I’ could inflame 
the fear of the ‘other.’ Hegel frequently describes a mediational relationship between the 
‘I’ and the ‘other’ in his political writings. Even his much maligned master-slave 
relationship has a reversible moment.12 What Gandhi characterizes as a ‘cycle of 
repression’ cannot be indiscriminately applied to what Hegel terms as master-slave 
relationship. On the other hand, structural violence and internal colonization are very 
much plausible in a state that does not ensure inviolable individual rights. Perhaps, 
Levinas wants to prevent what is traced to the supremacy of the self, perpetrated by the 
Enlightenment, by establishing the supremacy of the other.13  
 
 The failure of the Enlightenment to reconcile reason with reasonableness and to 
acknowledge the historicity of the theory-practice relation has created conceptual 
muddles. Bhabha’s claim that Goethe’s analysis of the unconscious character of 
progression of history of the peoples necessitates a philosophy of the interstitial cultures 
and cultural hybridization appears to be both nostalgic and romantic. In some sense what 
Bhabha describes as the voice of the unhomely is exploited brilliantly by the forces that 
                                                 
10 Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Trans. Hazel E. Barnes, New York: Philosophical Library, 
1956. Cited from Robert C. Solomon, Introducing Philosophy, New York: HBJ Publishers, 1993. pp. 644-
645. 
11 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, Trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969. 
Cited from Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco, On Levinas, Belmont: Thomson-Wadsworth Publishers, 
2005. 
12 Robert Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition, pp. 52-59. 
13 Bhabha, LOC, p. 17. Bhabha refers to Levinas’ ethical love as “the inwardness of the subject … 
inhabited by the radical and anarchical reference to the other.” 
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drive the process of globalization.14 The question that haunts most of the procedural 
political theorists such as Habermas and Seyla Benhabib is whether a genuine consensus 
is possible in such an unhomely atmosphere. Seyla Benhabib argues that a discursive 
consensus is possible in culturally variegated societies and that procedural democracy is 
amenable to overlapping consensus. Benhabib also qualifies her description by stating 
that she has late capitalistic societies under consideration.15  
 
In the late capitalistic democratic framework, relation between market and civil 
society is very clearly defined. In early capitalistic and developmental economies, the 
state regulates markets and civil society is dependent upon the state. Moreover, because 
of globalization the public sphere has undergone a startling metamorphosis. Social 
categories such as center – margins are under attack. What Habermas considers central to 
his project of communicative action, the linguistic-communicative competence has to be 
reevaluated in lieu of the tectonic shift in the center-margin relations. Thus far, liberal 
political theorists have analyzed the polity only in terms of the corporate-hierarchical and 
civil society-horizontal (liberal) social formations. What C.K. Prahlad characterizes as 
the bottom of the pyramid has not been the focus of political theorists because of the 
yawning theory-praxis chasm.16  
 
                                                 
14 Cornel West’s analysis of the process of globalization with respect to the culturally marginalized groups 
and the problems of redefining their cultural identity vis-à-vis changed social relationships with their 
erstwhile masters. The cultural politics of difference emphasizes social analysis of binary categories that 
have historically been unquestioningly accepted.  
15 Seyla Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996. pp. 67-94. 
16 C.K. Prahlad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty through Profits, New 
Jersey: Wharton School Publishing, 2005.  It is ironical that a lack of understanding about the economic 
status of the poor has been due to the corresponding lacuna in treating them as the ‘other,’ which has in turn 
prevented both the markets of the profit as well as the service of the needs of the poor.   
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Existing political theory cannot, because of the politics of liberalism, encourage a 
drastic rearrangement of social and political sphere in advanced liberal democracies. On 
the other hand, liberal society has become too fragmented to address issues within a 
common framework. The emphasis on competition has an osmotic effect on both market 
and public sphere. Even Habermas advocates a third alternative to the existing liberal and 
republican conceptions of politics.17 So, in order to redress the problems engendered by 
the estrangement of the public sphere, market, and the private sphere, a more cooperative 
interpersonal relational framework is necessary. While the distinction between market, 
civil society, and government stands in a broad sense, structurally the social sphere has 
been transformed into a clash of alterities and unhomely selves. Even social 
epistemologists such as Alvin Goldman are trying to grasp the cultural failures in terms 
of a framework of responsiveness rather than in a deeper sense of cultural particulars 
versus cultural universals as described by Wiredu. It is here that Gadamer’s and Levinas’ 
respect for the ‘other’ attains the status of an imperative. Even though Habermas 
indicates the absence of advanced moral development in Mead’s philosophy of the other, 
which is theorized on the basis of role formation, significant gestures, and the generalized 
other because of its neglect of the post-conventional rationalization potential of the 
human beings, it has great relevance at the level of everyday interaction and in multi-
cultural exchange.  
 
In a conflict resolution process involving multicultural interlocutors, the ground 
condition for a dialogue is recognition of mutual interests. Multicultural dialogue is 
                                                 
17 Seyla Benhabib, Ed., Democracy and Difference, pp. 21-30. Refer to Jürgen Habermas’ article “Three 
Normative Models of Democracy.” 
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asymmetric because it involves theoretical, practical, and aesthetic issues, 
simultaneously. Habermas’ stipulation for a successful dialogue aimed at a consensus 
such as comprehensibility, redeemability, justifiability, and discursivity could be 
combined with Mead’s method of social communication.18 In multicultural exchanges, 
the conventional level of social rationalization has greater utility than the post-
conventional. It is interesting that while Habermas criticizes Hegel for subjectivizing the 
‘I-Thou’ relationship in the analysis of master-slave relation, the post-conventional moral 
understanding is an abstraction. The post-conventional stage of moral development 
espoused by Habermas must necessarily encompass the pre-conventional and 
conventional stages and there must be a vertical movement among the three stages both 
synchronically and diachronically. At any juncture, each member of the public sphere is 
at different levels of moral understanding and there is a grid of cooperation and 
competition that intersects each actor’s life in different ways. The post-conventional stage 
of rationalization of Kohlberg, endorsed by Habermas, is not a linear category.19 It 
assumes a shared cultural history, egalitarian social environment, motivational factors, 
and organic development but neglects the vicissitudes of individual experience. In its 
extreme, the post-conventional stage is fit only for a Buddha, a Jesus, or a Gandhi.  
 
Consensus – A Need for Asymmetric Communicative Action 
The concept of symmetry is applied in this chapter with respect to the disparities in 
epistemological, conceptual, linguistic, and physical aspects of the participants in a social 
                                                 
18 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2 Life World and Systems, pp. 1-15. 
19 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry 
Weber Nicholsen, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. pp. 116-125. 
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discourse. As Habermas points out in Communication and Legitimation of the Society 
(1979), a social equilibrium is assumed as an underlying condition in theories on 
achieving a consensus through a dialogue. Habermas avoids strategic action or discourse 
because the former is overtly consequential while the latter is overtly procedural. Hence, 
there is a hiatus in the process aimed at arriving at an understanding in asymmetrical 
ituations. In the event of such a breakdown both tacit and explicit assumptions about 
culture, knowledge, and politics are scrutinized.  
 
More often than not, there is a need for paradigm shift, which is not recognized in 
political discourse. Social epistemology, which Alvin Goldman defines as the impact of 
knowledge acquisition on society, is mostly assumed as unproblematic in political theory 
as long as the existing cultural paradigm has wide currency.20 Howard Zinn claims that 
people are responsible for changes and not governments. Zinn’s observation is logically 
correct. But the question is: Who are the people responsible for social change? For the 
sake of convenience, let us divide the society into three classes. They are: the upper class, 
the middle class, and the lower class. In the history of humankind, the cultural paradigm 
has always been the bastion of the upper class. Even though, the above-mentioned 
observation appears to be a hackneyed expression of Marxian historical materialism, 
Zinn’s statement implies that the government is the last to realize the need for a social 
change.21 It is only a logical corollary that the government is the last to awaken to the 
need for social change because it is far removed from the civil society and the market.  
                                                 
20 Alvin Goldman, “Group Knowledge Versus Group Rationality: Two Approaches to Social 
Epistemology,” Episteme, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004. pp. 11-20. 
21 Howard Zinn, Oracle, Tampa: University of South Florida, December 1, 2004. 
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The upper class is always advanced in terms of science, technology, political 
authority, economy, and philosophy, which are the deciding factors of a cultural 
paradigm. Because of the disparity in the epistemic levels in the society, an idea takes a 
long time to evolve into a social policy. An idea developing into a social or public policy 
is coeval with the awareness of people at the lower strata of the society, because only if a 
majority of the population realizes that it needs to create a change in public policy is the 
government forced to act. Otherwise, the benefits of individual enterprise would never be 
shared equitably even in a democracy. From the above analysis, it can be surmised that 
the chasm in expertise and power on the one hand and non-expertise and powerlessness is 
impossible to bridge.22 There are several plausible reasons for the failure to maintain 
what Rawls would call a reflective equilibrium in a society.23 Some of them are: 
 
1. Group knowledge versus Group rationality (Goldman’s comparison) 
                                                 
22 Cornel West’s critique of the postmodern politics of difference as “prophetic criticism” emphasizes the 
aspect of reductionism in terms of sociological, psychological or historical factors. West, while 
acknowledging the critical consciousness of the demystificatory criticism, terms it one-factor analysis. 
What is interesting in lieu of West’s criticism of the cultural politics of difference is the anachronistic 
position of postmodernism. For some, in West’s case, people of color, the pre-modern, modern, and the 
post-modern distinction remains meaningless. This is true of colonies and the third world economies. 
23 Daniels, Norman, "Reflective Equilibrium", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/reflective-
equilibrium/>. “The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our 
considered judgments (some say our "intuitions") about particular instances or cases, the principles or rules 
that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we believe bear on accepting these 
considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of these elements wherever necessary in order to 
achieve an acceptable coherence among them. The method succeeds and we achieve reflective equilibrium 
when we arrive at an acceptable coherence among these beliefs. An acceptable coherence requires that our 
beliefs not only be consistent with each other (a weak requirement), but that some of these beliefs provide 
support or provide a best explanation for others. Moreover, in the process we may not only modify priori 
beliefs but add new beliefs as well. In practical contexts, this deliberation may help us come to a conclusion 
about what we ought to do when we had not at all been sure earlier. (Scanlon 2002). We arrive at an 
optimal equilibrium when the component judgments, principles, and theories are ones we are un-inclined to 
revise any further because together they have the highest degree of acceptability or credibility for us.” 
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2. Liberal democracy versus Corporatism 
3. Expertise versus Audience 
4. Communicative actions versus Strategic action 
5. Community versus Society 
6. Solidarity versus Subsidiarity 
7. Deontology versus Consequentialism 
 
Most of the afore-mentioned categorizations are discussed with respect to the symmetric 
nature of the lifeworld in liberal democracies. Most liberal political theorists have an 
approach that is culture-specific. While liberalism does not overtly encourage self-denial 
or sacrifice, social transformation from a stratified society to a direct-access society is 
possible only at terrible human costs. In this sense, most of contemporary political theory 
is synchronous and not diachronous.  
 
Procedural democracy is intimately connected with historical conditions of 
society. By abstracting the procedural from the teleological, the form is accorded 
supremacy over content. Procedural theorists speak of liberal democracy as the Promised 
Land that needs only a reflective equilibrium or an overlapping consensus with respect to 
the internal dynamics of the process. As a process, procedural democracy is considered to 
be the panacea for the ills of world. Habermas universalizes formal categories of 
procedural liberalism through a theory of universal pragmatics. Universal pragmatics 
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combines formal linguistic structures with everyday spoken language.24 It is also an 
important aspect of Mead’s notion of role-formation and generalized other. Universal 
pragmatics is also related to the post-conventional rational development of Kohlberg and 
Selman. But there is a need to engage people not only at the level of the moral and 
political but also at the cultural. Hence, there is a need for social action that emphasizes 
cooperation, self-denial, good social consequences, and a procedural consensus.  
 
The social action that I envisage encompasses Weberian purposive-instrumental 
action and Habermasian communicative action. It also emphasizes truthfulness, rightness, 
and truth, Habermasian criteria for successful validity claims. It supports evaluator-
neutrality and evaluator-relativity, in a weak sense. I call such an action co-operative 
action. In the realm of social action, there are several variables such as social choices, 
individual circumstances, political process, and cultural factors. Hence, there is a need to 
coordinate individual actions with social objectives. In achieving limited or partial 
unanimity (Arrow’s terminology), co-operative action does not exclude different social 
choices.25 The social attitude required is performative and not pedagogical but without a 
sense of possessiveness or attachment to the pleasures of the favorable outcome as the 
sole motivating force. Happiness, heuristic motivation, self-sacrifice, and personal 
satisfaction are not prohibited in co-operative action. What is prohibited is internal 
colonization and structural violence, which democracy is required to address. As Arrow 
                                                 
24 Habermas, Communication and Evolution of the Society, Boston: Beacon Press, 1979. Refer to the 
article “What is Universal Pragmatics?” 
25 K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. p. 74. 
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repeatedly points out, individual and social choices cannot be reconciled under all 
conditions.   
 
Co-operative Action 
Concepts emphasizing deontology tend to trivialize an emphasis on consequences, while 
the converse is true for those concepts of action that privilege consequences, such as 
utilitarianism. Co-operative action is modeled on the concept of non-attached action. The 
concept of non-attached action emphasizes the performance of an action with truthfulness 
and sincerity on the part of most of the participants. It emphasizes procedural fairness in 
the pursuit of wealth, happiness, and success. Non-attached action is at once an individual 
and a group action. In the context of The Bhagawad Gīta, non-attached action is a clever 
reconciliation of the deontological with the teleological. As a treatise that emphasizes 
social action within the confines of Indian caste system but at the same time recognizing 
the need to transcend social barriers, The Gīta offers the solution of ‘renunciation in 
action as against renunciation of action.’26 The context of non-attached action is a 
battlefield in which cousins, uncles, teachers, and friends are on opposite sides. A 
simmering feud assumes gargantuan proportions and culminates in a war between two 
royal clans (first cousins), the Kauravas and the Pāndavas. Eventually, it becomes a war 
in which friends fight with friends, uncles with nephews, and teachers with their students 
because of what could be termed as a confusion of deontological dogmatism with social 
responsibility, on the one hand, and extreme purposive-instrumental reason on the other. 
Arjuna, the Pāndava prince, who is the recipient of the teachings of Lord Krishna on the 
                                                 
26 M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2000. p. 121. 
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battlefield described in the Indian epic of The Mahabhārata, is confused between his 
sense of duty and sense of civility. Is killing some one even for deontological reasons 
justified? Can one relinquish what is one’s duty to kill in the pursuit of justice and, 
instead, sacrifice the desire to avenge what is perceived as a denial of justice? Should 
injustice be tolerated and ignored without any opposition?27  
 
In The Gīta, which is a religious text, the ultimate purpose is merged with God’s 
will and the duty to adhere to fulfilling one’s role in achieving such a purpose. Hence, at 
some level, deontology and teleology merges into God’s will. Hence, we are once again 
revisited with the Socratic question of whether the Gods advocate an action because they 
are just or actions are just because the Gods say so. The Bhagawad Gīta within its 
context provides an answer that karma or one’s duty is to be performed at all costs on 
account of the social responsibility attached to it. There is a causal link between 
individual and social action. In the Vedas, the concept of r ̣ta or cosmic moral order is 
connected to the dharma or righteousness of the individuals and the society. In order to 
explain how an action that is purportedly both right and wrong (killing one’s own kin for 
the sake of revenge or possessions, which is entailed by duty to protect one’s honor and 
regain what is rightfully one’s property that was unfairly usurped by Arjuna’s cousins 
and prohibited by one’s dharma not to kill one’s own kin for the sake of wealth). Lord 
Krishna advises Arjuna to perform his duty, which is to lead the war since the battle has 
been announced and the armies were facing each other.  
                                                 
27 The Mahabharata, edited and translated by J. A. B. van Buitenen, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1973-78). The Mahabharata is one of the two great epic-poems of India and the longest 
epic-poem in the world. The Bhagawad Gīta is a part of the epic.  
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According to Krishna, Arjuna was concerned with the outcome of the war and the 
blame that would be attached to him for his actions on the battlefield rather than the 
rightness or wrongness of his actions. Hence, Arjuna was more mindful of the 
consequences of his actions than the rightness of the means of achieving his goal.  
Krishna also emphasizes that the war was not wished by the Pāndavas and that all other 
avenues of sāma (discussion), dāna (concessions), bheda (warnings and threats), and 
finally the time for the use of daṇda (force) had arrived. Hence, Arjuna cannot shirk his 
responsibilities as a soldier to fight a righteous battle even if it was against his own 
clansmen. That being said, attitudinally, Arjuna had to become involved with the process 
of waging war. Here, Krishna introduces the concept of karma-yogi. A karma-yogi is one 
who performs an action without an attachment to the consequences of an action.28 Here, 
the consequences refer to self-interest and egoism.  
   
One can argue that in the final analysis, deontological positions cannot be bereft 
of common or individual good. The issue for the deontologists is whether an action is 
procedurally correct irrespective of its outcome. Underlying such an approach is the 
assumption that procedural correctness would ultimately lead to the right objective. Such 
an act of self-denial is anathematic to the consequentialists and they emphasize the 
primacy of the consequences more than procedural correctness. A secularized concept of 
non-attached action, in the form of co-operative action, in which the actors must be 
accommodative to self-denial as an exception but not the rule would not violate voluntary 
                                                 
28 M. Hiriyanna, pp. 121-124. 
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action encouraged in a democracy. The concept of co-operative action fuses subsidiarity 
and solidarity together. As a deliberative action, co-operative action does not stipulate 
conditions of linguistic competencies. The only pre-condition for co-operative action is 
the freedom to voice opinions irrespective of the linguistic or communicative 
competencies.  
 
The aim of co-operative action is progressive betterment of any potential conflict-
producing situation. Group decisions must not infringe upon individual rights unless 
society is adversely affected in terms of shared goods. The aim of co-operative action is 
to arrive at a consensus or a general agreement. The emphasis of co-operative action is 
not on unanimity. Hence, Jane Mansbridge’s advocacy of rational persuasion could also 
be accommodated.29 Mansbridge argues that rational coercion is inevitable in a 
deliberative process. The underlying principles of co-operative action are non-violence 
and truthfulness. While the consequences, both individual and social, are important, the 
social impact of the consequences of one’s action must be reconciled with the benefits or 
damages that accrue to the individual and the society. Once a decision about a course of 
action is reached then it could be adopted as a social policy. But if the policy fails to 
achieve its objectives, then alternatives must be pursued. Procedural dogmatism must not 
be condoned. Procedures are adjusted according to their effectiveness in problem solving 
and their social impact. If a group action causes harm to individuals, then the individual 
must be compensated. Issues pertaining to individual, social, religious, and cultural 
practices must not be a source of discrimination. Neither the valorization of individuals to 
                                                 
29 Jane Mansbridge, “Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity,” pp. 46-66 in Seyla Benhabib, Ed. 
Democracy and Difference, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 163
the detriment of society nor society to that of individuals must be encouraged. Most of 
the problems in the arena of politics arise due to the lack of understanding of the scope of 
problems in social and personal spheres. A personal solution for social problems and a 
social solution to problems pertaining to personal lives of people have caused tensions 
between private and public spheres.  
 
Co-operative action encourages cooperation as well as competition. Since, the 
emphasis is on the optimal performance of an action rather than a victory, the 
accomplishment of a task gives heuristic satisfaction. Accolades and benefits that accrue 
out of co-operative action must not be coveted but need not be shunned. Thus, the en-
ownment in terms of personal agency for the success of an action is exchanged with an 
attitude of self-releasement. Thus, the emphasis is on accomplishing a task with desired 
consequences with a sense of detachment to the fruits of action. This could be best 
illustrated with the help of an example of driving on the road. Each driver who is driving 
on the road must follow the rules of traffic. But in any given situation, there are 
involuntary violations of traffic rules. Voluntary violations are penalized. A driver who 
follows traffic rules assiduously and also constantly adjusts her driving according to the 
traffic would reach her destination safely, barring any unforeseen incidents. On the other 
hand, a driver who is always worried about delays, other drivers, and also about the 
possibility of accidents, losing her way, being stopped by police, or driving too slowly or 
too rashly, will more often than not commit serious errors which will cause problems for 
other drivers and to herself.  
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Ultimately, fruits of an action accrue when procedures and consequences are 
calibrated and evaluated according to the situation. Violations of procedures occur only 
when consequences of an action assumes more importance than procedural propriety. 
This would lead to impropriety and avariciousness. On the converse, a dogmatic 
adherence to procedures without a constant re-evaluation of consequences would be 
meaningless. It would only lead to despondency and also impose unnecessary constraints 
on fellow citizens. Co-operative action emphasizes consensus that does not require 
specialized discourse. Hence, it is also effective in dealing with asymmetric cultural 
discourse. For a consensus to be achieved should optimal conditions be established such 
as a public sphere that is structurally democratized or a process of consensus has to 
necessarily engage unequal and unhomely spaces? I strongly emphasize the need for a 
provisional procedural and purposive frame of reference in order to facilitate cooperative 
action. 
 
Consensus – A Conflict of Identities 
Bhabha’s reading of concepts such as nation or culture as containing the double moment 
of being a part of history as well as the makers of history creates a convulsion in the 
concept of civil society. It is this liminal conception of a dynamic, historical, and 
ephemeral self that is imbedded in the ever-emerging interstices of the cultures of the 
world. Can liberal democracy or republicanism encourage a discourse that emanates from 
the margins and not the center? Both liberal democracy and republicanism are based on 
the assumption of a nation-state, as a shared idea of a population. What happens to a 
liberal discourse when there is a proliferation of cultures and not one dominant culture or 
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religion? Can liberal democracy sincerely engage the shifting margins while staying in 
the center? Bhabha writes:30 
 
The people are not simply historical events or parts of a patriotic body politic. They 
are also a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference: their claim to be 
representative provokes a crisis within the process of signification and discursive 
address. We then have a contested conceptual territory where the nation’s people 
must be thought in double-time; the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a 
nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-
given or constituted historical origin in the past; the people are also the ‘subjects’ of 
a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the 
nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as 
contemporaneity: as that sign of the present through which national life is redeemed 
and iterated as a reproductive process. 
 
The struggle between the subjectivization and the objectivization of the population of a 
nation contains the binary oppositional structure listed in the beginning of this chapter. 
The advocates of liberal democracy more often than not fail to recognize the smoldering 
fire in the interstices. In a liberal democracy that enshrines individual liberty and which 
contains social shock absorbers such as courts, political institutions such as Congress and 
Senate, secular polity, freedom to protest, religious freedom, lobbying groups, elections, 
and referendums have successfully alleviated the problem of group violence.  
 
It is interesting that group violence and rioting breaks out more often than not in 
the under-privileged sections of the city in liberal democracies. Individuated human 
beings who have been inculcated with conceptions of individual rights and property 
inhabit the cities. Hence, the nature of crimes in a city is individual versus individual, 
mostly. But in the third world countries and in the rural areas in the liberal democracies, 
                                                 
30 Bhabha, LOC, p. 145. 
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the nature of the crimes could be classified into the group versus the individual, group 
versus group, and very seldom individual versus individual. In ancient cultures such as 
Africa and India, what Bhabha describes as the dual body politic is played at the vertical 
and the horizontal levels; at the vertical level as social and economic stratification and at 
the horizontal level as culturally diverse groups that are involved in a discourse aimed at 
cooperative or coercive action. Bhabha also identifies the vulnerability of a discourse 
because of its inability to confront its own historical contingency.  
 
 Bhabha describes the split in the narratives of national identities as the 
pedagogical and the performative. The pedagogical totalizes people into a totality and the 
social and political identities are defined in terms of a homogeneous and consensual 
community. On the other hand, the performative is specific and addresses unequal 
interests and identities within a population.31 Habermas, for the above-mentioned reason, 
emphasizes the importance of universal pragmatics, in which formal and pragmatic 
elements of the language are conjoined. Bhabha agrees with Claude Lefort’s description 
of the ‘enigma of language,’ which is related to the internal and external referential 
framework of language as the both reflexive and reflective. The construction of a self in a 
language occurs only with reference to the other, which is very close to Mead’s 
conception of the self. This view also reflects the independence of the text, a view that is 
especially espoused by Gadamer.  
 
                                                 
31 Bhabha, LOC,  p. 146. 
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Can procedural democracy successfully surmount the problem of a split national 
subject? Can liberal democracy meaningfully engage cultures that epitomize liminality of 
identities? Bhabha cites Raymond Williams’ distinction between “residual and emergent 
practices in oppositional cultures which require, he insists, a ‘non-metaphysical, non-
subjectivist’ mode of explanation.32 Habermas’ theory of communicative action that 
emphasizes a perpetual thrust towards agreement also borders on the pedagogical. Why 
should the world have a post-national central authority? As Bhabha argues, such a 
conception of post-national authority is abstracted from the context of everyday 
experience and remains a utopian ideal. Pragmatics is sacrificed on the altar of the 
formal. Why is there a need for a consensus that culminates in the formal transcendental 
idea of the post-national when even national identities are nebulous? Hence, there is a 
need for self-releasement and non-attachment to a universal foundational principle.33 
Instead of theorizing about absolutes, there is a need to thematize validity claims 
performatively. Is the world safe from hypostatization and reification if the interstitial 
becomes the cultural norm? What prevents the hypostatization of the non-consensual 
cultural interstices? Are differences sufficient to ward off cultural homogenization? I 
would argue that in terms of the individuation, interstices could be celebrated. But in 
sociation, the interstitial is analyzable only in terms of the already hypostatized 
categories. This has been proved in the Indian caste-system, which was anterior to the 
class system but did not originate from it.  
 
                                                 
32 Bhabha, LOC, p. 148. 
33 It must be mentioned here that Habermas explains Apel’s influence on the concept of universal 
pragmatics in an article titled “A Master Builder with Hermeneutic Tact” on Karl Otto Apel in Habermas, 
The Liberating Power of Symbols, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. pp. 66-77. 
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Difference as the Absolute 
The caste system that exists in India is the classic example of the absolutization of 
liminality. Instead of effecting a cultural integration of the society horizontally, the social 
distinctions were institutionalized and hypostatized. In a manner similar to the Socratic 
‘noble lie,’ but in more earnest tenor, the concept of guṇas or qualities elucidated in the 
Sāmkhya philosophy, has influenced The Bhagawad Gīta profusely. Unlike the United 
States or other countries that had a national consciousness due to religious and cultural 
identities, India’s diversity was both a blessing and damnation. Towards the later part of 
the R ̣g Veda in the Purus ̣asukta (hymn to the Purus ̣a), the beginnings of the class system 
based on occupation of priests, warriors, merchants, and laborers had begun. The outcasts 
or pariahs attained notoriety only later. The word pariah literally means ‘drummer’ in 
Tamil. At some point of time, the drummers were considered to be of lower caste and 
thus they were relegated to the group of untouchables. In the Buddhist chronicles, there is 
only a mention of the ruling class and the laboring class. Even when the Aryans and the 
native dāsas first came into contact, the caste-system was yet to develop. There were only 
the hunter-gatherer Aryan society and the agrarian dāsas. But social classification in 
terms of the four afore-mentioned classes became hereditary in course of time and the 
constant flow of people belonging to different cultures into the Indian subcontinent 
created a miasma of social grid formation in the form of the caste system. Hence, the 
diversity of India evolved organically but also in an unpremeditated fashion. A 
procedure, which was justified on the basis of the quality of birth, was the caste system.  
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Indian Caste System - A Systematic Hypostatization of Cultural Differences 
Indian social organization was necessitated by a constant process of sedimentation of 
cultures one over the other. Max Weber diagnosed the lattice-like social structure of the 
Indian caste system, which was nurtured by the class system in the beginning but 
overwhelmed the class system by institutionalizing occupational and cultural 
differences.34 The minute nature of the caste system extends to social, political, cultural, 
and religious practices of the individual, family, town, village, city, and the country as a 
whole. Caste system was a total and absolute social organization, which in simple 
terminology, what in Charles Taylor’s parlance could be termed as, the social imaginary 
of India. A multi-culturally diverse cultural sphere differentiated by every possible factor 
evolved into an oppressive system because of the very difference that has made India a 
tolerant democracy.  
 
Most writers on India have remarked that religious persecutions in India were 
exceptions and not the rule. With such a strong grid-like social structure, internal 
colonization and structural violence were localized. Religion was a superstructure while 
social organization in the form of caste system was the base. Religious conflicts occurred 
outside the sphere of the caste system. What is interesting is the fact that a modern shared 
social imaginary that developed in the West was not possible in India because of the 
fractious nature of the Indian society. But religion survived by incorporating various 
native and foreign practices into an amorphous Hindu culture.  
                                                 
34 Romila Thapar, Early India: From the Origins to AD 1300, University of California Press, 2004. 
Thapar has elaborately dealt with the phenomenon of the emergence of caste system in India. 
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The concept of India as a country can be explained only in terms of the 
Upanishadic negation of neti, neti (not this, not this). Could Indian culture be explained 
as indescribable (anirvaccaniya)?35 But while ineffability is a philosophically attractive 
principle, politically it is potently dangerous. Manifestations of ineffability occur in 
myriad ways and they are more often than not utilized to stultify the efforts of 
unsuspecting masses while the elites inject ideologies that are imprinted indelibly into the 
social psyche of the people. Ineffability is the magic wand that obfuscated social 
inequalities. Ineffability paralyzed people into inactivity while poets and artists prospered 
under its shade. Ineffability was nourished and nurtured by sacralizing language. 
Habermas elaborately discusses the process of demystification of the ineffable by what he 
calls the linguistification of the sacred.36  
 
In American history, consensus required for enacting a law in the aftermath of the 
American Revolution was channeled through two groups led by John Adams and Thomas 
Jefferson. There was a shared common goal of individual freedom and protection of 
individual property, which was the cultural paradigm of the independent American 
nation. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century America, which was predominantly 
racially homogeneous, language, culture, political institutions, and religion were common 
factors that united the population. Contemporary political theorizing has not incorporated 
changes in the essential character of American democracy. An interesting contrast would 
                                                 
35 Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 
Publishers, 1987. pp. 274-275. 
36 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, pp. 43-74. 
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be the Indian Constitution, which is a document that has been designed with cultural 
diversity and social inequality as the defining criteria.  
 
The Indian Constitution was framed under the leadership of B.R. Ambedkar in 
order to ensure peaceful coexistence of a secular, multi-religious, multi-cultural, and 
multi-lingual population. In the case of ancient Indian society, due to a lack of horizontal 
political system multicultural diversity was arranged in the hierarchical framework in 
which each vertical division was horizontally expanded on the basis of the social status of 
the new entrants. In ancient India, corporatism was the determining factor of the social 
status and hence horizontal relation between various groups could happen only within a 
particular grid. In the contemporary context, corporatism is the domain of the market and 
the public sphere is characterized by democracy. In a sense, corporate market and 
democratic public sphere are always in conflict. But because of a judicial system based 
on common laws and free elections, most advanced democracies have ameliorated the 
tension between the democratic public sphere and the corporate market, though not 
entirely.  
 
Caste system that unfortunately still exists in India is the best example of a 
corporate system.37 Indian caste-system has been considerably weakened because of a 
strong emphasis on individual rights, equality, freedom, and affirmative action after 
India’s independence from the British. But the process of dismantling casteism, 
empowering women, and establishing religious amity began almost two centuries ago. 
                                                 
37 Howard Wiarda, Civil Society: The American Model and Third World Development, Cambridge: 
Westview Press, 2003.pp. 27-42. 
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India needs to elevate herself to the next rung of the democratic ladder by strengthening 
democratic institutions locally. India, still, does not have a culture of co-operation, but 
only co-option. The culture of competition that is hailed as the central feature of 
advanced liberal capitalism is very much absent in India. The concept of doing one’s 
dharma (svadharma), contentment, non-attachment, and social responsibility has been 
misinterpreted to exclude competitiveness as a moral good, thus making competition 
deplorable. 
  
On the contrary, The Bhagawad Gīta encourages a healthy sense of competition 
by emphasizing the non-instrumental aspects of the process of achieving one’s objective. 
In the absence of a coordinated definition of competition and regulatory bodies, the 
cultural diversity of India spawned a culture of accommodation. Such an attitude of 
accommodation gave rise to a culture of co-option. On the other hand, the fractured social 
organization of India into various castes also institutionalized attitudes. Competition was 
encouraged on the part of kshatriyas (warriors). Learning and religious practices were the 
forte of brahmins, while unquestioned servitude in physical labor was assigned to the 
labor class (sūdras). Acquisition of wealth was the domain of the merchant class 
(vaishyas). The class distinctions mentioned above had a dual role. On the one hand, it 
created a hierarchical society, which later became hereditary. On the other hand, even 
during severe social unrest, the Indian society did not crumble because of the svadharma 
of each class did not depend on the government but on the social organization itself. 
Since social hierarchy was the structural foundation of the Indian society after the period 
of the Vedas it was impossible to disentangle the hereditary nature of social classification. 
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Even though, social policies of the Indian governments over the past fifty years have 
been more populist than progressive and the bureaucracy itself wreaking of corruption, 
the reason why India has grown into a stable democracy is because of the manner in 
which social transformation was achieved by people such as Gandhi.  
 
From the eighteenth century, there was a concerted effort to alleviate social evils 
in India by progressive individuals and social movements. As Gandhi, repeatedly 
stressed, Indian independence was both an internal as well as external freedom. Gandhi 
called for a complete social change as the precursor to political freedom. For Gandhi, 
political rights were meaningless without a concept of duty. Duty, for Gandhi, was to 
strive for the development of the downtrodden people of India. Progress was a social, 
political, religious, and economic activity. Hence, for Gandhi, a political transformation 
was a spiritual transformation and vice versa. Moreover, the spiritual was intimately 
connected to the welfare of the people around him. When India gained independence 
from the British, the attitude of the majority had become sensitive to the plight of the 
discriminated population. Only those states and regions that had feudal landholdings 
continued to discriminate against the lower castes whereas in more literate states caste-
discriminations shrank significantly.  
 
Affirmative action, which is called reservation in India, poses an interesting 
problem for Bhabha’s politics of interstices. Ironically, before the reservation for lower 
castes was passed into law by the Indian government, people wanted to advance their 
castes in the social hierarchy, that is, aspired to be a part of the upper castes. But, with a 
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strong emphasis on reservation in education, jobs, and promotions for the lower castes, 
there is a downward trend. Quixotically, all castes including the Brahmin castes are 
demanding reservation on the basis of their caste, minority, and economic status. Hence, 
the institutionalization of the social interstices does not always alleviate problems of 
social justice. Economic assistance program of the government of India has turned into 
rentier rights based on heredity. For the brahmins, privilege has turned into a 
disadvantage while under-privileged status for lower castes, have become a privilege.  
 
The proponents of reservations for the lower castes such as Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, 
who himself belonged to an untouchable caste, advocated reservation only for a certain 
period resembling Rawls’ “difference principle.” A period of fifty years is not sufficient 
to recompense the victims of thousands of years of discrimination. Only the top-tier of 
the erstwhile-discriminated population enjoys the fruits of reservation while the poorer 
section does not have access to quality education and employment opportunities. This 
was partly due to what is derisively called the Hindu rate of growth of 3 – 4% in 
economy.38 With economic liberalization and less governmental interference, India has a 
healthier rate of growth of 6-7% for the past few years. But the private sector has not 
encouraged reservation in employment either due to political implications or quality of 
the work force. Only if the private sector encourages the under-privileged, would Indian 
society surge forward. Hence, at least, metaphorically, the interstices must dynamically 
interact with the centers of culture in India. Democracy is a passive phenomenon and not 
an active phenomenon amongst the Indian population that still struggles with the 
                                                 
38 Shashi Tharoor, From Midnight to the Millenium, New York: Arcade Publishing, 1997. p. 159. 
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problems of everyday existence such as water, electricity, transportation, jobs, housing, 
and rampant corruption. Democracy in spirit is yet to pervade entire Indian population. 
 
Cultural Melting-pot or Multi-cultural Democracy 
India did not have a caste system during the early Vedic period. Only when the Indian 
society became sedentary, did class divisions emerge in India.39 Ironically, there is a 
reversal of privilege and caste hierarchy, at present. It is interesting to observe that 
dynamic social interstices challenge cultural stereotypes and hypostatization while a 
settled procedural democracy is less sensitive to socio-cultural changes and aspirations of 
the margins. The philosophy of the interstitial that Bhabha advocates could be 
institutionalized in a procedural democracy, for example, in the form of affirmative 
action for cultural minorities and, hitherto, oppressed classes. But once the politics of 
interstices is institutionalized, it ceases to be a philosophy of presence. Without a binding 
principle or a social commitment at both institutional and individual levels, procedures 
are ineffectual.  
 
The melting pot or multi-cultural democracy as the ideal of America is a later 
justification of the idea of America as a symbol of freedom.40 In any culture, immigrants 
begin with a distinctive disadvantage of being treated as aliens. In the United States, legal 
immigrants have more rights and are not discriminated overtly. There is a cultivated 
sensitivity amongst the American populace with respect to immigrants. But events such 
                                                 
39 Romila Thapar, A History of India, London: Penguin Publishers, 1990. pp. 28-49. 
40 Sidney Hook, pp. 95-105. 
 176
as the September 11th 2001 could drastically alter the opinion of the people especially 
against minorities from the Middle Eastern countries.  
 
It is in this context that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr’s observation that there is an 
obsessive search for the roots amongst the immigrant population of the United States 
poses an interesting issue.41 While Takaki responds that multi-culturalism or multi-
ethnicity could be an enriching aspect of the American society, it must be noted that 
America and other countries that encourage immigrants need to have a social, political, 
and cultural response to multiculturalism. In so far as there is a measured distantiation 
between various cultures encouraged by the conception of negative liberty rather than 
studied engagement with other cultures, a multicultural democracy is impossible 
irrespective of whether a nation is a cultural melting pot such as India or an advanced 
liberal democracy that encourages multiculturalism such as the United States.  
 
                                                 
41 Ronald Takaki, Ed. Debating Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Refer to Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr.’s article “The Return to the Melting Pot.” 
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Conclusion 
 
The necessary function of a successful political system is to establish consensus between 
individuals, civil society, political hierarchy, and electoral institutions, not exclusively 
procedural and symmetric, but responsive to the asymmetry of human relationships. I 
discuss the reasons for disagreements on important issues such as affirmative action and 
multicultural democracy in this chapter. I analyze the daunting challenges to multi-
cultural democracies such as the United States and India and the need for consensus in 
social, religious, economic, and political spheres. Both India and the United states have 
multi-religious and multi-ethnic population. Hence, there is a pressing need to encourage 
consensus in the public sphere. Subsidiarity or mutual social relationship rather than 
frivolous legal wrangling is necessary for the peaceful coexistence of a diverse society. A 
possessive individualistic society or an authoritarian community cannot engender 
consensus. Only a mutual social relationship in which people are willing to give more 
than or at least as much as they take and tolerant to cultural differences will be able to 
support consensus. 
 
 
In most of the academic programs that are actively engaged in research on multi-
cultural issues, religions, and cultures one finds de-contextualization and essentialization 
of alien cultures. The most significant de-contextualization occurs among already settled 
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generation of the immigrant population themselves. There is a hypostatization of 
imported cultures, which are completely isolated from the dynamic developments of the 
native countries from which the immigrants themselves hail. More often that not, there is 
a clash of cultures between the immigrant settlers and the countries of origin. 
Fundamental factors that contribute to the organic development of an immigrant culture 
are not present in the same degree in the United States as in the native countries. Hence, 
there is a concerted effort to search for roots among the ethnic population of the United 
States. There are several ways in which the multi-cultural question could be handled. I 
will list some of them.  
 
1. The presence of English as the common language. Even though the 
immigrants might have a different language as their mother tongue, the 
dominant linguistic framework of English would evoke no challenges 
from the immigrant population because of the functional and cultural 
prestige attached to English.  
 
2. The two-party system. The American political system shifts the cultural 
paradigm to that of class-issue from that of ethnic allegiance. In this 
sense, the American political system needs to make compromises and 
turn into a word-world fit to a world-word fit.1 Thus far, the word-world 
fit has helped range the ethnic minorities within the two-party 
framework, which has helped in the assimilation of the minorities. But 
                                                 
1 John Searle, Expression and meaning: Studies in the theory of speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979. 
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as the minorities become politically more active, the polity needs to 
become more sensitive to the ethnic divisions because of issues such as 
dual-status citizenship, religious fundamentalism, and issues such as 
terrorism.  
 
3. In course of time, the two-party system might undergo a transformation 
into a multi-party democracy. Wiredu’s emphasis on a non-party 
democracy supplies the best atmosphere for a government by 
consensus. But, in a capitalistic environment, non-party democracy is 
difficult to achieve.  
 
4. The question of universal pragmatics poses a very interesting challenge 
to the multi-ethnic and multi-party democracies. Habermas does not 
address the structural problems imbedded in a linguistically diverse 
polity even when the emphasis is on universal pragmatics. As the 
United States recognizes the need for training in other languages, then 
the vexatious issues pertaining to a linguistically constructed lifeworld 
will come to the fore. Linguistic construction of social reality differs 
with cultures. Without self-denial in terms of a language, which is in 
turn a denial of an en-worlded self, there is neither a concept of 
universal pragmatics nor that of national unity. 
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 Habermas attempts to circumvent this problem by positing a post-national constellation, 
which avoids problems of cultural relativism. But such an enterprise demands gargantuan 
self-denial of individuals who belong to variegated cultures, religions, nations, and 
languages. Institutionalization of such an idea into a political enterprise would definitely 
engender what Lyotard calls the tyranny of the consensus. The problem posed by 
Habermas’ grandiose conception of a post-national organization in the form of United 
Nations Government resembles Nathan Glazer’s idea that the Constitution of the United 
States must only guarantee equality of individuals and not redress inequalities of hitherto 
oppressed ethnic groups.2 Such a formal notion of an egalitarian democracy is plausible 
under conditions that resemble Habermas’ ideal speech situation.3  
 
In the United States, secularism or multi-cultural acceptance has occurred in an 
incremental manner. Inclusion of African American minorities into the political spectrum 
happened in the course of time and not suddenly. Asian Immigration Act (1965) and 
other legislations that were inclusive of the cultural differences indicate the gradual 
cultural maturation of America. Concepts such as secularism, racial equality, anti-
apartheid policies, gender equality, and other concepts that enhance natural rights have 
developed inductively. In the case of the United States, the original position as the status 
quo ensuring equality that Rawls discusses is relevant because of the founding of a new 
world influenced by the ideas of Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau. The 
                                                 
2 Ronald Takaki, Ed. Debating Diversity, Oxford University Press, 2002. Refer to Nathan Glazer’s article 
on “The Emergence of an American Ethnic Pattern.” 
3 Habermas’ notion of ideal speech situation has been elaborated in his article ‘Wahrenheitstheorien” which 
has not been translated into English. In his later works, “ideal speech situation” has taken different guises 
as communicative action, universal pragmatics, and discourse ethics. From a list of pre-conditions for a 
successful communicative action, the “ideal speech situation” has metamorphosed into a more thematic 
principle that is interlinked with the process of argumentation.  
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American Revolution was a reaction against the abuse of power of the British monarchy, 
which viewed America as one of the colonies. In many ways, the American Revolution of 
1776 was an internal revolt that ended with the formation of a separate country, which 
expanded on the basis of joint-business interests, not to mention the Bible 
Commonwealth. Hence, the American idea of a socio-political consensus was centered 
on commerce and individual rights. [It must be noted here that there was a strong political 
movement in favor of republicanism. Great American personages such as Benjamin 
Franklin and John Adams supported the republican ideals.]  Nathan Glazer and other 
claimants to the pristine American idea of non-ethnic liberal democracy have not 
acknowledged the tacit understanding of a social imaginary underlying the ideal of 
America. 
 
In any social situation, the historicity of the prevalent cultural framework can 
never be exorcised from any socio-economic analysis to create artificial conditions of 
equality. Only through a culturally immanent dialogue can a consensus be achieved. 
Whether a consensus achieved is a hard or soft-consensus depends upon the gravity of the 
issues debated. Only in a discourse based on heuristic motivation can there be a hard- 
consensus. For example, hard consensus is plausible in a discourse among nuclear 
scientists about a specific issue or a group of scientists working on a project. In a 
discourse among warring groups or in the event of ethnic strife, a hard-consensus is 
neither sought nor achieved. On the contrary, soft-consensus or provisional consensus is 
preferable to a hard-consensus. Because of the differences in the cultural paradigm and a 
possible abortive bid to forge a hard-consensus, the simmering differences between two 
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divergent factions could lead to serious conflagration. In such situations, Habermas’ 
depth-hermeneutics would not be of great help but rather an aesthetic claim to the 
truthfulness of subjective expression would thaw frigid interpersonal relationships. In 
many ways, a type of co-operative action, which is a combination of self-denial, a belief 
in progress, broad consequentialism, and broad deontology, is warranted. Weber’s 
analysis of purposive-instrumental rationality emphasizes a strong sense of 
consequentialism that is not necessarily utilitarian. On the other hand, Habermas’ 
emancipatory telos would be strongly deontological.  
 
Habermas tempers the concept of emancipatory telos in his later works by 
emphasizing socially contingent critical self-reflection and universal pragmatics. Thomas 
McCarthy’s explains the role of systematic distortion in universal pragmatics as a tension 
between those experiences imbedded in the unconscious of individuals and the social 
dimensions of individual experience. Habermas calls these experiences historico-
hermeneutic critical experiences.4 A concept of consensus requires integration of the 
individual-social experience at the level of depth-hermeneutics, according to Habermas. 
When the interlocutors interact with each other at the level of depth hermeneutics, does it 
really constitute a consensus in the ordinary sense of the term? Furthermore, at that level 
I argue that a dialogue becomes argumentative, which Habermas seeks to avoid. On the 
other hand, Parsonian social system seems to be restrictive to individual creativity 
because of the conception of society as a system.  
 
                                                 
4 Habermas, Communication and Evolution of the Society, 1979. pp. xiii-xv. I refer to this work as CES. 
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Habermas’ objective was to situate his theory on an entirely new paradigm. The 
paradigm of consciousness that characterized pre-modern and modern eras had to be 
replaced because of the contingency of social conditions. Hence, Habermas builds his 
theory of communicative action on the new paradigm of language. Habermas writes:5 
 
What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: 
language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited to us. Our 
first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and 
unconstrained consensus. Autonomy and responsibility together (Mündigkeit) 
comprise the only idea we possess a priori in the sense of the philosophical 
tradition.  
 
Habermas’ program of integrating the formal and pragmatic structures of communication 
has important portends for the entire spectrum of social and political philosophy. The 
structural conflict between a liberal civil society and a corporate system characterizes 
advanced liberal democracies.  
 
C. B. Mcpherson’s writings on possessive individualism that underlies liberal 
capitalistic societies describe the tension between democracy and property.6 The 
reduction of democracy to liberty in terms of individual human rights and individual 
property rights precludes the necessity for a civitas. Mcpherson clearly does not accede to 
the claims that procedural democracy could be the final solution to political issues. Jane 
Mansbridge criticizes Mcpherson on his diffidence to endorse the importance of 
democratic participation as the bedrock of a consensual polity. But democracy is an 
                                                 
5 Habermas,  CES, Ibid. p. xvii. 
6 C.B. Macpherson, Democracy and Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1962. 
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ideology that needs critical self-reflection and it is not a state of emancipation. 
Democracy facilitates critical self-reflection but does not necessarily demand it.   
 
On the surface, Glazer’s claim is powerful, but only plausible in Rawls’ ‘Original 
Position’ or ‘veil of ignorance.’ By declaring that everyone is equal, injustices cannot be 
punished, deterred, nor corrected. Glazer also performs a Rawlsian epoche when he limits 
political rights to individual rights and severs group rights. In the civil rights violations, 
the question was blackness versus whiteness and not individual black versus individual 
white. Another interesting but weak argument is that of exoneration from culpability for 
past injustices due to a lack of deliberate design on the part of the perpetrators. Social and 
historical conditions that prevailed during the period when atrocities were being 
committed are claimed to be accidental. Those who do not belong to the pre-1964 
generation claim that they have no culpability for what happened before 1964 and hence 
they must not be penalized by affirmative action in the post-1964 era.  
 
Liberalism imposed a divide between the individual and the social that has been 
ingeniously utilized to champion causes such as gun-rights and anti-affirmative action by 
questioning the constitutional authority of the Federal government to intervene in favor of 
the minorities in the United States.7 The liberal conception of individual rights has 
historicized the individual and hence has also encouraged an evaluation of history as 
individual history (petty narratives in Lyotards’s words). But such an individuation of the 
                                                 
7 The afore-mentioned appeal to individual liberty is based on a liberalism of convenience rather than 
ritualistic liberalism (Sidney Hook’s phraseology). This is a problem of pseudo liberalism and hence there 
are no rational solutions. 
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self is a post-modern conception. Post-modern conception of selfhood is a social 
rationalization applicable for a group of people who have undergone the transformation 
in successive stages from the pre-modern to the post-modern selves. But in the case of 
stunted evolution of a historical self as witnessed in the discrepancies in the third world – 
first world division and, even within a society, between the upper classes and the down-
trodden classes, there is a need for self-denial on the part of the whole society, the 
oppressors and the oppressed. Otherwise, what Gandhi refers to as the ‘cycle of 
repression’ and what Franz Fanon proposed as what was an unavoidable recourse to 
violence against colonial repression would destroy the social fabric. Rawls and Habermas 
propose institutional solutions. But such institutional solutions guaranteed by liberal 
democracy needs to be supported at the societal level by human leadership and sacrifices. 
Such a responsibility rests on social integrates or the group of people who have an idea of 
society as a collective.8  
 
 Democracy is neither a self-regulatory nor a self-righteous system. It was under 
the eyes of the United States Constitution that slavery flourished. Even what Charles 
Taylor considers modern social imaginary a only a self-projection of prevailing social 
values of a society. Hence, modern social imaginary is a mirror image of a society. It is 
not very clear whether a self-imagination of how one’s society is would eliminate the 
social ills. History proves that all religions of the world proclaim charity, magnanimity, 
honesty, non-violence and other venerable traits required by human beings. But in all 
                                                 
8 Alvin Goldman, Episteme, Edinburgh University Press, 2004. pp. 11-20. 
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parts of the world, wars, oppression of women, casteism, religious persecution, 
colonization and slavery have been unabashedly condoned.  
 
As Fanon argues, the oppressor and the oppressed have no shared beliefs in 
humaneness. There is no human connection between the colonized and the colonizer. 
Hence, for Fanon, the only solution possible is through violence.9 The encapsulation of a 
situation of pathological loathing between the colonizer and the colonized is what Gandhi 
refers to as the ‘cycle of repression.’10 Such situations lead to genocide. Democracy 
provides a non-violent way of resolving conflicts. But constant checks and balances are 
required to prevent the hypostatization of democratic institutions. Thus, liberal 
democracy in its procedural forms is not free of systematic distortions. Unlike Habermas’ 
ideal speech situation, the entire political system is under the spell of a social imaginary. 
Is it plausible for a society to be reflexive and transform itself or is it necessary for an 
external agency to disrupt its inertia?  
 
Social transformations have been brought about only by sustained opposition to 
injustice and not only by self-evaluative political action. It is also very much possible that 
in procedural democracies, injustice can be committed procedurally. Criminals, in order 
to circumvent the consultative political process that is integral to liberal democracy, often 
utilize ineffectual procedures and procedural loopholes. More often than not, it is difficult 
                                                 
9 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, London: Penguin Books, 1978. In the book, Fanon advocates 
the inevitability of anti-colonial violence on the premise that there is no human connection between the 
colonizer and the colonized because the colonized do not acknowledge the human worth of the colonized. 
10 Dennis Dalton, Ed., Mahatma Gandhi: Selected Political Writings, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co., 1998.  
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to respond to individual violations because of the universal nature of the procedures. In a 
procedural democracy, individual responses need procedural validation. More often than 
not, a false social imaginary about the procedural aspects of democracy could lead to 
insensitivity about alien cultural paradigms. The deification of procedural democracy, 
which Sidney Hook aptly calls ritualistic liberalism, has elevated the celebration of 
American democracy to the level of religious fervor. The unquestioning acceptance of the 
notion that there is a passionate yearning for democracy, in all cultures, stems from a lack 
of critical self-reflection in the Western countries about their history.  
 
The question that arises is whether the American style of a Democrat versus 
Republican conception of liberty would be applicable in the third world context. In the 
Searlean sense, America is a word to world fit. Searle claims that there are two kinds of 
word-world relation. One is the word to world fit and the other is the world to word fit. In 
the former, there is a pre-understanding of the meaning of words while in the latter the 
meaning emerges with the usage. Searle argues that assertive sentences have ‘word to 
world’ direction of fit while directives have ‘world to word’ fit.11 India is a world to word 
fit. In spite of a specific agenda of liberty for all enshrined in the American Constitution, 
women’s and minority suffrage has taken almost two hundred years after independence to 
fructify. The deliberative process was completely unable to convince the American 
people of the abominable practice of racism and discrimination. Civil War was required 
to abolish slavery in America.  
 
                                                 
11 John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An essay in the Philosophy of Language, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. Also refer to Barry Smith. Ed. John Searle, Buffalo: SUNY Press, 2003. p. 9. 
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In the third world, the Indian caste system and the denial of women’s rights were 
the two most atrocious inhumane practices. Gandhi consistently advocated the abolition 
of caste system and the liberation of women in India.12 Most of the contemporary 
political theorists neglect the failure of the deliberative process, which was guaranteed to 
represent the grievances of the people even in an advanced liberal democracy such as 
America. Joshua Cohen’s idea of associative democracy is laudable for its emphasis on 
the role of civil society in informing decisions of the government pertaining to social 
issues. Even in Cohen’s theory, there is a tacit assumption about the common goals of the 
government and the people of a country. Both the government and the people work in 
tandem to address social issues. Pluralism in the Western context, more often that not, 
means pluralism of individual ideas. Since democratic ideals have permeated the West 
and people believe in the political process, pluralistic ideas are channeled through the 
Congressional process of representation. But, a country such as India which is not only 
pluralistic in terms of individual opinion but also in terms of multi-lingual, multi-ethnic, 
and multi-religious population which has inherited problems bequeathed over several 
millennia cannot perform an epoche and adhere to a deliberative-associative 
democracy.13 In this context, Habermas cites Jaspers. “To understand each other through 
ciphers implies a form of communication in contact with the transcendent. Here the most 
intimate tie can be accompanied by the most remarkable hostility.”14 Jaspers also further 
                                                 
12 Please refer to the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi published by the Mahatma Gandhi Foundation, 
India.  
13 Joshua Cohen, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” Ed. Seyla Benhabib, Democracy 
and Difference, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.  
14 Jürgen Habermas, The Liberating Power of Symbols, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. p. 39. 
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explores whether a maximal shared framework of understanding heterogeneous faiths 
possible.  
 
In the context of affirmative action as a cultural reparation to the blacks in the 
United States, Nathan Glazer’s critique of affirmative action as reverse colonization is a 
denial of the history of the evolution of the social self of America. Is it a form of 
psychological escapism instead of encountering the past? Glazer’s critique attempts to 
scuttle the process of cultural sublimation of the American self.15 Glazer’s analysis of the 
emergence of ethnic group politics in the form of affirmative action extended to native 
Americans, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and Pacific Islanders as contravening the ideal of a 
non-ethnic and non-religious America. Glazer’s analysis appears very incisive until one 
compares the evolution of American democracy and the discordant notes that emanate 
between the words enshrined in the Constitution of America and the stark reality of 
slavery and racial discrimination. Here, once again the clash between consequentialism 
and deontology come to the fore. Glazer emphasizes a turning away from the sanguine 
past of America.  
 
For the people who did not suffer the oppression of slavery and discrimination, 
much is not lost as a result of turning away from the past by declaring equality of 
opportunities for all. But for those who have to turn away from a horrid past, the future 
hopes always remind them of the horrors of the past. The present is a distant dream since 
                                                 
15 Ronald Takaki, Ed. Debating Diversity, Oxford University Press, 2002. Refer to Nathan Glazer, “The 
Emergence of an American Ethnic Pattern.” 
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they are haunted by the past.16 What Glazer suggests is not a catharsis for the people who 
were oppressed but even more repression that would only indelibly scar the analysands 
perpetually and turn them into psychopaths or socio-paths. One of the reasons why 
America did not become another Algeria or South Africa was because of the democratic 
institutions that allowed a sliver of hope to filter into the psyche of the blacks.  
 
Glazer’s espousal of an anti-affirmative action stance has some merits. There are 
abuses of affirmative action policies and because of deontological emphasis on 
affirmative action the consequential import of affirmative action policies as a privilege 
are construed as rights. Demands of reparations and other retrospective corrective 
measures create a fiasco. Glazer concedes that the political rhetoric of the founding 
fathers of America has not been honored with action as witnessed in the denial of 
women’s suffrage and continuation of slavery after 1776. But Glazer’s approach neglects 
historical atrocities committed on the black people and the native Indians. The American 
dream of an egalitarian state is the ideal that is to be coveted and defended and the 
perversions of this ideal must not be mistaken as a purposive activity, according to 
Glazer. Glazer also claims that since slavery and other acts of discrimination happened 
not with an underlying deliberate teleology, affirmative action as a purposive corrective 
measure is remiss of the non-partisan role of the government in encouraging an action 
aimed at the advancement of the minority ethnic groups in America. Ethnic minorities 
who were discriminated against thus far must be declared free to pursue their dreams in 
                                                 
16 In status societies, prevalent philosophies emphasize a type of fatalistic determinism in explaining the 
present plight of people. In such societies, the philosophy of present and future are ineluctably intertwined 
with the philosophy of the past. Such a philosophy effectively maintains the status quo. An example would 
be the caste system in India.  
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the same way as other Americans. Glazer cleverly separates economic affirmative action 
as distinct from political discrimination. Glazer claims that since political and ideological 
discrimination were perpetrated on the blacks and other minorities, a restoration of the 
political rights would alleviate the problem of discrimination.  
 
On the surface, Glazer’s proposition is attractive. Glazer’s suggestion is passable 
as a liberal theory sans Rawls’ difference principle and definitely supports Nozick’s 
‘night watchman state.’ But what Glazer fails to mention is that the manifestation of 
ideological deprivation is not only in the political realm. Ideological oppression is a 
malnourishment of cultural, social, political, economic, and healthy individual 
development. By denying the basic necessities of human life, the growth of the oppressed 
people is stunted which is in turn used as a tool of justification for their under-
development, thereby justifying more repression. Cultural repression is a human rights 
violation.  
 
For a more natural evolution and justification of the institution of slavery, Glazer 
needs to compare slavery in America with Indian caste-system. It is interesting to 
compare the history of the United States and the history of India. One can cite thousands 
of glorious verses from the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Bhagawad Gita, Buddhist and 
Jain canons and other philosophical, religious, and literary works about the ecumenical 
strands of Indian philosophy.17 In the Bhagawad Gita, Lord Krishna goes as far to say 
                                                 
17 A.L. Basham, The Wonder that was India, New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 1999. 
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that a liberated soul must not discriminate between a man, a dog or an untouchable.18 
Does this mean that the general Indian population is to be likened to a Yogi? On the 
contrary, the emphasis on the liberated soul affirms the discriminatory nature of ordinary 
citizens. On the other hand, Habermas concedes that Western tradition, especially the 
institution of religion, has not been fair towards other religions.  
 
Multiculturalism in America is to be viewed in terms of enrichment of social 
mosaic and the American populace must become willing participants in making America 
a cultural melting pot. A multi-cultural democracy is the tottering first step towards 
becoming a cultural melting pot. Glazer is correct in arguing that the non-ethnic character 
of America has contributed to a sense of freedom to multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
population that were allowed into America in greater numbers after 1965. But what 
Glazer did not take into account is that America is not an isolated continent. America has 
a foreign policy and also makes decisions with regard to its relationship with other 
countries, which would have good or bad consequences.  
 
An America that encourages possessive individualism in the garb of freedom and 
simplifies ethnicity in terms of exotic cuisines, attires, cultural artifacts, and few catchy 
phrases will not be able to utilize the cultural advantages that accrue out of being a multi-
cultural democracy. What Glazer in a catchy phrase calls ‘salutary neglect’ of cultural 
politics but not of ethnic-cultural freedom to run schools, religious institutions, and 
indulge in cultural activities has been advantageous and disadvantageous at once for 
                                                 
18 The Bhagawad Gīta, Trans. Jayadayal Goenka, Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 1996. Ch. 5. 
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America. The advantage of American politics and not cultural-ethnic politics has kept the 
focus on the American dream. On the other hand, disruptive features of ethno-cultural 
politics have always been outside the American cultural paradigm, which has led to a 
fragmented foreign policy. Because of a flawed social epistemological framework that 
encourages avoidance and tolerance of other cultures and not constructive engagement, 
the American intelligentsia and the government reveled in the self-congratulatory nature 
of the American dream and failed to recognize the gathering danger outside the American 
continent. The World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks on the 11th of September were a 
stark reminder for all countries to sincerely engage their cultural minorities socially and 
politically. Cultural interaction must be facilitated between people at all levels: between 
nations and between communities. Only when people recognize others as socially 
embedded with similar concerns in their lives in all cultures will there be a genuine 
interaction. Only a cooperative action among various cultures can facilitate multi-cultural 
understanding.  
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